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 See Part III



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD SAVINGRAM**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

258

*File 181/4/4*

:CM

I.17037

Dated: 6th July, 1961

Rec'd: 7th July, 1961

FROM:

Australian High Commission,  
OTTAWA

SAV 75 CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Washington Sav 49, U.N. New York Sav.51,  
London Sav. 97, Cairo Saving 1.  
Tel Aviv Saving 1.

Arab Refugees.

During talks Hay and I had with Canadian External Affairs officers they raised the question of Arab Refugees and of putting further pressure on both the Arabs and Israel. In the case of the Arabs they thought we might threaten to cease financial support for the refugees if some progress was not made. In the case of Israel, support might be given to President Kennedy's idea that Israel should offer to take a token of 10% off the Arab Refugees. The Canadians thought that if such an offer were made, most of the refugees would refuse to take it up and perhaps not more than 15,000 would choose to go back to Israel.

2. I said that Arab Refugees would be a major item at the next session of the General Assembly. I had heard that the Americans were thinking of having a mission sent to the Middle East by the Palestine Conciliation Commission but I had not been able to discover any proposed terms of reference and doubted whether the Americans themselves had worked out anything precise. The Canadians said they had the same impression.

3. I said I expected things to continue much the way they were at present. The basic difficulty was that the Arabs refused to accept the very existence of the state of Israel and there seemed no early prospect of changing this. I expressed scepticism about the possibility of a financial threat having any effect though it might be worth trying as a tactical form of pressure. The Arabs knew that whatever we might say, we were unlikely to withdraw a financial contribution. I also had considerable sympathy for Israel in resisting an influx of Arabs. They would be a fifth column of considerable size. Moreover, they could not be given all the human rights that we looked for in a modern state because in the present state of virtual siege

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*PA*

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD SAVINGRAM

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:CM

I.17037

-2-

Israel could not be expected to allow Arabs to move about freely in all places or to have all offices of state open to them.

4. One of the Canadians suggested that even so it might be worth Israel's while to make a gesture. If an offer were made but accepted by only a few refugees, Israel would be in a much stronger tactical position in the United Nations. I expressed disagreement with this.; the Arabs would have no difficulty in getting round this problem. They would say that the offer had not been taken up because of its terms or because the Arabs knew what treatment they would get in Israel if they returned.

Plimsoll.

MIN & DEPT E.A.

10th July, 1961

SEC A/Ss UM@ ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME  
E AF ME@ INF IC

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256

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Embassy,  
AUSTRALIAN ~~LEGATION~~  
TEL AVIV.

In reply quote No. 230.5

Memorandum No. 249

6th July, 1961.



*File 181/4/4*


The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

ARAB REFUGEES.

From conversations I have had with officials and others on the Arab refugee problem in recent days, I feel that there is a growing mood of depression in Israel about the outcome of the forthcoming General Assembly debate on the Arab refugees. This derives principally, of course, from the attitude of the United States Government, but also derives in part from the very unfavourable reception which Mr. Ben-Gurion appears to have received on the occasion of his recent visit to the United Kingdom Prime Minister. Public opinion here has now come to the conclusion that Israel is going to be forced to yield somewhat from its present position and will have to accept at least the principle of the return to Israel of such Arab refugees as may wish to come. No political party would agree to accept such retraction before the elections, which are to be held next month, as there is general hostility to the reception of any Arabs whatever in Israel territory.

2. The security problem is the leading consideration but not far behind it is the capacity to receive an influx of any number of refugees. The flow of Jewish immigrants from elsewhere is, if anything, increasing slightly at present. Facilities for their reception, particularly housing and suitable employment, are becoming increasingly tighter as the funds for these objectives fall behind requirements. Resistance will therefore be stubborn.

*Copy to U.N. branch*

  
(J.M. McMillan)  
Ambassador.

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File 181/4/4  
255

Extract from AP. Lamingham No. 73. of 26.6.61.

[Guidance on preliminary views  
in Department on probable items  
for Agenda of UNGA - 1961]

20. PALESTINE REFUGEES

The whole question of future arrangements for Palestine refugees is due to come up for discussion at the XVth Session and the Palestine Conciliation Commission is required by a resolution adopted at XVth Session to report not later than 13th October on its efforts to secure implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 which resolved that all refugees who wished to be repatriated should be permitted to return to their homes and instructed the P.C.C. to facilitate this.

We expect the United States as the major contributor to the refugee relief programme to make the running on this item. Our own thinking is still at a preliminary stage. We would be interested in any suggestions of a new approach to the problem which we regard as one of the keys to progress in the Middle East.

RA  
181/4/4



Telephone Nos. 28190  
28663



Australian Embassy  
35, Sharia el Kasr el Aali,  
Garden City,  
Cairo.

In reply quote No. 221/5/20

Memorandum No. 344

16th June, 1961.

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
CANBERRA.

*Recorded  
Re. - file on  
18/6/61  
and RTI  
RHS  
M.E. (97)*

U.A.R. : THE PALESTINE PROBLEM - PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S  
LETTERS

Please refer to our previous memorandum No. 303 of 31st May, 1961.

2. In paragraph 9 of our memorandum under reference, we advised that President Kennedy of the United States had addressed letters to several of the heads of state of Arab governments in which, among other things, he touched on the problem of reaching a just settlement of the Palestine refugee problem. A summary of his letter to President Nasser has now been issued in the press of 16th June:-

"President Kennedy said he believed the Palestine problem was a difficult one, involving deep emotional complications which could not be resolved easily and expeditiously.

In spite of this, President Kennedy said, the American government thought it was possible to find an honourable and human solution. He added that the United States government was prepared to make every effort and to shoulder any burden to bring about a settlement if this attitude on its part were to be welcomed.

He said the United States was ready to help find a solution to the tragedy of the Palestine refugees on the basis of repatriation or compensation for lost property. It was also ready to assist in working out a just solution to the problem of the Jordan River waters, he said.

The American President expressed his gratification that the United Nations General Assembly recently emphasised the necessity of a speedy implementation of its previous recommendations on the refugee problem.

He added that the United States attitude would always be based on support of the United Nations General Assembly resolutions concerning the refugees and that Washington would continue to interest itself in an honest implementation of those resolutions for the benefit of the refugees.

President Kennedy referred to his country's interest in the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission and to the possibility of activating it so that it may play a role in the tackling of the problem.

He said he did not know what specific steps the Commission could take, but he did know that the United States would be interested to see the Commission attempt to take effective action and hoped that the Commission would find full co-operation on the part of all concerned if and when it tried to do something for the protection and welfare of the Arab refugees.

*Copy to UN Arab*



253

- 2 -

President Gamal Abdel-Nasser's reply, which will be lengthy and detailed, will be sent to Washington as soon as it is completed. The U.A.R. Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Mustafa Kamel, will deliver it to the State Department."

*W. Mayne Wilson*

(W. Mayne Wilson)  
Secretary.



252  
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Embassy,  
AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION  
TEL AVIV.

In reply quote No. 230.5  
Memorandum No. 227

16th June, 1961.

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

ISRAEL AND THE ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM.

During my visit to Jerusalem yesterday, I talked with officials of the Foreign Ministry about recent developments affecting the Arab refugee problem. Perhaps partly because Mr. Lotan, now Head of the British Commonwealth Division, is less well-versed in these matters than his predecessor, Mr. Liveran, or perhaps because the Ministry itself is in a state of some confusion on the question, I was not able to obtain a very satisfactory statement of Israel's position in the light of recent American activity in the direction of promoting moves for peace in the Middle East. If anything, I would think that President Kennedy's reactions to Mr. Ben-Gurion's approach has disturbed the Israel Government. It is probably now coming to the realisation that it cannot continue to maintain its resistance to any modification of its policy. It is increasingly aware that Israel must make some concessions, even if they turn out to be largely nominal. This is no doubt causing a good deal of soul-searching which may be particularly embarrassing for the Foreign Minister herself in view of the many statements she has made. Israel claims to have made a number of concessions already, none of which have been matched by any move on the part of the Arabs.

2. Foreign Ministry officials with whom I talked still seem to be worried at the prospect of some enlargement of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. They are also concerned that some of the countries newly admitted to the United Nations will take positions unfavourable to Israel and will vote against Israel when the General Assembly debate comes on.

3. I told Mr. Lotan that I am always willing to give him the opportunity of telling me anything he wishes to pass on at any time regarding the Arab refugee question, and I think he appreciates the fact that Australia has always taken a direct interest in this question.


4. I am sending a copy of this memorandum to the Australian Embassy in Cairo, the Australian Embassy in Washington, the Senior External Affairs Officer, London, and to the Australian Delegation to the United Nations in New York.

*Copy to UN Branch.*  
  
(J.M. McMillan)  
Ambassador.

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Telephone Nos. 28190  
28663

  
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*File 181/4/4 251*  
Australian Embassy,

35, Sharia el Kasr el Aali,  
Garden City,  
Cairo.

221/5/20  
In reply quote No. 303  
Memorandum No.

31st May, 1961

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
CANBERRA.

U.A.R. : RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

The propaganda war has flared up again between Israel and the U.A.R. this month, stimulated apparently by a speech of Ben Gurion's on 17th May, in which he accused the Arab countries of committing a breach of the United Nations Charter by organising an economic boycott of Israel and by refusing to settle the dispute with Israel peacefully. He was also said to have accused the U.A.R. of violating the Constantinople Convention by excluding Israeli vessels from the Suez Canal. He said, too, that about 500,000 Arab inhabitants had emigrated from Israel and 500,000 Jews had come from the Arab countries, which was tantamount to an exchange of inhabitants between Jews and Arabs. Somewhat earlier, Mrs Golda Meir was also reported to have said at a news conference in Oslo that the only thing the Arab countries had given to the newly emergent African states was an anti-Israeli policy. She further said that Israel was willing to establish peace on the basis of the existing boundaries.

2. These two speeches provoked an outburst from the U.A.R. Director of Information, Abdel Kader Hatem, who declared it was not surprising to see the "leaders of the Zionist gangs resort to lies" in their official statements, and that Israel was not in a position to speak of violation of the U.N. Charter and resolutions in as much as she had, since 1948, deliberately brushed aside the World Organisation's Charter and decisions. On the question of the economic boycott, he said Ben Gurion's complaint and his talks of peace are part of a policy of misrepresentation of facts pursued by Israeli rulers to camouflage their aggressive intentions and conceal their begging for subsidies from foreign powers. Ben Gurion, he added, had no right to seek passage through the Suez Canal. All international conventions lay down the U.A.R.'s right to maintain the security of its waterway and "exclude the enemy from using it". On the cause of the Palestinian refugees he said that Ben Gurion had raised a new theory in the hope of stamping out their right to return to their usurped country. Finally, Dr Hatem said that "Israel, the imperialist stooge in the Middle East, wishes to mislead the world with its false call for peace. The Israeli Foreign Minister said that the only thing extended by the Arab countries to the new African states was hatred of Israel. As a matter of fact, hatred is the embodiment of Israeli policy, Israel's feigned interest in aiding African countries emanates from Israel's hatred, and is motivated by the desire to serve imperialistic interests". He then listed all the occasions in the past in which Israel had voted with the imperialists against Arab and African interests. Concluding his remarks, he said: "Her offer of peace

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250

- 2 -

with the Arab countries is like the attitude of a brazen faced thief who robs a house and dares to ask the owner to allow him to go in peace".

3. On 19th May, the press reported briefly that Radio Israel had made a long reply to Hatem, but had failed to answer a single point of Hatem's refutation of Israel's allegations. No details of the Israeli reply, however, were printed.

4. These exchanges have been accompanied by numerous editorials in the press, the general arguments being that Israel is starting to become panicky at the rapid rate of development of the Arab countries, particularly the U.A.R., and that Israel's ability to resist the inevitable showdown with the Arab countries was daily being sapped by the disintegration of Israeli political life and the increasing economic difficulties which she was experiencing.

5. Perhaps the most significant of the articles on Israel to appear in the Cairo press were a series of three written by M.H. Heikal in Al Ahran on 5th, 12th and 19th May. In the first of these articles Heikal claimed that Israel was going through a "soul-searching moment". The Arabs were still a menace to her security, particularly since she was being faced by a Nasser and not a Farouk, while internally she was being faced with crises in her political, economic and social life - not to mention the scandals in the army and the security service. In the foreign policy field, "Israel's ambition to infiltrate into African countries, in a bid to bolster up its economy, has been dealt a devastating blow by the Casablanca Conference. On that occasion, the prominent leaders opened the eyes of the newly independent African states to the fact that Israel is being used as a tool of imperialism in its bid to replace former colonialist economic domination". Heikal then spoke of an Israeli plan to make concessions to the Arabs as a means of promoting a peace settlement with them, and declared: "However, I am in a position to declare, in the most categorical manner, that even these concessions will never induce Gamal Abdel Nasser to give up his resolve ... There is therefore no course open before Israel but to concentrate on reinforcing its war machinery so that it may force Abdel Nasser to give up his resolve ... There are indications that this policy, with U.S. assistance, will be pursued". The U.A.R., however, will not lose its resolve, nor will it lose its power in the face of increasing Israeli armament.

6. In his second article, Heikal stated that the real aim of the Arab revolution today is to acquire intrinsic force for the Arabs. This force, when fully realised, will afford the effective means whereby Israel's aggressions may be thwarted. The defeat of the Arabs by Israel in 1948 was not a defeat for these nations but a defeat for the systems of government in those nations. On their defeat, new revolutionary forces had been set in motion which could be thwarted. Imperialism had then tried to get the Arabs into military pacts 'by taking advantage of the Israel danger myth', but most of these countries refused. The imperialists then refused to allow the Arabs to buy arms from them. Heikal said that "the clash (between Israel and the Arabs) is inevitable", although it would not be started by the Arabs. Israel feels that if it were to delay that inevitable armed clash, the march of development in the U.A.R. at the present pace would

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249  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

- 3 -

completely frustrate its hopes. Israel cannot afford to wait. Her only hope for survival is to act as an imperialist base and serve the interests of imperialism, in return for which she would seek their support for her defence. Heikal estimates that the conflict between Israel and the Arabs will break out within five years.

7. In his third article, Heikal devoted most of his time to criticising the Arabs for their wasteful and extravagant use of their most valuable asset, oil. The time had come, he said, when the proceeds from this asset should be diverted into building up the potentialities of the Arab world to resist and wipe out Israeli aggression, instead of being exploited for the benefit of foreign countries. One could not escape the feeling from reading his article, however, that the real target of his attack was not so much Israel as the oil barons themselves. Some observers here believe that this article contains within it the expression of a more socialistic trend in U.A.R. thinking, that the U.A.R. Government may in fact be sharpening their knives for their own decadent brothers under the pretext of saving them from the wicked "Zionist gangs".

8. It seems clear from all this that there is little likelihood of any peaceable settlement being reached between Israel and the Arab states at the present time. The American Government's stated hopes of achieving a settlement in the near future through some type of compromise formula on the matter of territory and compensation for the Palestinian refugees have encountered outspoken opposition here even before the proposals have been made public. Al Gomhouria reported that the Saudi Minister of State, Ahmed El-Shukeiry, had said that "the American Government will advance proposals which are will describe as constructive political plans for withholding aid to U.A.R., A. and advancing international loans to Israel to enable her to pay compensation to Arabs who come forward with their claims for compensation". In view of the many pronouncements here that the Arabs will never abandon their claims to the Palestinian homeland, there seems little prospect for success for these alleged plans.

9. The most recent development in the field, however, has been the despatch of letters from President Kennedy to King Saud, and the reference by King Saud of this letter to other Arab states for comment before making a reply. Letters have also been exchanged between President Kennedy and President Nasser. It is quite possible that these exchanges of letters are directly concerned with the Arab-Israeli question. President Kennedy's letters have not been rejected outright, but it would be an achievement indeed if he could engineer a settlement of the Palestine issue at the present time.

(W. Wayne Wilson)  
Secretary

**CONFIDENTIAL**





Telephone Nos. 28190  
28603

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248  
70181/4/4  
Australian Embassy,  
35, Sharia el Kasr el Aali,  
Cairo City,  
Cairo.

In reply quote No. 221/5/2  
Memorandum No. 303

31st May, 1961

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
CANBERRA.

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246

- 3 -

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(W. Wayne Wilson)  
Secretary



721 181/4/4 245  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD SAVINGRAM

SECRET

:EHB

I.14214

Date: 5th June, 1961

2142

Rec'd: 6th June, 1961

1700

(via Leased-Line)

FROM:

Australian Embassy,  
WASHINGTON.

SAV 676 SECRET

Copy U.N. New York, Ottawa, London, Tel Aviv and Cairo.

ISRAEL-BEN GURION'S VISIT.

Israel/Lebanon Desk Officer (Crawford) said on 5th June that following questions were raised at meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ben Gurion on 30th May (Kennedy was accompanied by Talbot, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs and Feldman, Deputy Special Counsel in the White House who is President's Chief Adviser on Jewish Affairs).

(1) Israel is Atomic Energy Potential. President Kennedy referred to public speculation regarding Israel's atomic energy potential and requested clarification of Israel's intentions, in view of fact that in Arab minds, U.S.A. was closely identified with Israel on this issue. Ben Gurion said that U.S.A. have absolute faith in Israel's public assurances that atomic energy was being developed only for peaceful purposes. He said that Israel had consulted scientists of international repute regarding atomic energy as source of power, which interested Israel, particularly in regard to desalination of water. President Kennedy reiterated concern of U.S.A. that there should be no proliferation of atomic weapons, and that U.S.A. would use its weight to prevent this. Ben Gurion renewed his assurances in this regard.

(2) Middle East Arms. Ben Gurion voiced concern at arms build-up in Arab countries, particularly supply of Soviet arms to U.A.R. President stated very forcibly United States hopes that disputes in Middle East should be solved by peaceful means.

(3) Palestine Refugees. President pointed out that U.S.A. was committed to support of U.N. resolutions on refugee questions, including efforts of P.C.C. which was required to present report to next United Nations General Assembly. Crawford said President did not spell out United States thinking at great length, as future action by P.C.C. was still "in the mill". Ben Gurion was non committal and did not appear optimistic that Arabs would respond to any effort made by Israel to break the "log jam" on refugee questions. (But see paragraph 4 below).

(4) Great Power Guarantee. Ben Gurion thought a "hands off" agreement between Soviet Union and U.S.A. on Middle East might be useful and wondered whether President Kennedy would find occasion to take this up with Premier Krushchev. President was noncommittal and said that meeting with Krushchev would not deal with specific

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD SAVINGRAM

244  
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2.

I.14214

questions such as this. Crawford said that President intended to be discouraging regarding great power guarantee, which would, of course, cut across U.N. resolutions on Middle East.

2. At the conclusion of meeting, President summed up by saying that U.S.A. was very much concerned with the welfare of all Middle East states, was grateful for Ben Gurion's assurances on atomic energy development and stressed the need for something positive to be done on subject of refugees.

3. Following the Kennedy-Ben Gurion meeting, a statement by Ben Gurion appeared in press on 2nd June to effect that U.S.A. and Israel had reached agreement on refugee problem (see our savingram 667). Crawford surmised that Ben Gurion had pondered President's firm exposition of necessity to take action on refugees and had reckoned on sabotaging United States efforts by proclaiming U.S.A.-Israel agreement, which would be certain to inflame the Arabs. Crawford said that in view of Ben Gurion's mis-construction of conversation with Kennedy, State Department had hastened to issue a strong public rebuttal at noon on 2nd June, text contained in our Savingram 677. State Department had also called in all Arab Ambassadors on evening of 2nd June and Assistant Secretary Talbot had given them a frank and accurate account of Kennedy's conversation with Ben Gurion about refugees and stressed that no agreement had been made by two leaders.

4. Regarding effect of visit, Crawford said that overshadowing of Ben Gurion's visit by Kennedy's impending departure for Europe had suited U.S.A., which had wanted as little publicity as possible, but had undoubtedly lessened advantages Israel had hoped to get from visit. Crawford thought Israelis might be regretting their eagerness in forcing a meeting on U.S.A., although, of course, Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting had not been arranged when their plans were laid. Crawford considered that from Israeli side Ben Gurion's visit had had a useful effect on the Bond drive and would probably do Ben Gurion some good internally. As against this, Crawford thought that Ben Gurion's tactics on refugee discussions, which had forced a public rebuttal by U.S.A., was another sign of his gradual loss of tactical sagacity. Although Ben Gurion would return to Israel assured of United States friendship, he would also be aware of the U.S.A.'s determination to follow through on a matter distasteful to Israel, viz. the refugee question.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
A/ MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE  
J.I.C.  
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
MIN. I/C A.A.E.C.

7th June, 1961

SEC A/Ss UN ER COMREL PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA  
E.A.F&ME E AF ME@ INF DL IC

POSTS: COLOMBO KARACHI NEW DELHI WELLINGTON

SECRET

National Archives of Australia

NAA: A1838, 181/4/4 PART 2



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper

*Times*

File No.

*181/4/4*

Published at

*Canberra*

Date

*6. 6. 61*

to acclaim success in the early rounds.

## Gaza Strip Is Aided By New Organisation

CAIRO (Associated Press).—An unprecedented £225,000 economic development aid project for Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip has been inaugurated officially.

Richard Reuter, board chairman and executive director of the American-Canadian Relief Organisation, came to Cairo to launch the project.

Linking with the United Arab Republic's plan to "make Gaza green," CARE has provided equipment, including two water pumps and a mobile X-ray van that already are functioning in the Gaza Strip.

The pumps are gushing fresh water through pipes to the 60,000 residents of Gaza.

Poor pumping and distribution cause diseases among the town's refugees.

Twenty-five irrigation pumps are being installed to start a project for reclaiming hundreds of acres of now sandy land.

On the land where the earliest pages of history were written, Arab refugee families will be given work in the farming they know so well.

Electric generators, transformers and cable will give Gaza town a new high-tension electric system, a prerequisite for the strip's industrial development.

Factories for textiles, furniture, soap, rugs and many other products either are established by the U.A.R. administration or are planned.

More vital industrialisation will now find strong power to turn its wheels.

A mobile chest X-ray unit will help solve Gaza's crippling health problem, tuberculosis.

To detect T.B. cases early, the Gaza administration asked CARE to supply the X-ray unit. T.B. now can be weeded out of the crowded camps for treatment before their coughing spreads the germ.

CARE, a non-profit, non-governmental, non-political relief co-operation, began its Gaza operations in 1955 by sending agricultural commodities such as flour, milk powder, corn, beans, etc., to 60,000 economic refugees.

Without U.A.R. and CARE food aid, the refugees would have remained destitute.

About £250,000 in CARE food and equipment has gone into Gaza since 1955.

The food aid will continue, but CARE and the refugees hope that by the economic development schemes worked out by the Gaza administration more refugees will be able to stand on their own feet economically.

CARE was founded in 1945 by several service groups, religious organisations and labour unions to send food to war ravaged Europe.

With Europe reconstructed, CARE shifted its emphasis to Africa, Asia and Latin America.



## INWARD SAVINGRAM

26 181/4/4 242  
SECRET

:EHB

I.14214

Date: 5th June, 1961

2142

Rec'd: 6th June, 1961

1700

(via Leased-Line)

FROM:

Australian Embassy,  
WASHINGTON.SAV 676 SECRET

Copy U.N. New York, Ottawa, London, Tel Aviv and Cairo.

ISRAEL-BEN GURION'S VISIT.

Israel/Lebanon Desk Officer (Crawford) said on 5th June that following questions were raised at meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ben Gurion on 30th May (Kennedy was accompanied by Talbot, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs and Feldman, Deputy Special Counsel in the White House who is President's Chief Adviser on Jewish Affairs).

(1) Israel is Atomic Energy Potential. President Kennedy referred to public speculation regarding Israel's atomic energy potential and requested clarification of Israel's intentions, in view of fact that in Arab minds, U.S.A. was closely identified with Israel on this issue. Ben Gurion said that U.S.A. have absolute faith in Israel's public assurances that atomic energy was being developed only for peaceful purposes. He said that Israel had consulted scientists of international repute regarding atomic energy as source of power, which interested Israel, particularly in regard to desalination of water. President Kennedy reiterated concern of U.S.A. that there should be no proliferation of atomic weapons, and that U.S.A. would use its weight to prevent this. Ben Gurion renewed his assurances in this regard.

(2) Middle East Arms. Ben Gurion voiced concern at arms build-up in Arab countries, particularly supply of Soviet arms to U.S.S.R. President stated very forcibly United States hopes that disputes in Middle East should be solved by peaceful means.

(3) Palestine Refugees. President pointed out that U.S.A. was committed to support of U.N. resolutions on refugee questions, including efforts of P.C.C. which was required to present report to next United Nations General Assembly. Crawford said President did not spell out United States thinking at great length, as future action by P.C.C. was still "in the mill". Ben Gurion was non committal and did not appear optimistic that Arabs would respond to any effort made by Israel to break the "log jam" on refugee questions. (But see paragraph 4 below).

(4) Great Power Guarantee. Ben Gurion thought a "hands off" agreement between Soviet Union and U.S.A. on Middle East might be useful and wondered whether President Kennedy would find occasion to take this up with Premier Khrushchev. President was noncommittal and said that meeting with Khrushchev would not deal with specific

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD SAVINGRAM

241  
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I.14214

questions such as this. Crawford said that President intended to be discouraging regarding great power guarantee, which would, of course, cut across U.N. resolutions on Middle East.

2. At the conclusion of meeting, President summed up by saying that U.S.A. was very much concerned with the welfare of all Middle East states, was grateful for Ben Gurion's assurances on atomic energy development and stressed the need for something positive to be done on subject of refugees.

3. Following the Kennedy-Ben Gurion meeting, a statement by Ben Gurion appeared in press on 2nd June to effect that U.S.A. and Israel had reached agreement on refugee problem (see our savingram 667). Crawford surmised that Ben Gurion had pondered President's firm exposition of necessity to take action on refugees and had reckoned on sabotaging United States efforts by proclaiming U.S.A.-Israel agreement, which would be certain to inflame the Arabs. Crawford said that in view of Ben Gurion's mis-construction of conversation with Kennedy, State Department had hastened to issue a strong public rebuttal at noon on 2nd June, text contained in our Savingram 677. State Department had also called in all Arab Ambassadors on evening of 2nd June and Assistant Secretary Talbot had given them a frank and accurate account of Kennedy's conversation with Ben Gurion about refugees and stressed that no agreement had been made by two leaders.

4. Regarding effect of visit, Crawford said that overshadowing of Ben Gurion's visit by Kennedy's impending departure for Europe had suited U.S.A., which had wanted as little publicity as possible, but had undoubtedly lessened advantages Israel had hoped to get from visit. Crawford thought Israelis might be regretting their eagerness in forcing a meeting on U.S.A., although, of course, Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting had not been arranged when their plans were laid. Crawford considered that from Israeli side Ben Gurion's visit had had a useful effect on the Bond drive and would probably do Ben Gurion some good internally. As against this, Crawford thought that Ben Gurion's tactics on refugee discussions, which had forced a public rebuttal by U.S.A., was another sign of his gradual loss of tactical sagacity. Although Ben Gurion would return to Israel assured of United States friendship, he would also be aware of the U.S.A.'s determination to follow through on a matter distasteful to Israel, viz. the refugee question.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
A/ MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE  
J.I.C.  
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
MIN. I/C A.A.E.C.

7th June, 1961

SEC A/Ss UN ER COMREL PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA  
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POSTS: COLOMBO KARACHI NEW DELHI WELLINGTON

SECRET

National Archives of Australia

NAA: A1838, 181/4/4 PART 2



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD SAVINGRAM

240  
file 181/4/4

SRG

I. 14215

Dated: 5th June, 1961  
1604

Rec'd: 6th June, 1961  
1702

Via leased line

FROM:

Australian Embassy,  
WASHINGTON.

Sav. 677.

UNCLASSIFIED.

Copy Australian Mission to United Nations, New York,  
Ottawa, London, Tel Aviv, and Cairo.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

Our Savingram 667.

State Department spokesman made following statement  
on 2nd June in reply to a question regarding reported "agreement"  
between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ben Gurion on refugee  
question.

Begins:

"On 10th May the United Nations Conciliation Commission  
for Palestine issued a communique reporting that it had met that  
day to consider steps which could usefully be taken in the fulfilment  
of its responsibilities pursuant to General Assembly Resolution  
1604 (X) of 21st April, 1961, and relevant previous resolutions.  
These resolutions envisage the solution of the Palestine refugee  
problem through Repatriation or compensation.

The United States Government has consistently  
supported these resolutions and will fully support moves made by  
the Commission in accordance with them. Now, in their brief informal  
meeting in New York, President Kennedy raised with Prime Minister  
Ben Gurion the subject of the tragic plight of the Arab refugees  
and stressed the importance of Israel's co-operating with such  
efforts as may be initiated by the F.C.C. Since the Commission's  
endeavours have not as yet taken precise form, and since in any  
case the responsibility lies with the parties directly concerned  
as they may be assisted by the United Nations Commission, the  
question of an understanding between the President and the Prime  
Minister as to a specific solution did not arise"

Ends.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
A/MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE  
J.I.C.

7th June, 1961

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239

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD SAVINGRAM

SRG

- 2 -

I. 14215

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AF ME@ INF DL MT IC

KARACHI NEW DELHI WELLINGTON



SECRET

## INWARD SAVINGRAM

File 181/4/4

GJW:HP

I.13558

FROM:

Dated: 24th May, 1961.

Rec'd: 30th May, 1961.  
(Via Leased Line)Australian Embassy,  
WASHINGTON.

Saving 632.

SECRET.Copy U.N. New York, Ottawa, London, Tel Aviv and Cairo.  
Israel.

Israel/Lebanon Desk Officer (Crawford) said on 23rd May that President Kennedy would hold brief meeting with Prime Minister Ben Gurion in New York on 30th May before Kennedy's departure for Paris.

2. Crawford told us in confidence that initiative for meeting had come from Israeli side and the United States had accepted with considerable reluctance. However, Ben Gurion's presence in Canada and United States political realities (there had undoubtedly been considerable pressure from influential political figures and friends of Israel which President Kennedy could not ignore) had forced the hand of the Administration.

3. Crawford referred to "New York Times" report from Lawrence Fellows date-lined Jerusalem 22nd May which listed following as likely topics Ben Gurion would raise with President:

- (i) Request to Kennedy to propose to Khrushchev a big power declaration recognising existing borders in Middle East: or failing that, that at least United States, U.S.S.R. and United Kingdom sign statement serving as a form of recognition of Israel's continued existence in Middle East.
- (ii) Soviet Bloc's supply of arms to Arab countries and Israel's willingness to subscribe to an arms embargo in the Middle East provided Israel first achieved parity.

4. Crawford thought above report could well be inspired and accurate speculation on kind of question Ben Gurion would raise, but it might also be part of Ben Gurion's advance "softening-up" process. Regarding (ii) above, he said the United States estimated that Israel's military capacity was still superior to Arabs' by 5:4 and that parity would be reached for two more years, exclusive of further Israeli build-up in the meantime.

5. Crawford considered real reasons behind Ben Gurion's visit to United States were:

- (1) Desire to evaluate new President and Administration at first hand. Crawford agreed with Tel Aviv's memorandum 185 that Israelis felt some concern at absence of any

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237  
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## INWARD SAVINGRAM

-2-

I.13558

signs of a sympathetic attitude on part of new Administration towards Israel; or, as he put it, Israelis had found new Administration less responsive than they had expected from Presidential campaign. Feeling of unease and insecurity in Israel over series of events listed in our Saving 516 paragraph 5 (Israel's atomic reactor, Lavon affairs, Eichmann trial, etc.) undoubtedly contributed to Ben Gurion's desire to probe new Administration for himself. Crawford said the persistence of the "ghetto complex" compelled Israel to seek reassurance that it still held the love and protection of the United States.

(ii) Same series of events in (i) above had created problems with Israel's supporters abroad. Ben Gurion realised that the bond drive was slipping and he wished to see where he stood with various United States organisations supporting Israel, with whom he had been involved in controversy since his speech to World Zionist Federation last December and more recently over his joint statement on 30th April with leaders of the American Jewish Committee (a largely non-Jewish organisation) in which Ben Gurion declared that Israel would not interfere in internal affairs of Jewish communities abroad and that emigration of Jews to Israel was matter for their own discretion. Ben Gurion had blocked a censure motion in Israeli Cabinet on his actions, which his opponents saw as an attack aimed at power wielded by the World Zionist organisation and its executive arm, the Jewish Agency, but only at price of letters to other Jewish organisations backing down from joint statement with American Jewish Committee.

(iii) Its internal significance. Ben Gurion would calculate that his meeting with the President would be useful to him in his present political troubles at home, especially in this pre-election period. He would expect visit to demonstrate that he was still the man who was recognised as Israel's spokesman abroad.

5. Crawford said that although Ben Gurion's visit had been forced on the United States, it would nevertheless give United States opportunity to make certain things clear to Israel Government. The kind of thing that State Department hoped President would say to Ben Gurion were:

(i) Palestine Refugees. Urgent action was required in view of full debate on U.N.R.W.A. mandate which would take place at 16th General Assembly and 15th Assembly's decision calling for report by P.C.C. by 15th October. United States felt that Israel must co-operate in releasing the log-jam on refugee question created by both Arabs and Israelis. Although United States realised ultimate solution of the refugee problem lay in re-settlement, this could never be achieved without Israel's acknowledgment of refugees' rights to repatriation under the United Nations Declaration. (Further background on United States thinking on refugees question will follow.)

(ii) Atomic weapons. United States would impress on Ben Gurion opposition to the proliferation of atomic weapons and fact that this policy was as firmly held by present administration as the last.

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## INWARD SAVINGRAM

-3-

I.13558

(iii) Arab-Israel Relations. Israel must not take any provocative action to upset the delicate power balance in the Middle East. Israel had a vested interest in co-operating with the United Nations, whose frontier control bodies were an effective guarantee on Israel's independence.

We assumed Crawford had in mind repetition of the series of incidents listed in our Saving 367 (blatant Army rehearsals, Jerusalem independence parade, etc.) which had the appearance of being contrived to create conditions of an external threat in order to unify Israel internally.

6. Crawford emphasised that contents of preceding paragraph was highly speculative at this stage and should be treated as such.

7. Crawford said that Ben Gurion's visit was not an easy matter for United States, which was anxious to play it down as much as possible - the fact that meeting would take place in New York as President was on his way to emplane for Europe was a reflection of this. Israelis would make maximum capital out of meeting. However, President was a political realist who had to accept facts of Middle East situation and could not ignore the realities of Arab votes in the United Nations. Crawford said that Jerusalem press had got wind of letter from President to King Saud regarding Ben Gurion's visit. Letter had not been publicised by United States, but had sought to reassure King that United States would deal objectively with Middle East problems during Ben Gurion's visit. Similar letters had been sent to other Arab rulers and Crawford asked us to protect this information.

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Min. & Dept. External Affairs.  
A/Min. & Dept. Defence.  
J.I.C.

31st May, 1961.

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## INWARD SAVINGRAM

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235

SNG

I. 13540

76 181/4/4

Dated: 25th May, 1961

Rec'd: 30th May, 1961

FROM:

Australian Embassy,  
WASHINGTON.

Sav. 637.

SECRET.

Copy Australian Mission to United Nations, New York,  
Ottawa, London, Cairo, Tel Aviv.PALESTINE REFUGEES:

Our Savingram 632. Ben Gurion's visit to United States of America. By way of further background, Israel/Lebanon Desk Officer (Crawford) said on 24th May that State Department considered early action on refugees was imperative for following reasons:

- (a) Whole question of U.N.R.W.A. mandate was scheduled for discussion at 16th United Nations General Assembly.
- (b) Although Arabs' proposal for appointment of custodian of refugee property was not accepted at 15th Assembly, Arabs had supported proposal for report by Palestine Conciliation Commission and this was required by 15th October.
- (c) Congressional opinion. State Department believed that Senator Fulbright, motivated by genuine interest in welfare of refugees, was likely to threaten a progressive reduction of the U.S.A.'s appropriation for U.N.R.W.A. year by year as a means of putting pressure on Arabs and Israel to get together on refugee question. Fulbright saw present impasse as primarily due to selfish intransigence on both sides and considered State Department should take some initiative to break this impasse.

2. ( Crawford said the State Department itself saw refugee question as the greatest irritant in Arab-Israel relations and considered that whole Middle-East problem could best be tackled by first attacking specific issues, such as refugees, and that such an approach could pave the way, in say a decade, to possibility of an over-all settlement.

3. On refugee question, U.S.A. hoped that eventually solution could be reached along lines of basic United Nations resolutions giving refugees choice of repatriation or resettlement with compensation. Crawford said that obviously Israel would not

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD SAVINGRAM

234  
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- 2 -

I. 13546

readmit 1,000,000 refugees and the only real solution was resettlement, but U.S.A. felt that it was essential for the Arab-Israeli log-jam to be broken and for Israel, as a start, to accept the principle of repatriation. Crawford himself was not certain that Israel would oppose token repatriation of refugees, although present Israeli thesis was that solution of refugee problem depended on willingness of Arabs to achieve a political settlement with Israel. (See Australian Mission to United Nations Savingram 45.). He considered that Israel's agreement would depend on amount of pressure U.S.A. was prepared to put on Israel although he could not indicate at this stage how far the U.S.A. would go in this direction. This would be a high level decision.

4. Crawford said that State Department saw, in the support given by Arabs themselves for a report by T.C.C., a means of making a start on solution of refugee problem. T.C.C. had already met twice and had at least recognized that some action must be taken. Crawford said that an obvious first step was the despatch of a mission to determine the real as distinct from the propaganda attitudes of the countries involved. As the Arabs might suspect a trap in any findings made by the P.C.C., in view of its composition (France, Turkey, U.S.A.) a possible way out would be to associate some impartial figure of international appeal with the T.C.C.

5. Crawford said that refugee question was not one which could be solved by secret diplomacy. U.S.A. for its part would have to play it straight with both Arabs and Israel. U.S.A. had demonstrated this by President's letters to Arab rulers regarding Ben Gurion's visit. The desire of the U.S.A. to find a just and objective solution to refugee problem was one of the positive points which President had been able to make in those letters and one which should commend itself to Arabs.

6. Crawford said that above information, in particular that regarding the President's letters to Arab rulers, was highly classified by the State Department and he requested special care in its handling.

7. Saudi Arabia Desk Officer (Stockey) also referred, but in very guarded fashion, to President's letter to King Saud as one of a series, and considered letter might help to explain the mildness of Saudi reaction so far to Ben Gurion's visit.

8. Jordan Desk Officer (Walstrom) said that Jordan's reaction to visit had also been mild so far.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
A/MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE  
J.I.C.  
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
TREASURER & TREASURY

31st May, 1961

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD SAVINGRAM

233  
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- 3 -

I. 13540

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COLOMBO KARACHI NEW DELHI ROME TEL AVIV WELLINGTON

SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper

*London Times*

File No.

181/4/4

Published at

Date

21/1/61

ARAB DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY

Sir.—A remarkable undertaking run by Arabs for the benefit of the Arab refugees is in danger of having to close down. It is the Arab Development Society, a charitable non-profit-making organization in Jordan, whose work has drawn unstinted praise from United Nations relief officials and from the World Bank mission to Jordan, as well as from every journalist and private visitor who has seen it on the spot.

The A.D.S. was started through the energy and idealism of Musa Alami, a distinguished Palestinian Arab who was educated at Cambridge. Twelve years ago he put a handful of refugees to work in the Jordan valley, digging for water. Against the opinion of the experts he found water, and today on land which was barren throughout history there is a farm of 800 acres on which some of the best vegetables and fruit in the Middle East are grown.

This farm gives work to a large number of heads of families from the refugee camps, so that very many refugees benefit directly or indirectly from it. But its main value is that it provides revenue for the Society's Vocational Training Centre, which is established alongside and in which orphan refugee boys are boarded, educated, and given training in some trade as well as in modern methods of agriculture. Since its foundation over 400 boys have passed through the Centre and found jobs, many extremely good ones, and another 50 have gone on to higher education.

Now the Centre and farm face a financial crisis. The oil company which hitherto bought almost the entire produce of the farm have found themselves unable—for reasons unconnected with the Society—to continue buying. It may take more than two years for the Society to develop new markets and once again become self-supporting. Meanwhile the Centre must be kept going if the orphans are not to be sent away to the hopeless life of the refugee camps. This will cost at least £50,000 a year.

We think that we in Great Britain, with our past responsibility for Palestine and our many ties of friendship with the Arabs of Palestine and Jordan, should not allow this courageous enterprise to die. We are therefore appealing for a sum of £100,000 to be raised in the U.K. and remitted to the A.D.S. in Jordan to meet its immediate needs. Would all those who would like to participate kindly send their donations to the Manager, Barclays Bank Limited, 161, Euston Road, London, N.W.1, for the Arab Development Society, by cheque made payable to The Arab Development Society?

Yours faithfully,

CAMPBELL, ARCHBISHOP IN  
JERUSALEM.  
LESLIE SHEFFIELD.  
DULVERTON.  
T. S. R. BOASE.  
C. J. CHANCELLOR.  
FREYA STARK.  
ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE.

May 23.

*PA*





File 181/4/4

235

Embassy,  
AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,  
TEL AVIV.

In reply quote No. 230.5.1

Memorandum No. 175

5th May, 1961.

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

U.N.W.R.A.

During the course of my discussion yesterday with Mr. Liveran, head of the International Organisations Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I asked him for his assessment of the debate in the recently concluded General Assembly of the United Nations on the subject of U.N.W.R.A.

2. He said that the outcome could have been worse than it was, but that Israel was nevertheless uneasy because it was being asked to retreat from its established position. When the matter comes up for discussion in the next General Assembly, Israel is determined to adopt a completely firm and inflexible attitude. This is based on the reasoning that any yielding whatever will mean an undermining of the Israel position. The Government of Israel is well aware that there will be pressure on it, even from some of its closest friends, to show a conciliatory attitude and a mood for compromise. With all the goodwill in the world Israel cannot possibly do so on this issue.

3. Mr. Liveran commented that in the recent discussion, the Arabs had been able to say all that they wanted to without acceptance of the responsibility for the consequences. In the next debate, however, they should be faced squarely with the issue of what is to happen from that point on. They will have to make up their minds whether they want U.N.W.R.A. to continue for another five-year period, or whether they want it to be wound up. If they accept its continuance and particularly if the United States Government and the other contributing governments are prepared to continue to provide finance, the programme must be accepted in its entirety, in the form in which it is now operating. If the Arabs are not prepared to have U.N.W.R.A. continue for a further period, they will have to take upon themselves the responsibility for feeding the refugees or letting them starve. In this context, the question of whether the Arabs want the problem to continue as a running sore or whether they want it to be wound up is not necessarily the active issue in the debate.

4. I am sending a copy of this memorandum to the Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York.

*Mr. Hall* *Mr. G. ...*  
Original on 852/12/10

(J.M. McMillan)  
Ambassador.

*P.A.*



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper Mideast Mirror

File No. 181/4/4

Published at Lebanon

Date 29.4.61

UNITED STATES AND THE  
PALESTINE ISSUE

"Misunderstood," Says Envoy

JERUSALEM -- Mr. William Macomber, the United States ambassador to Jordan, addressed a press conference here on April 25 on the subject of America's attitude towards the Palestine issue, with particular reference to her vote last week against an Afro-Asian resolution at the United Nations concerning the rights of Palestinian refugees to the property left behind them in Israel.

The US envoy said that the general Arab reaction to America's negative vote had been caused by misunderstanding of the country's real viewpoint on the Palestine question, which was one in which she was profoundly interested. She had supported the UN resolution of 1948 which laid down that Israel should reinstate refugees willing to return to their homes in Palestine and compensate those who did not wish to do so.

Mr. Macomber went on to say that the United States considered that there were several current international issues, such as Laos, Cuba and the Congo, which must be resolved urgently. Raising the question of Palestinian refugees' property at the present juncture would be a waste of time, since the Palestine question as a whole would be brought before the UN General Assembly next September.

This, he declared, meant only that his government wished to postpone discussion on a subsidiary point until the next Assembly session - it did not mean that the United States was resolved not to support the refugees' rights to their property.

(The Afro-Asian resolution, which was defeated when it was put to the vote, called for a guarantee of the refugees' property rights and the establishment of appropriate and effective machinery to safeguard these rights.)



UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
LIMITED

A/RES/1604 (XV)  
24 April 1961

Fifteenth session  
Agenda item 26

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/On the report of the Special Political Committee (A/4734)/

1604 (XV). Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and  
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958 and 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959,

Noting the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period 1 July 1959-30 June 1960,<sup>1/</sup>

Noting with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

1. Notes with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has not yet been able to report progress on carrying out the task

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/4478).



entrusted to it in paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 1456 (XIV), and again requests the Commission to make efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and report thereon not later than 15 October 1961;

2. Directs attention to the precarious financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and urges Governments to consider to what extent they can contribute or increase their contributions so that the Agency can carry out its programmes;

3. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out the mandate of the Agency, and to the specialized agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees.

993rd plenary meeting,  
21 April 1961.



INWARD CABLEGRAM ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

181/4/4

TWMP:BMW

I.10217

Sent: 21st April, 1961.  
1845  
Rec'd: 22nd April, 1961.  
1528

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN.547. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Washington for information, London SAV.423,  
Ottawa SAV.431, Tel Aviv SAV.12, Cairo SAV.20.

Arab Refugees.

Our telegram 546.

Roll call vote on remainder of resolution recommended by special political committee began with Brazil. Canada's abstention was in line with previous intention of contributors and with its instructions but by the time the roll had reached the Netherlands Arab tactics of allowing solution to fail for want of a two-thirds majority were clear. Favourable votes of Australia and other remaining contributors were individually decided upon and of course designed to frustrate Arabs tactics.

2. Although the Arabs demanded procedural vote on various requests for separate votes they refrained from challenging (as they might well have done) the President's ruling that preambular paragraph 4 and operative paragraph 2 required two-thirds majority under Rule 85.

3. United States and Israel are well satisfied with the outcome some of the credit for which lied with French efforts with Brazzaville group who in committee had merely abstained in paragraph votes.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
A.G.'s DEPT.  
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M.'s

23rd April, 1961.

SEC A/Ss UNO ER COMREL PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA  
IAF&ME E AF MEO INF IC

CONFIDENTIAL



SAVINGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

181/4/4

AH:BMW

O.6189

Sent: 19th April, 1961.  
2234

TO:

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK. ...265

Repeated to:

Australian Embassy,  
WASHINGTON. ...SAV.119External Affairs Office,  
LONDON. ...SAV.EA.111Australian High Commission,  
OTTAWA. ...SAV.67Australian Embassy,  
TEL AVIV. ...SAV.9Australian Embassy,  
CAIRO. ...SAV.18CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 516.

Arab Refugees.

You may vote in favour of the latest United States proposal and should oppose the latest Arab draft.

2. We have seen a New Zealand cable which interprets United States proposals reported in your 473 and 474 as involving inscription of a separate item on agenda of 16th Assembly. We do not think this desirable and would hope that welfare of refugees could be considered along with question of mandate.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (850/12/10)  
A.G.'s DEPT.  
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M.'s

21st April, 1961.

SEC A/Ss LA UNO ER CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME  
E AF MEQ INF IC

CONFIDENTIAL

National Archives of Australia

NAA: A1838, 181/4/4 PART 2



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *NYT* File No. *181/4/4*  
Published at *PARIS* Date *19-4-61*

*me 19-4-61*  
**U.S. Loses in U.N.  
On Palestine Issue**

By KATHLEEN TELTSCH  
Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., April 18—An Arab-supported resolution that would have the General Assembly act to safeguard the "property rights" in Israel of Palestinian refugees was approved today.

The proposal was adopted by a vote of 47 to 19 in the Assembly's Special Political Committee over the opposition of the United States, Britain and Israel.

Twenty states abstained and thirteen were absent, which leaves doubt whether the controversial resolution will muster the two-thirds vote needed for final adoption by the Assembly.

The Arab countries, together with Asian, African and Communist-bloc nations, succeeded in defeating a mild United States proposal on aid to refugees that made no mention of

*Continued on Page 3, Column 5*

*me 19-4-61*  
**PALESTINE VOTE  
LOST BY THE U.S.**

*Continued From Page 1, Col. 5*

the disputed "property rights" provision.

The Arab delegations broke into applause when the United States proposal was rejected 31 to 30, with fifteen abstentions.

It was the first time in years that the United States had been defeated on the perennial issue of continuing aid to refugees displaced by the Palestine War in 1948. The United Nations provides aid to 1,000,000 of the refugees living in Arab countries, a program financed in the main by United States and British contributions.

The Arab-backed resolution would have no immediate impact but would inject the question of properties into future deliberations. It would have the next Assembly—which will meet this fall—consider means of safeguarding these "property rights." It did not define what they involve.

Arabs have contended that the refugees have a right to lands and holdings in Israel which they value at up to \$12,000,000,000, a figure usually regarded by outsiders as exaggerated.

**Israel Opposes Provision**

Israel has repeatedly expressed willingness to pay compensation to the refugees for losses, but has attacked the "property rights" provision as an effort by Arabs to stake a claim to whole villages as part of their determination to destroy Israel.

Israel contends also that it would be unthinkable for the United Nations to be asked to control lands within a sovereign state. This, she says, would open the floodgates to similar claims from 40,000,000 refugees in all parts of Asia and Europe who have suffered losses.

The position of the United States has been that the property element is new and controversial and should not have been included in what was intended as a routine procedure continuing aid for another year until the Assembly next reviews the program of the United Nations Relief and Work Agency.

In another development, Joseph Shields of Ireland urged that a new approach be made before the next Assembly and proposed creation of a compensation fund for Palestine refugees.

**Israel in 'Filibuster'**

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, April 18 — Israel has embarked on the rough equivalent of a filibuster in the Israeli-Jordanian Mixed Armistice Commission in an apparent effort to avoid condemnation for having massed tanks



Name of Paper *Times*File No. *181/4/4**ME*  
*225*Published at *London*Date *6. 4. 61*

# PALESTINE REFUGEES WHO HAVE NEVER BEEN TO PALESTINE

## NEW GENERATION OF STATELESS CHILDREN

From Our Middle East Correspondent

## BEIRUT

A picture of President Nasser covered almost the whole small wall, and on a bedside table beneath stood a radio set of respectable size. A baby was on the bed, while his mother, an Arab woman with almost rosy cheeks, stood barefoot alongside. The father, a pleasant-looking young Arab, offered a smiling welcome.

This was the room—the home—of one family of Palestine refugees in a camp outside Beirut. The walls were made from the sides of petrol drums straightened into rusty iron sheets. Such a detail is boring now to a world which does not know what to do about these refugees and has tired of hearing about them, but the other details—the picture of President Nasser, the radio and the baby—signify how the 13-year-old affair of the Palestine refugees is moving, and cannot be brushed aside.

The father was probably a boy of nine in the exodus from Palestine in 1948 and the mother a girl of six or seven. They were married 18 months ago and their baby boy was born in the camp. He is not a refugee by virtue of an event during his life, and the same has to be said of no fewer than 400,000 of the 1,125,000 who are counted as Palestine refugees in 1961. These 400,000 were born after the flight from the homeland. They have the status of refugees, but did not themselves become refugees.

## MARRIAGES DAILY

Marriages are taking place every day among the refugees, and each husband, whether his wife is a fellow refugee or not, has his family with him. Usually he lives in a camp, but sometimes he does not. Every year 35,000 babies are born of these marriages in the four "host" territories—the Gaza strip, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. If the next decade passes as the last has done, nearly all who will be called Palestine refugees will never have been in Palestine, having been born elsewhere.

These 35,000 newcomers every year, classified as they are as refugees, are not citizens of the countries of their birth, and they will on this account have the same handicaps in getting work as their relatives who were born in Palestine and left as adults or children. They will also be prey to the same disinclination to work, a factor which has to be faced among people living or growing up in idleness. Their numbers will constantly increase because births among the refugees outnumber deaths by four to one. They will be children and citizens of the United Nations only.

This is the situation of which the baby is a symbol. The picture of President Nasser, hanging in this and countless other refugee shelters, illustrates to whom the Muslims (and nine-tenths of the refugees are Muslim) look for rescue. The bold display of the portrait, though the man is head neither of the country from which the refugees came nor the country where they are sheltering, accentuates the apathy of the refugees. But if the years go by without the promised return, even President Nasser will begin to come down from the walls.

## RELATIVE COMFORT

The radio set, and also a refrigerator which could be seen in another dwelling, are signs of relative comfort in the mother

question: how badly off, in day-to-day terms, are the refugees? In spite of the shame of their circumstances, are they yet, by their resilience, creating comforts around them which persuade them almost into carrying on as they are—fed, cared for medically, and clothed largely by charity? Are they, in fact, better off than the squatters who belong to the countries to which they, the refugees, fled?

## NOT DESTITUTE

These are pertinent questions. Many shacks and squalid shelters have marred the Middle East since long before the Palestine refugees appeared. The people in them do not get the free flour, sugar, rice, and fats, to the total of 1,500 calories daily, which is the basic ration distributed by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (U.N.R.W.A.) and very few could show a radio set, a refrigerator or the electricity necessary to use these. They are living as they are through the apathy of others or their own apathy, or because it suits them to do so.

The refugees have not reached this stage of apathy yet, because most of them were not destitute or given to complete idleness in Palestine. According to official reports, about one-fifth at once found work in their new countries as skilled urban workers, but the farmers and unskilled workers who were the majority did not get work, because the countries where they took refuge had all the farm and unskilled labour needed. Nevertheless, in Lebanon today some unused land has been turned to fruit growing by Palestinians working for Lebanese owners, and an official in the Ministry of Agriculture said recently that Lebanon was fortunate that 300,000 Syrian and Palestinian agriculturists were filling the gap left by Lebanese drifting from the land to the towns.

## OCCASIONAL WORK

This last confession contrasts with the picture officially presented of the refugees being forbidden or unable to find employment. In the camps it is said that between a quarter and a third of the refugees who could work get occasional employment. As the Palestinians accept rates of pay lower than those given to Lebanese there is some demand for their services, even though, officially, employment of them, if they have not managed to become Lebanese citizens, is forbidden.

The Palestinians in Lebanon accept lower pay because of their plight, but also the help they get from the United Nations in rations makes it possible for them to do so. If their pay rises above stipulated levels, they lose their rations. Women who marry refugees do not, though they may live in camps, get rations.

Jordan, however, where one-third of the population fled from Palestine, and the Gaza strip, where there are two refugees to every person not so described, cannot possibly employ all the refugees, either openly or secretly, full-time or part-time. Because of this, and because 300,000 boys and girls have grown to maturity, who would not know how to work even if they returned to their parents' homes tomorrow, U.N.R.W.A. is trying to establish vocational training. This will enable a few to offer skills which no country can reject.

Training centres for boys are being opened in the countries which surround Israel, and one for girls in Jordan should be ready late next year. U.N.R.W.A.'s life is at present sanctioned until the middle of 1963 and probably will be extended; even if it is not, every one can see that the refugees' children need education and training for years to come. It is on this basis that plans are laid down, and the support of the United Nations General Assembly is



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19 April 1961

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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/SPANISH

Fifteenth session  
Agenda item 26

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND  
WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST

Report of the Special Political Committee

Rapporteur: Mr. Angel SANZ BRIZ (Spain)

1. In accordance with the request made in paragraph 21 of resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 and in paragraph 8 of resolution 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958, the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East submitted to the General Assembly his report for the year ending 30 June 1960.<sup>1/</sup>
2. At its 898th plenary meeting on 10 October 1960, the General Assembly decided to include the above item in the agenda of its fifteenth session, and at the 904th plenary meeting on 13 October, allocated the item to the Special Political Committee for consideration and report.
3. The Special Political Committee considered the question at its 199th to 214th meetings from 14 to 30 November 1960, at the 224th meeting on 19 December, and at its 246th to 254th meetings from 11 to 18 April 1961.
4. At the 199th meeting, the Chairman, with the consent of the Committee, invited the Director of the Agency to take a place at the Committee table. At the same meeting, a statement was made by the Director of the Agency.
5. At the 202nd meeting on 17 November, the Chairman drew the attention of the Committee to a letter from the representatives of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yemen

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/478).

61-11040

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P.A.



(A/SPC/48) requesting that a Palestinian Arab delegation composed of four persons be heard by the Committee. After some discussion, the Committee agreed to grant a hearing to the delegation in accordance with the procedure followed at previous sessions. With the consent of the Committee, Mr. Emile Ghory, a member of that delegation, made a statement at that meeting, and Mr. Izzat Tannous, another member, at the 212th meeting on 29 November.

6. At the 214th meeting on 30 November, the Committee concluded its general debate on the item and adjourned its consideration pending the submission of a draft resolution. At the 224th meeting on 19 December, the Chairman suggested that, since negotiations between interested delegations had not yet resulted in the formulation of a draft resolution, consideration of the item be postponed until a later date. This suggestion was approved without a vote, it being understood that the question would remain on the agenda of the fifteenth session for the consideration of any draft resolutions which might be submitted. In view of this decision, the representative of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East read a statement by the Director.

7. On 7 April, a draft resolution submitted by Afghanistan, Federation of Malaya, Indonesia, Pakistan and Somalia (A/SPC/L.61) was circulated. According to this draft resolution the General Assembly, inter alia, after noting with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) had not been effected and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continued to be a matter of serious concern, and recognizing the need to safeguard the property rights of the Arab refugees of Palestine, would: (1) note with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had not yet reported progress on carrying out the task entrusted to it in paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 1456 (XIV), and again request the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to make efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixteenth session; (2) recommend to the General Assembly at its sixteenth session the establishment of appropriate and effective machinery for safeguarding the property rights of the Arab refugees of Palestine; (3) direct

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attention to the precarious financial position of the Agency and urge Governments to consider to what extent they could contribute or increase their contributions so that the Agency could carry out its programmes; and (4) express its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out the mandate of the Agency, and to the specialized agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees.

8. At the 246th meeting on 11 April, when the Committee resumed consideration of this item the representative of Indonesia introduced the five-Power draft resolution which was amended to include in the first paragraph of the preamble references to the resolutions adopted at the thirteenth and fourteenth sessions (A/SPC/L.61/Rev.1).

9. At the 247th meeting on 12 April, the United States of America submitted four amendments (A/SPC/L.62) to the five-Power draft resolution:

(1) The third preambular paragraph of the five-Power draft resolution would be changed to read:

"Noting with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that therefore the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern."

(2) The final preambular paragraph would be changed to:

"Recognizing that the sixteenth General Assembly is to review the whole problem of the refugees ....".

(3) In operative paragraph 1, everything after the word "thereon" would be deleted and the words "not later than 15 October 1961" would be added.

(4) Operative paragraph 2 would be changed to read:

"Recommends to the General Assembly that at its sixteenth session primary consideration be given to the future welfare of the refugees themselves."

10. At the 248th meeting on 12 April, Iraq and Libya submitted sub-amendments (A/SPC/L.63) to the United States amendments (A/SPC/L.62). According to the

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Iraqi-Libyan sub-amendments, a final preambular paragraph would be added to the five-Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.61/Rev.1) to read:

"Recognizing that the General Assembly at its sixteenth session is to review the whole problem of the refugees".

Operative paragraph 2 of the five-Power draft resolution would be changed to read:

"Recommends to the General Assembly that at its sixteenth session primary consideration be given to the future welfare of the refugees themselves and that effective machinery for safeguarding the property rights of the Palestine Arab refugees be established."

11. At the 249th meeting on 13 April, the Philippines submitted an amendment (A/SPC/L.64) to the second preambular paragraph of the five-Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.61/Rev.1) to add the words "covering the period 1 July 1959 - 30 June 1960".

12. At the 252nd meeting on 17 April, the representative of the United States withdrew the United States amendment (A/SPC/L.62) to the five-Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.61/Rev.1), and at the same meeting submitted a new draft resolution (A/SPC/L.65), under the terms of which the Assembly would, inter alia, (1) note the annual report of the Director of UNRWA and commend to the particular attention of Governments his programme of vocational training; (2) note further that in accordance with paragraph 1 of the General Assembly resolution 1456 (XIV) the mandate of UNRWA was to be reviewed at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly; (3) express the belief that in its consideration of this item at the sixteenth session, careful consideration should be given to the future welfare of the refugees themselves, including the safeguarding of their rights set forth in resolution 194, paragraph 11, to repatriation or compensation for properties left behind.

13. At the same meeting, the representative of Iraq withdrew the Iraqi-Libyan sub-amendments (A/SPC/L.63) to the United States amendment, and submitted orally a new amendment to the operative paragraph 2 of the five-Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.61/Rev.1), according to which that paragraph would read:

"Recommends to the General Assembly that at its sixteenth session primary consideration be given to the future welfare of the refugees themselves including the means of safeguarding their property rights."

14. Also at the same meeting  
co-sponsors of the five-P  
the Philippine amendment  
amendments which had be  
incorporated in a rev  
(A/SPC/L.61/Rev.2).  
15. At the 253rd m  
submitted a revise  
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second and thir  
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operative par  
16. At the  
the revised  
"reported  
report".  
17. At  
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14. Also at the same meeting, the representative of Pakistan, on behalf of the co-sponsors of the five-Power draft resolution, accepted the Iraqi oral amendment, the Philippine amendment (A/SPC/L.64), and also amendments 1 and 3 of the amendments which had been submitted by the United States (A/SPC/L.62). These were incorporated in a revised text of the five-Power joint draft resolution (A/SPC/L.61/Rev.2).

15. At the 253rd meeting on 18 April, the representative of the United States submitted a revised text of his delegation's draft resolution (A/SPC/L.65/Rev.1). In the revised text, the first and the second operative paragraphs became the second and third preambular paragraphs, with necessary changes, and the words "to repatriation or compensation for properties left behind" in the third operative paragraph were deleted.

16. At the same meeting, the United Kingdom submitted an amendment (A/SPC/L.66) to the revised five-Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.61/Rev.2) to change the word "reported" in the second line of operative paragraph 1, to read "been able to report".

17. At the same meeting, the Committee proceeded to vote on the revised five-Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.61/Rev.2) and the United Kingdom amendment to it (A/SPC/L.66).

The United Kingdom amendment was adopted by 26 votes to 22, with 32 abstentions.

The first, second and third preambular paragraphs were adopted by 64 votes to none, with 16 abstentions.

The fourth preambular paragraph was adopted by a roll-call vote of 46 to 20, with 20 abstentions. The voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Ceylon, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia.



Against: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Sweden, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Finland, Italy, Japan, Laos, Peru, Portugal, Senegal, Thailand, Upper Volta, Uruguay.

Operative paragraph 1 was adopted by 55 votes to 1, with 25 abstentions.

Operative paragraph 2 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 46 to 18, with 22 abstentions. The voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Ceylon, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Sweden, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Finland, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Laos, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Senegal, Thailand, Upper Volta, Uruguay.

Operative paragraphs 3 and 4 were adopted by 68 votes to none, with 16 abstentions.

The Committee adopted the revised draft resolution as a whole by a roll-call vote of 47 to 19, with 20 abstentions. The voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Ceylon, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

/...



Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, France, Honduras, Israel, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Senegal, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay.

Abstaining: Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cameroun, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Laos, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Sweden, Thailand.

18. At the 253rd meeting on 18 April, the Committee proceeded to a vote on the United States revised draft resolution (A/SPC/L.65/Rev.1). It was rejected by a roll-call vote of 31 to 30, with 15 abstentions. The voting was as follows:

In favour: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Senegal, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Against: Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Federation of Malaya, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

Abstaining: Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, Israel, Japan, Laos, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand, Venezuela.

Recommendation of the Special Political Committee

19. The Special Political Committee therefore recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution:

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY  
FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958 and 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959,



Noting the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period 1 July 1959-30 June 1960,<sup>2/</sup>

Noting with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that therefore the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

Recognizing the need to safeguard the property rights of the Arab refugees of Palestine,

1. Notes with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has not yet been able to report progress on carrying out the task entrusted to it in paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 1456 (XIV), and again requests the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to make efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and report thereon not later than 15 October 1961;

2. Recommends to the General Assembly that at its sixteenth session primary consideration be given to the future welfare of the refugees themselves, including the means of safeguarding their property rights;

3. Directs attention to the precarious financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and urges Governments to consider to what extent they can contribute or increase their contributions so that the Agency can carry out its programmes;

4. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out the mandate of the Agency, and to the specialized agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees.

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<sup>2/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/4478).



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GENERAL  
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Agenda item 26

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR  
PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST

United States of America: draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958 and of 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959,

1. Notes the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and commends to the particular attention of Governments his programme of vocational training;
  2. Notes further that in accordance with paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 1456 (XIV) the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency is to be reviewed at the sixteenth General Assembly;
  3. Believes that in its consideration of this item at the sixteenth session, careful consideration should be given to the future welfare of the refugees themselves, including the safeguarding of their rights set forth in resolution 194 (III), paragraph 11, to repatriation or compensation for properties left behind.
- 

61-10639



UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
LIMITED

A/SPC/L.65/Rev.1  
18 April 1961

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Fifteenth session  
SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE  
Agenda item 26

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS  
AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST

United States of America: revised draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958 and of 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959,

Noting the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and commending to the particular attention of Governments his programme of vocational training,

Noting further that in accordance with paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 1456 (XIV) the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency is to be reviewed at the sixteenth General Assembly,

Believes that in its consideration of this item at the sixteenth session, careful consideration should be given to the future welfare of the refugees themselves, including the safeguarding of their rights set forth in resolution 194 (III), paragraph 11.

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61-10791



UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
LIMITED

A/SPC/L.66  
18 April 1961

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Fifteenth session  
SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE  
Agenda item 26

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS  
AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST

United Kingdom: amendment to the draft resolution submitted  
by Afghanistan, Federation of Malaya, Indonesia, Pakistan and  
Somalia (A/SPC/L.61/Rev.2)

In the second line of operative paragraph 1, change the word "reported"  
to "been able to report".

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61-10796



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

181/4/4  
217

JRR/JS

O. 5962

Sent: 14th April, 1961.  
1830

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

253. UNCLASSIFIED.

Arab Refugees - Your UN.473 and 474 and our 229.

You have discretion to abstain in circumstances  
such as described in your UN474.

-----  
MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (852/12/10)  
A.G.'s. DEPT.  
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIGRATION.  
TREASURY.  
P.M.'s.

19th April, 1961.

SEC A/Ss UN@ ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA E.AF&ME  
E ME@ INF IC C&P

OTTAWA LONDON TEL AVIV CAIRO COLOMBO KARACHI  
NEW DELHI WASHINGTON.

PA  
[Signature]



UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



*in file*  
Distr.  
LIMITED *18/8*  
A/SPC/L.64  
13 April 1961

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Fifteenth session  
SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE  
Agenda item 26

*File 181/4/4*

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS  
AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST

Philippines: amendment to the draft resolution submitted by  
Afghanistan, Federation of Malaya, Indonesia, Pakistan and  
Somalia (A/SPC/L.61/Rev.1)

Amend second preambular paragraph of A/SPC/L.61/Rev.1 as follows:

Add at the end of the paragraph the following: "covering the  
period 1 July 1959-30 June 1960."

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61-10255

*P.A.*



UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
LIMITED

A/SPC/L.63  
12 April 1961

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

215

Fifteenth session  
SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE  
Agenda item 26

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF  
AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR  
EAST

Iraq and Libya: sub-amendments to amendments submitted  
by the United States of America (A/SPC/L.62)

1. Amend paragraph 2 of A/SPC/L.62 as follows:
2. Add as a final preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/SPC/L.61/Rev.1, the following:  
    "Recognizing that the General Assembly at its sixteenth session is to review the whole problem of the refugees,"
2. Amend paragraph 4 of A/SPC/L.62 as follows:
  4. Change operative paragraph 2 to read as follows:  
    "Recommends to the General Assembly that at its sixteenth session primary consideration be given to the future welfare of the refugees themselves and that effective machinery for safeguarding the property rights of the Palestine Arab refugees be established;"

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61-10209



UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
LIMITED

A/SPC/L.62  
12 April 1961

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Fifteenth session  
SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE  
Agenda item 26

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF  
AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR  
EAST

United States of America: amendment to the draft  
resolution submitted by Afghanistan, Federation of  
Malaya, Indonesia, Pakistan and Somalia  
(A/SPC/L.61/Rev.1)

1. Change the third preambular paragraph to read:  
"Noting with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that therefore the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,".
2. Change the final preambular paragraph to:  
"Recognizing that the sixteenth General Assembly is to review the whole problem of the refugees..."
3. Operative paragraph 1: Delete everything after the word "thereon", and add "not later than 15 October 1961".
4. Change operative paragraph 2 to:  
"Recommends to the General Assembly that at its sixteenth session primary consideration be given to the future welfare of the refugees themselves."

61-10149



UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



213  
Distr.  
LIMITED

A/SPC/L.61/Rev.1  
11 April 1961

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Fifteenth session  
SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE  
Agenda item 26

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY  
FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST

Afghanistan, Federation of Malaya, Indonesia, Pakistan and Somalia:  
joint draft resolution

The General Assembly

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958 and 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959,

Noting the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

Noting with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), has not been effected, and that therefore the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

Recognizing the need to safeguard the property rights of the Arab refugees of Palestine,

1. Notes with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has not yet reported progress on carrying out the task entrusted to it in paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 1456 (XIV), and again requests the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to make efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixteenth session;

61-10059

/...



2. Recommends to the General Assembly at its sixteenth session the establishment of appropriate and effective machinery for safeguarding the property rights of the Arab refugees of Palestine;

3. Directs attention to the precarious financial position of the Agency and urges Governments to consider to what extent they can contribute or increase their contributions so that the Agency can carry out its programmes;

4. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out the mandate of the Agency, and to the specialized agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

PH

I.9275

Dated: 12th April, 1961.  
1920  
Rec'd: 13th April, 1961.  
1704

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN474 CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

Repeated Washington for information. Ottawa Sav. 369,  
London Sav. 356, Tel Aviv Sav. 7, Cairo Sav. 15.

Arab Refugees.

*ref. to Arab  
Property Rights*

The United Kingdom Delegation have told other contributors that in private conversation Dr. Davis has now taken the view that a resolution is required at this time in the light of the general atmosphere in the Near East. The Delegation is therefore recommending to London tonight that they vote in favour of all United States amendments, that, if the amendments to the final preambular paragraph and second operative paragraph are defeated (either directly or by success of Iraqi sub-amendments), they vote against the two paragraphs concerned but that they vote in favour of the whole resolution. United States has not yet received final instructions but delegation is inclined to think that in circumstances outlined above they would vote against resolution as a whole and not even abstain. Most other contributors seem to be going to abstain in such circumstances.

MIN & DEPT. E.A.  
A.G.'S DEPT.  
MIN & DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.N.'S

14th April, 1961.

SEC A/Ss LA UNO ER COMTEL PAC&AM SA E.AF&ME E AF  
MEQ INF DL IC AM&SP S&SEA

COLOMBO KARACHI NEW DELHI WELLINGTON

*2. N. Branch  
(in London)  
concerning whether  
an allegation needs  
new instructions*

*I discussed with Mr. Braden  
in light of instruction last year as  
Arab property rights. He is inclined  
to recommend following US rather  
than UK (I of sub-amendments take  
place) said we had no  
vices*

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National Archives of Australia

NAA: A1838 181/4/4 PART 2



211

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

LAS

I.9285

Dated: 12th April, 1961.

1855  
Rec'd: 13th April, 1961.  
2145

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN 473 UNCLASSIFIED.

Repeated Washington for information, Ottawa SAV.368,  
London Sav.355, Tel Aviv Sav.6, Cairo Sav.13.

Arab Refugees

In Special political committee today United States argued against present form of Arab Resolution (introduced yesterday in names of Afghanistan, Malaya, Indonesia, Pakistan and Somalia) on grounds that no resolution was in fact necessary at this stage that draft resolution went beyond the strict terms of the item and that it was not helpful to raise controversial or partial issues at this point since U.N.R.W.A. mandate was to be reviewed in five months. Key problem arose from fourth preambular and second operative paragraphs which by referring to "property rights" dealt with only one aspect of the problem of the refugees., if any recommendation was to be made to Sixteenth Session Committee should cover the whole field and not centre on that one aspect.

2. United States then introduced amendments in following form:

(a) After the words "has not been effected" in third preambular paragraph insert "that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of Resolution 513 (vi) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement".

(b) Change the final preambular paragraph to read "recognizing that the Sixteenth General Assembly is to review the whole problem of the refugees"

(c) In operative paragraph one delete everything after "thereon" and substitute "not later than 15th October 1961".

(d) Delete second operative paragraph and substitute "recommends to the General Assembly that in its Sixteenth Session primary consideration to be given to the future welfare of the refugees themselves".

3. Statements by Arabs and sponsors indicate that amendments (a) and (c) above may be accepted. However Iraq and Libya have introduced following "sub amendments" to United

.../2



INWARD CABLEGRAM

- 2 -

I.9285

States amendments under which

(a) Machinery words introducing United States amendment  
(b) above would be changed so that paragraph quoted would be added as a final preambular paragraph and not substituted for existing final preambular paragraph.

(b) The following words would be added to the text proposed by the United States for operative paragraph 2 '2' and that appropriate and effective machinery for safeguarding the property rights of the Arab refugees of Palestine be established".

4. United Kingdom said that had the draft resolution not sought to prejudge issues more properly to be debated at a later session it would have hoped to be able to vote in favour., however the draft sought to limit the coming debate to suit one side in the dispute. United Kingdom supported United States amendment and on its own account orally proposed that in operative paragraph one the words "has not yet been able to report" be substituted for the words "has not yet reported".

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MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
A.G.'s DEPT  
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M's

13th April, 1961.

SEC A/Ss LA UNO ER COMREL PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA  
SA EAF&ME E AF ME@ INF DL IC  
COLOMBO KARACHI NEW DELHI WELLINGTON



CONFIDENTIAL 209  
181/4/4  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

SHA:

I.8852.

Dated: 7th April, 1961  
1820

FROM:

Recd.: 8th April, 1961  
1953

Australian Mission to United  
Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN444. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Washington for information,  
Ottawa Sav. 344, London Sav. 333.

U.N.R.W.A.

Our telegram 389.

Draft resolution in name of Afghanistan,  
Malaya, Indonesia, Pakistan and Somalia has now been  
circulated along lines of text as in telegram under  
reference except that operative paragraphs one and two  
have been combined to read as follows:

"Notes with regret that the United  
Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has not  
yet reported progress on carrying out the task entrusted  
to it in paragraph 4 of General Assembly Resolution 1456(XIV),  
and again requests the United Nations Conciliation Commission  
for Palestine to make efforts to secure the implementation  
of paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194(III) and  
report thereon to the General Assembly at its Sixteenth  
Session."

Negotiations between United Kingdom,  
United States and Arabs have been held during the week  
but failed in persuading Arabs to drop reference to  
safeguarding of refugee property. In these circumstances  
the United States has shown us and other members of the  
contributing group the following amendments which they propose  
should be submitted to the Arab text:

1. Change third preambular paragraph to read:

"Noting with deep regret that repatriation or  
compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11  
of General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) has not been  
effected and that no substantial progress has been made  
in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of Resolution 513(VI)  
for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or  
resettlement."

2. Change the following preambular paragraph to:

"Recognising that the Sixteenth General  
Assembly is to review this whole problem of the refugees,"

3. Delete everything after word "thereon" in  
first operative paragraph.

4. Change operative paragraph 3 to:

"Recommends to the General Assembly at its  
Sixteenth Session primary consideration be given to the

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL 202  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

I.8852.

- 2 -

future welfare of the refugees themselves."

5. We suggest an additional operative paragraph as follows:

"Requests the Director of the Agency and the host governments to co-operate in giving effect to the proposals contained in paragraph 52 of the Director's report."

3. The contributing group is meeting on Monday to discuss the above. Item now likely to be taken next Tuesday April 11th.

MIN & DEPT E.A.  
A.G.'S DEPT.  
TREASURY  
P.M.'S

9th April, 1961

SEC A/Ss UN@ ER COMREL PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME E AF MEO  
INF IC

CAIRO TEL AVIV.

CONFIDENTIAL





CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

File 181/4/4

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION  
TEL AVIV, Embassy,  
XXXXXXX

In reply quote No. ....

Memorandum No. 230.5

121

6th April, 1961.

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

I refer to your Savingram No. 7 of 27th March, 1961, in which you asked to be kept informed regarding developments with the Palestine refugees, which was only received here on 5th April.

2. As far as can be seen from here, the situation remains unchanged from that described to you in my telegram No. 89 of 18th November, 1960. This is confirmed by the account of the conversation between Mr. Harry and Mr. Yuval on 14th March last.

3. The Israel attitude is that Israel has already made all the concessions which she can reasonably be expected to offer towards the settlement of the refugee problem. According to this attitude any further yielding to pressure would be tantamount to giving away Israel's entire position.

4. I mentioned this topic yesterday to Mr. Lotan, Head of the British Commonwealth Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and derived the impression that while Israel had no doubts about Australia maintaining its present attitude, it was feared that the constant pressure now being exercised by the Arabs would induce some other countries otherwise well disposed towards Israel to feel that some kind of compromise might be desirable or practicable. This uncomfortable feeling appears to be aggravated by the fact that the new American administration has not yet formulated its Middle Eastern policy, and it is feared here that, whatever the new policy may be, it might involve pressure on Israel to show some further signs of willingness to accept a token return of 100,000 refugees and some other action. In other words, the main fear is that of a process of attrition.

5. I am sending a copy of this memorandum to the Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York.

*Mr. McMillan*

*Original on 85/4/10*

(J.M. McMillan)  
Ambassador.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**INWARD SAVINGRAM**

JRR

I.7393

Sent: 21st March, 1961.

Rec'd: 23rd March, 1961.

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

Sav: U.N. 42 CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Washington for information, London Sav.239,  
Ottawa sav.242.

My telegram 317.

Draft resolution which the Arab representatives presented to the United Kingdom and United States representatives is largely identical with Resolution 1456 (XIV) operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the latter becoming operative paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 in this year's draft. Final preambular paragraph and first three operative paragraphs of Arab draft read as follows:-

"Recognizing the need for appointing a custodian to safeguard the property rights of the Arab refugees of Palestine,

1. Notes with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has not reported progress as to the task with which it was charged in paragraph 4 of General Assembly Resolution 1456 (XIV)..
2. Urges the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to make further efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 (III)..
3. Requests the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to make necessary recommendations to the sixteenth regular session of the General Assembly with the view to the appointment of a custodian for the properties of Palestine Arab refugees"..
- 21 Arab delegations presented alternative form of operative paragraph 3 as follows:-
3. Recommends to the sixteenth regular session that arrangements be made for the appointment of a custodian for the property of Palestine Arab refugees."

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
A.G.'s. DEPT.  
IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M.'s.

24th March, 1961.

SEC A/Ss UN@ COMREL PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E  
AF ME@ INF DL IC

CAIRO TEL AVIV

**CONFIDENTIAL**



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

I. 7263;

Dated: 21st March, 1961.

0900.

Rec'd: 22nd March, 1961.

1800.

:MP

FROM:

Australian Embassy,  
WASHINGTON.

652. CONFIDENTIAL

Copies to U.N. New York, Ottawa, London and Cairo.

U.N.R.W.A.

Stookey (Arabian Peninsula Affairs, which handles Palestine refugees question) referred on 20th March to contacts between United Kingdom; United States and Arab Delegations on possible General Assembly draft resolution (see Austunat's telegram 371).

2. Stookey said that United States position was that there was no necessity for a resolution on U.N.R.W.A. Director's Report, particularly since the whole question of the U.N.R.W.A. Mandate was due for discussion at next Assembly. However, Arabs were determined to have the question thoroughly aired and wanted a strong resolution, including two proposals advanced in the first instance by Shukairi, (Saudi Arabia), neither of which United States found acceptable -

(1) Director of U.N.R.W.A. should be appointed custodian of property of Arab refugees;

(11) Censure of Palestine Conciliation Commission for its inactivity.

Regarding (11) above Stookey said United States could not accept terms of draft which shifted the onus to the Commission itself, whereas the ultimate reason for the failure of P.C.C. lay in the intransigent attitude of the Arab States and Israel. Stookey said United States might go far as support for a mild resolution "regretting" that Commissioner had been unable to report more progress.

3. Regarding contacts between United States and Arabs, Stookey said that Arabs had first expressed desire for a mild resolution, but had sprung draft (see paragraph 2 above) which United States could not accept. United States had pointed out to Arabs possible serious consequences of their resolution, if it led to alignment of Arabs with Soviet Bloc, whose support Arabs were convinced they would have.

CONFIDENTIAL



## INWARD CABLEGRAM

204  
SECRET

I, 7263.

2.

United States had pointed out serious implications for future of U.N.R.W.A. and support of refugees if Arabs were to align themselves with Bloc (whose present attitude of opposition to United Nations was well known and who were not contributing to U.N.R.W.A.) against West (which was underwriting U.N.R.W.A.).

A/MIN.&DEPT. E.A.  
A.G.'s DEPT.  
IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M.'s

23rd March, 1961.

SEC A/Ss LA UN@ ER COMREL PAC&AM AM&SF S&SEA  
E.AF&ME E ME@ INF INTELL

TEL AVIV

SECRET





CONFIDENTIAL 205

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

STRAND,

LONDON, W.C.2.

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.

Memo No. 467

17th March, 1961

The Acting Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
CANBERRA

U.N.R.W.A.

Reference our Saving No. 226 of 15th March.

2. Foreign Office on 14th March sent the following instructions to New York on question of proposed resolution:

"We agree that discussion in the Political Committee should be deferred until an acceptable draft resolution has been negotiated. We are opposed to the Arab additional references, but leave it to you to decide whether to lobby actively against them or to confine yourself to saying you would vote against them. In view of the desirability of avoiding provoking Arabs because of Oman question, we would favour adopting the less active role if possible.

Our comments in detail are as follows:

- (a) We are ready to accept the passages based on the 1959 resolution contained in preamble and operative paragraphs.
- (b) We are opposed to the Custodian proposal which we consider would be counter-productive and likely to make the Israelis adopt a more rigid attitude over Arab refugee property.
- (c) We dislike operative paragraph 1. Criticism of the Conciliation Commission is outside the scope of such a resolution of U.N.R.W.A. The Commission was never called upon to report progress, but to assist the Governments concerned to achieve a final settlement. This item could only lead to a heated and unprofitable debate.

We do not understand the State Department's objection to preambulatory paragraph 3 since this appears to be taken textually from the 1959 Resolution; we would not favour your opposing it unless the Americans can produce some good reason not apparent to us here.

You should vote against the items referred to in 2(b) and (c) above, if they are not removed from the draft by negotiation."

2. Copy of this memorandum is being sent to Washington, New York and Cairo for information.

(H. Marshall)

for Senior External Affairs Representative.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

181/4/4

JRR

I.6780

Sent: 16th March, 1961.  
1745  
Rec'd: 17th March, 1961.  
2100

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN306 CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Washington for information Ottawa sav.226,  
London sav.222.

U.N.R.W.A.

Our telegram 259.

2. There have been further contacts this week between United Kingdom, United States and Arab delegations concerning a possible agreed draft resolution on this item but so far without result. The Arabs are still seeking some wording which would imply the recognition of continued ownership of former Arab property now in Israel, one proposal is that the Conciliation Commission should be asked to recommend means whereby a "custodian" office in respect of such property could be set up. The Arabs have been informed that any reference to the custody of property would probably be unacceptable. However a further meeting is arranged for tomorrow.

3. Arabs are saying that if they cannot get an agreed draft satisfactory to themselves very shortly they will introduce a resolution of their own when the special political committee reconvenes. Israeli delegation informed us that in this event they would seek to arrange a counter resolution calling on the two parties to enter into direct negotiations with a view to settlement.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
A.G.'s. DEPT.  
TREASURY  
P.M.'s.

18th March, 1961.

SEC A/Ss UNO ER COMREL PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA E.A.F&ME  
E AF MEC INF INTELL  
CAIRO TEL AVIV

**CONFIDENTIAL**

National Archives of Australia

NAA: A1838, 181/4/4 PART 2



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

ME

201

Name of Paper Summary of World  
Published at Broadcasts

File No. 181/4/4  
Date 20-3-61

The Pope's support for Palestinian Arabs (Text) Cairo: The Secretary-General of the Arab League Abd al-Khalik Hassunah stated today that His Holiness the Pope had expressed to him his support of the right of the Arab people of Palestine to their usurped homeland. He added that he had explained to the Pope the latest developments in the Palestine question and the persecution of the Arabs in the occupied part of Palestine. Hassunah said that he was very pleased with his recent visit to His Holiness the Pope in the Vatican. He said that he had long wanted to visit His Holiness the Pope to express the Arabs' feelings towards him in view of his just stands in connection with the Palestine question. (MENA 17.3.61)

PA  
Cair



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *Summary of World Broadcast.* File No. *181/4/4*  
Published at *Part IV Second Series* Date *15-3-61*

The Lyndon Johnson Plan for the Palestine Question

Cairo "Voice of the Arabs" 08.00 GMT ("Palestine Radio") 13.3.61

Text of report of MENA comment:

Some Jordanian and Israeli papers have published reports about a new American plan regarding the Palestine question. The plan aims at solving the question by amending the old partition project and by forming an international fund to rehabilitate the refugees and to return some of them to their country. The USA would contribute about 500 million dollars to this fund. The plan also aims at opening the Suez Canal to Israeli ships, provided they do not carry military or strategic equipment. The plan would allow the UAR and Jordan to use Eilat port, and would suspend immigration to Israel for 10 years. This plan has been called the Johnson plan, after the US Vice-President Lyndon Johnson.



199  
SECRET

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

.../JS

I. 579879. 181/4/4

Dated: 7th March, 1961.  
1850  
Recd: 8th March, 1961.  
1239

FROM:

Australian Embassy,  
WASHINGTON.

524. SECRET. PRIORITY.

Repeated London 101, U.N. New York and Ottawa.

Our 523.

Resumed General Assembly.

Sisco gave us following resume of United States attitude (in many cases still tentative) on major political items which would now come before General Assembly because of failure to achieve truncated session.

Plenary.2. (a) New Members.

State Department thought there would be no change on Mauritania - Outer Mongolia impasse;

(b) Tibet.

The running was up to Malaya and Thailand, but the United States would be prepared to "take what the traffic would bear" on this item;

(c) Hungary.

"New ideas" referred to in paragraph 4 of our 448 had mostly been overtaken by Soviet refusal to co-operate in limitation of session. Present State Department thinking was to aim at a resolution deploring non-compliance; continuing (by implication or specifically) Sir Leslie Munro's mandate; and perhaps (this depended on views of new administration) conceding some change on credentials issue (this had in fact been one of the "new ideas" previously mentioned);

(d) Congo.

Only new point was that Nkrumah's proposal for African troops to take over responsibility had been modified (we gather as result of Western efforts) until composition of force envisaged by Nkrumah very nearly equalled that of existing United Nations force with addition of some Africans. Major remaining obstacle was presence of Irish but Sisco implied that if a concession was to be made over this, it would have to be made by Nkrumah. Sisco referred with some pleasure to Dayal's forthcoming return to New York for "two weeks consultation": He implied that this period would be stretched out indefinitely to keep Dayal out of Congo.

SECRET



## INWARD CABLEGRAM 17/9

Political Committee.3. (a) Disarmament.

This would prove the major item. In his discussion with Stevenson, Gromyko seemed agreeable to idea of Disarmament being taken up later in session (but not at its end since he wished to get back to Moscow). United States would appreciate this respite to re-think its position. Sisco expressed personal view that item could probably not be disposed of without the West putting up some proposal regarding both forum and timing of substantive discussions. Soviet would doubtless press for some statement of principles and this might be hard to resist;

(b) Korea.

State Department would like this item taken first. However at the moment United States was having trouble with R.O.K. which had taken very strong exception to draft worked out in Washington last week. State Department hoped Koreans could be persuaded;

(c) Outer Space. (Your 342).

United States did not have firm position yet on handling of this item nor any draft on substance. Sisco expected however that State Department would come up with a draft resolution urging early meeting of committee;

(d) Africa: United Nations Programme.

United States position on this had not yet been finalised. A recommendation was on its way to Secretary suggesting a somewhat revised approach designed to place responsibility and initiative in lap of Africans themselves and if possible, to incorporate other elements typical of Kennedy's outlook. Recommendation proposed that all references to Congo and to limitations of armaments be dropped and that increased stress be placed on the need for aid to Africa in economic, social and educational fields. Recommendation also included suggestion that item call for review of aid channelled through United Nations (thus including this point in Africa Item rather than in Czech Item 77 as envisaged in your savingram AP24).

Special political Committee.4. (a) Peaceful Uses.

Sisco said State Department favoured postponement of consideration to 16th General Assembly and concurred in our surmise that if this device proved acceptable, prospects of organising a conference in 1962 would be slim. Sisco confirmed however that State Department had not adopted a position as between 1962 and 1963 for conference;

(b) Palestine Refugees.

Sisco thought there was evidence that Arabs were moderating their position somewhat. State Department did not want any resolution and would like to see question brushed off without any discussion. It was pointing out to Arabs that questions was in any case due for review at 16th Session.;

SECRET



## INWARD CABLEGRAM

SECRET

-3-

I. 5798/9

(c) Czech Item on independence of Newly Emerging States.

Sisco considered this would revive the whole colonialism debate. He said there was considerable pressure on the new admission to "make up for" United States abstention in plenary last year. He thought that because of existence of unacceptable Bolivian-Cuban draft resolution, it might not be possible to dispose of the item without devising an alternative resolution.

(d) South Africa Racial Items.

State Department had no precise position as yet on substance. Sisco thought that outcome might be to work for a resolution which would take up thread from Security Council Resolution by requesting Secretary-General to continue his efforts. However, outlook of African and some Asian countries on this issue, obviously set limits to scope for manoeuvre: Perhaps the most that could be done would be to attempt to moderate their outlook.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.  
J.I.C.  
P.M.'s.

8th March, 1961.

|     |      |         |    |        |        |     |       |        |
|-----|------|---------|----|--------|--------|-----|-------|--------|
| SEC | A/Ss | UN@     | ER | COMREL | PAC&AM | EA  | AM&SP | S&SEA  |
| SA  | SEA  | E.AF&ME | E  | AF     | ME     | INF | DL    | INTELL |

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File 181/4/4 196  
File No. 852/14/10

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with His Excellency Mr. M. Yuval, Ambassador of Israel  
on 14th March, 1961  
Officers Present Mr. R.L. Harry,  
Mr. B.C. Hill.

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

ITEM OF ARAB REFUGEES AT RESUMED U.N.C.A. XV SESSION

Mr. Yuval called at his request to express:-

- (i) his Government's opposition to proposals put forward by Arab delegations in debate on this item at the first part of the UNGA XV;
- (ii) his Government's hope that the Australian delegation would assist Israel in opposing such proposals.

2. The matters in question were Arab suggestions:

- (a) to make some sort of "custody" arrangement for former refugee property in Israel;
- (b) to drive ahead on repatriation of refugees despite Israel's objections;
- (c) to enlarge the membership of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (perhaps by adding to the present membership of France, Turkey, and the U.S.A. - three Eastern European and three "neutral" States).

3. Mr. Yuval explained his Government's opposition to such moves on lines already well-known to us.

4. Mr. Harry informed the Ambassador of the instructions on this item approved by the Acting Minister. Mr. Yuval declared himself satisfied with these.

5. Mr. Harry took the opportunity to inform the Ambassador of the main points of the Acting Minister's instructions to the Delegation on other topics covered in the brief for the resumed session.

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FOLLOWING POSTS:

Tel Aviv,  
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Report prepared by

(B. C. Hill)

ACTION:

5515/60.



## INWARD CABLEGRAM

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I. 5141.

Dated: 28th February, 1961.  
1925.  
Rec'd: 1st March, 1961.  
1828.

TWWP:MP

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN222. CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Washington for information, Ottawa Saving  
157, London Saving 168.

RESUMED SESSION.

I talked separately today to Boland and Sir Patrick Dean about the resumed session. Both say there have been confidential discussions between Zorin and Stevenson who are to meet again tomorrow. Both believe that there will be no agreement until the very last moment (possibly even after the Assembly has begun) but that there is a good chance of agreement. Dean has the impression from a talk yesterday with Zorin that the Russians would be glad to have an agreement with the Americans on the handling of disarmament even if it meant postponing the substance of the question for six months though they might want a certain amount of discussion without a resolution. Dean also believes that the Arabs would be agreeable not to push either the Palestine refugees or Oman questions at the resumed Session if this was part of the general agreement on shortening the session.

2. Boland said that Nkrumah would address the Plenary on the opening day next Tuesday. The meeting would then adjourn. By giving Nkrumah Head of State treatment in this way his speech would be insulated from the Assembly's consideration of the Congo question which Boland will try to hold off until the United Nations Conciliation Commission has presented its report. (The Permanent Representative of Ghana told me that Nkrumah will leave for London on Tuesday night after making his speech in the Assembly). The foregoing could all be upset if Khrushchev comes. In Georges-Picot's Committee advising the Secretary General on the organisation of the Secretariat the U.S.S.R. Representative today made a bitter speech about the failure of the Communist countries to get more positions in the Secretariat by now.

3. His speech was so strong and unpleasant that it virtually broke up the meeting. This could be setting the stage for Khrushchev's coming here to press his attack on the Secretariat. But in any case prolonged, bitter, and fundamental attacks on the Secretary General or substantial debates on the Congo could mean a longer and more difficult session.

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194

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

I. 5141.

2.

4. The whole operation seems to me to have some unreality. If there is a plenary debate on the Congo and long meetings of the Fourth Committee the Communists can well afford to let the First Committee close down and other political items lapse.

Plimsoll.

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A/MIN.&DEPT. E.A.  
MIN.&DEPT. DEFENCE  
P.M.'s

2nd March, 1961.

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*File* 181/4/4  
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UNGA 15 (Resumed Session)/Item 26.

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES  
IN THE NEAR EAST

Documents:

Annual Report of the Director of UNRWA  
- A/4478  
Report of the Negotiating Committee  
for Extra-Budgetary Funds - A/4623  
Report of the Secretary-General on  
the World Refugee Year - A/4546

Background:

The Director of UNRWA has presented budget estimates for 1961 totalling \$40,600,000, of which \$36,519,000 represents expenditure for continuing programmes and \$4,081,000 is proposed for expanded programmes. This compares with budget estimates of \$38.7 million for 1960 and revised estimated expenditure and commitments for that year of \$36.5 million. The Director has in fact submitted a three-year programme for the period 1961-1963 which would entail (a) some \$34 million per year for present relief and education programmes, (b) an additional \$16.2 million during the three-year period, of which \$8.1 million would be used to expand technical training, \$3.7 million to improve and expand elementary and secondary education, and \$4.4 million to meet inevitable increases in the regular relief services and rising costs. Of the total of \$16.2 million the Agency hoped to obtain some \$4 million from World Refugee Year contributions, of which \$2.3 million had already been received as at 7th December, 1960. (Note:- The Secretary-General's report on the World Refugee Year, document A/4546 of 22nd October, 1960, shows the provisional WRY allocations to UNRWA as \$2,766,129 in cash and \$5,107,694 in kind, making a total of \$7,873,823.)

2. There has been little change in the outlook for the refugees in the past year. The total number of refugees registered has increased by 33,000 to 1,120,889. Over one third of the Agency's total budget is devoted to the purchase and distribution of basic food relief costing no more than seven U.S. cents per refugee per day. Some 9,000 ration recipients were removed from the rolls and some 5,000 were added to or reinstated on the rolls, but there still remain many known inaccuracies in the ration rolls. The health of the refugees has been well maintained and no major epidemics have occurred. The number of refugees accommodated in camps continues to rise steadily, and all tents have been eliminated from the Agency's camps as well as many sub-standard shelters. The refugees are provided with clothing collected overseas

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.../by voluntary



CONFIDENTIAL 192

-2 -UNGA 15(Resumed Session)/ Item 26

by voluntary agencies. The Agency found jobs for 691 refugees and gave financial assistance to 404 refugees who emigrated (162 to the United States of America, 210 to Latin America, 18 to Canada, 4 to Australia and 10 to Europe). Relations with the host governments are said to be good and improving. The financial problem remains: apart from the World Refugee Year, the United States, United Kingdom and Canada between them are contributing some 93 per cent of normal contributions.

3. At the meeting of the ad hoc Committee of the whole Assembly held on 20th October, 1960 for the announcement of pledges of contributions to United Nations Relief and Works Agency, a total of \$29.5 million was pledged by twenty-nine governments. Of that amount, approximately \$17.9 million was for the 1961 programmes as against the total estimated requirement for that year of \$40.6 million. However, the Director estimates that the total for governmental pledges for 1961 will eventually amount to the same level as in previous years, namely, about \$34 million.

4. Discussion of this item was begun at the first part of the fifteenth session but was not completed as no draft resolutions were forthcoming. It was agreed that the item should stand over until a later date, though there was a difference of opinion as to whether or not the item should be taken up again at the resumed session. For details of the discussion in the Special Political Committee from 14th November to 19th December, 1960, reference should be made to the delegation's memorandum 1386/60 of 29th December 1960.

#### Australian Attitude:

5. Australia's pledged contribution of £A90,000 (equivalent to \$201,600) for the twelve months ending 30th June 1961 has been paid.

6. The proposed United Nations Relief and Works Agency budget appears reasonable.

7. Our attitude to the draft resolution canvassed by the United States delegation and the amendments proposed by the Arab delegations, has been given in telegrams 760 and 796 of 19th November and 1st December, 1960 respectively. However, it does not appear that it is necessary for any resolution at all to be adopted at this session, since, in accordance with resolution 1456 (XIV), the question of the mandate of the Agency will come up for review at the sixteenth session in any case. The delegation should seek instructions on any new developments.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper

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*London*

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181/4/4

Published at

Date

25. 2. 61

766

THE WORLD OVERSEAS

THE ECONOMIST FEBRUARY 25, 1961

"Seventy per cent of my parishioners were against the regime, but they mistrusted America almost as much as they hated Franco."

The monarchical question? Of no importance, republicans assert. A temporary restoration might be a useful transitional expedient, but it could be no more than a very short-term one. The essential problem is to restore liberal institutions and revive Spanish faith in those who claim to champion them. It is a problem the West's more enlightened leaders should give some attention to if they wish to avoid having another Cuban surprise leer at them one bright Spanish dawn.

## Austria Changes Chancellors

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT IN VIENNA

HERR RAAB's resignation, so long expected and so often postponed, was finally made known on February 16th at the People's Party conference at the Hotel Panhans on the Semmering hills near Vienna. Being in hospital at the time, Herr Raab made his decision known in writing, and without naming his successor he recommended that the offices of chancellor and party head should be held by the same person. The senior party members followed this clear lead, and within a few minutes Dr Alfons Gorbach, the present party chief, had been nominated. But the change-over will not take place till April 11th.

Dr Gorbach's nomination is popular, not only within the ranks of his own party, but among the Socialists, the warmth of whose faery embrace has already caused him a slight pang of apprehension. Dr Gorbach, who is 62, was born at Imst in the Tyrol and brought up in Styria. After having lost a leg on the Isonzo front in the first world war, he studied law at Graz University and entered politics. The thirties found him in the "Fatherland Front," which caused his immediate arrest after the Anschluss. He spent five years in Dachau, and was then released with permission to work as a labourer, only to be re-arrested and consigned once again to a concentration camp, where he remained until 1945. It is very seldom, in public almost never, that one hears any reference here to the old concentration camp friendships between former political rivals. But they have played a considerable part—far greater than the clamour of political warfare might lead one to suppose—in giving a certain stability to the public life of Austria since the war. It is, in fact, not altogether a flight of fancy to say that the civil strife of the thirties was buried in the stone quarries of Dachau and Auschwitz. So that although the Socialists' welcome of Dr Gorbach's nomination is undoubtedly founded on his record as a conciliatory—perhaps, from his own party's point of view, all too conciliatory—negotiator, it is a heartening sign that they should choose to write of his "courage, selflessness and humanity" in the days when he was an anonymous prisoner wearing a number.

Coalition government is always a sluggish stream; in the next few weeks Vienna will see little but minor administrative work at the centre of government. How many ministerial posts will be

shuffled, and whether any old faces will disappear and be replaced by fresher ones, will appear in due course. (One to go may be Dr Heilingsetzer, the minister of finance.) It cannot even yet be said whether Dr Gorbach will really turn into a long-term chancellor—or, in the event of the People's Party losing the next election, vice-chancellor—at all. At present, he gives something of the impression of a caretaker. How long he lasts will depend not only on his own intentions and stamina, but also on his ability to breathe fresh life into his party organisation. He has already said that he wishes to "loosen up" the coalition machinery, a vague term, but one which contains a host of practical implications which are very familiar here. These might include a reduction of the *Proporz* system which makes a political issue out of every appointment in public life. They might even go so far as to enable some, though doubtless not all, of the decisions now taken by the coalition committees to be put to the vote in Parliament.

The term of government now ending has been undistinguished. Within the People's Party it has been marked by authoritarian stonewalling, coupled with a tactical ineptitude in negotiation which gradually lost the party advantages of its majority. Politically speaking, it has won the war and lost the peace, again and again. Dr Gorbach has a forbidding task in front of him if the Socialists are not, at last, to gain full control when they next go to the country. It would be wrong to lay all the blame for this at Herr Raab's door. At the moment, the cries of praise and valediction as he steps down to a lesser post are ringing a little hollow. But he did his country good service in the early years of the "Raab era," and this is what will ultimately be remembered.

## Elections in Gaza

FROM A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

LAST month the Palestine Arab National Union, a miniature edition of the National Union of the United Arab Republic but not affiliated to it, held elections in the Gaza strip. They were the first to be held there since the 1948 war, and they may give a tiny jolt to the long-frozen deadlock over the Palestine Arab refugees and the parent issue of Arab-Israeli relations. So far, the boundaries of the problem become and so parrot-like response of all parties, that the emergence of 346 freely-elected representatives, one for every 1,000 inhabitants of the crowded strip, provides a rare occasion for glancing at the currents beneath the ice in this Egyptian-administered demilitarised zone.

All authority is at present vested in the Egyptian government, Lieutenant-General Ahmad Salem, a distinguished energetic veteran, and in his staff of 19 Egyptian officers supported by a powerful police arm. General Salem's decisions are formally ratified by a Legislative Council of leading citizens appointed to him. But the 250,000 Palestinians in the strip have, in fact, little say in running their own affairs. Their dependence on Egypt for defence and the governor-general's strong pro-Arab sentiments keep resentment against Egyptian rule within bounds.

It is not yet clear what role the Egyptians have in mind for the Palestine Arab National Union and whether it is to be allowed taste of power at any level. Its functions may be restricted to carrying word of local grievances up the pyramid and passing down slogans and directives: a means of organising the people's national aims without opposition. But it appears that the Egyptians in the face of some obstruction from local notables, were keen for the elections should be genuinely representative. Many an established orange-grove owner found himself beaten by a young man. The Mayor was elected, in spite of criticisms of his streets, but there were many gaps in his entourage. The were said to have forced the "ins" on the defensive.

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THE WORLD OVERSEAS

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190

THE WORLD OVERSEAS

THE ECONOMIST FEBRUARY 25, 1961

area committees, comprising three elected and six mandated members, are to be set up in mid-March to coincide with victory celebrations marking the Israeli evacuation of Gaza and the return of the Egyptians in 1957. It is rumoured that President Nasser may himself be present this year. At the pinnacle of the PANU structure will be a Gaza executive committee of 15, its powers so far unknown. The new men are likely to breathe fresh life into these committees, however restricted a role the Egyptians assign them. They are also expected to bring greater realism to the task of recovering "usurped Palestine" than many of their elders who, although breathing fire, may have too great a stake in Gaza's present prosperity to want to disturb the *status quo*.

There are young men in Gaza who speak of the National Union as the nucleus of a Palestine government which will one day rally all Palestine refugees in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan; it would then demand recognition as a government, and would carry the war into the enemy's camp or force a settlement from a position of strength. "If the Algerians can do it, so can we." How far the Egyptians will follow them in this programme remains to be seen. They appear to be giving the refugees just enough military training to satisfy the firebrands, but not enough either to provoke an Israeli raid or to encourage a refugee assault—both cases in which the Egyptians would find themselves involved.

Behind the play of local politics lie the waste of human beings and the grey cement-tiled roofs of the refugee shelters climbing the sand-dunes. Gaza is living off the United Nations dole, but so politically charged are refugee economics that no firm statistics are available. "Census" has become a bad word, and talk of rectifying the refugee ration rolls, swollen by deaths and absentees,

is enough to cause a riot. Fifty thousand people could no doubt live comfortably off the fields and orange groves of the Gaza strip. Seven times that number—2,500 to a square mile—are now hemmed in between the beaches and the armistice demarca-



tion line which has been patrolled by the United Nations Emergency Force since November, 1956.

That they are alive, housed, fed and educated to standards higher than most in the Middle East is due to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and its team of dedicated local officials. Some 240,000 refugees are on the agency's rolls in Gaza, while a further 60,000 natives of the strip, who retained their homes but lost their fields when Gaza was cut off from its hinterland, receive partial assistance. Employment figures are the least known and most controversial. The best estimates suggest that 15 per cent of all able-bodied males are fully employed, and another 15 per cent wholly unemployed. The vast majority, 70 per cent, earn some small cash income in partial employment part of the year; by such means the living standards of most families are edged up to just above subsistence level. Unskilled labour is paid around £E4 a month.

But a stone's throw from the dirt roads and raw concrete of the camps, the new villas of land speculators, merchants, building contractors, and orange growers ride down to the sea in conspicuous prosperity: the rich are growing richer. UNRWA's Gaza budget is \$8 million; UNEF spends a further \$2 to \$3 million in the strip; remittances to families from relatives living outside Gaza may run to £500,000 a year; Egyptians from all over the Delta come to shop in Gaza for nylon goods, razor blades and calor-gas stoves, while the Egyptian governor-general's budget is believed to be

around £E3 million. A lot of cash is being pumped in, but its distribution is less than perfect. A harsh rule has it that only native inhabitants may own property, it being held as evident that the refugees need no such encumbrance, since any day they will recover their homeland beyond the demarcation line.

It is this basic article of faith that 50,000 refugee school-children in Gaza chant in patriotic jingles in UNRWA kindergartens, beat out in copper battle-scenes in handicraft workshops and pin in stern slogans to the front porch of every one of the agency's 82 model schools. But so well drilled seem the refugees' emotions, so readily do they scowl or smile at the cheerleader's bidding that, in their innocence of facts, they look less than ready for the long road which must lead to war with Israel or to a negotiated settlement—if it is not to be further squalid decades of international charity.

The agency, fiercely humanitarian on an inadequate budget, ministers to the refugees' bodies and leaves their souls to the Egyptian ringmasters. Or at least this is true of the international staff. Forbidden by UNRWA's charter to engage in politics, they view with alarm the possible conflict of loyalties that may arise as a result of last month's election to the revitalised Palestine Arab National Union of no fewer than 79 of UNRWA's local Palestinian employees. However, they are bending their efforts to expanding the vocational training programme with the aim of turning out an élite of 2,500 technicians a year from among the 1,100,000 refugees in their care in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Gaza. The urgent need is for a parallel development of UNRWA's placement service to find the new graduates jobs within or beyond the Arab world. This demands the active co-operation of host governments. What has to be hoped is that inter-Arab feuding, which must share responsibility with Israel for the refugees' condition, will not prevent the full use of these precious and expensively acquired skills.



189

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD SAVINGRAM**

181/4/4

:JM

I. 4748

Dated: 20th February, 1961

FROM:

Rec'd: 24th February, 1961

External Affairs Office,  
LONDON.

SAV.EX.160. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Washington EX.224, New York EX.213,  
Ottawa, Moscow, Paris, Cairo, Accra, Lagos, Tel Aviv,  
Karachi.

Arab League - Foreign Ministers' Conference V.

Reference our Savings 119, 120, 121 and 148.

For further information Beirut reported (by bag)  
to Foreign Office on 11th February as follows:-

"When I asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs yesterday about this meeting, he expressed some satisfaction. At least this time all members of the Arab League had been represented, and all had made an effort to reach agreement. There had moreover in his view been the beginnings of a more rational approach to the problems facing the Arab world. Only too often in the past people had said 'wee shall go to war, and if you do not do so too, you are traitors to the Arab cause'. There had been none of that this time.

2. On Algeria he said that if the struggle continued, the Algerians would have to accept Communist help whatever the consequences, since Arab help was insufficient. But they all foresaw the dangers of this and were sincerely anxious for a settlement, including, he thought, the United Arab Republic. I would have noticed that the subsequent invitation to Bourguiba had not been attacked in Cairo, though the prominence it gave him could not be welcome there. He assumed, incidentally, that Bourguiba would not be used as a mediator, but that the talks with him might pave the way to direct discussions. This seemed to him a more hopeful procedure. On his return to Beirut he had spoken frankly to the French Ambassador about the imperative need for a quick settlement.

3. When I asked him about Oman, he said that a second question had been raised which affected us; that of the Aden Protectorates. The Yemeni representative had demanded that the Arabs should treat this on a par with Oman. M. Takla claimed that he had refused point-blank to go along, saying that enough was enough. He had received general support, and had since made his peace in Beirut with the Yemeni. I told him I had the impression that his attitude would not have caused much pain in Sana'a.

4. Returning to the Omani question, he said that the Imam's brother had given an account of the talks here. Takla had asked why the Omanis would not talk direct to the Sultan,

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NAA: A1838; 181/4/4 PART 2



188

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS **CONFIDENTIAL**  
**INWARD SAVINGRAM**

I. 4748

2.

with us sitting in and perhaps guaranteeing any settlement reached; that had surely been the procedure followed with the Treaty of Sib. Taleb had answered that we were on the Sultan's side. The discussion had been moderate, and the decision reached had amounted to leaving it to the Arab Missions in New York to settle to what extent action on the agenda item should be taken at the resumed session, and when.

5. He then turned to Palestine questions, beginning with Israel's atomic programme. The information at the disposal of the Arabs did not suggest that there was any early danger, and he did not himself believe that the Israelis would in fact ever use atomic weapons; they wanted, he thought to exploit the threat created by their potentialities. But this would further poison the atmosphere in a most dangerous way. Some form of international guarantee must be provided. Perhaps this could be done by the Great Powers; he even referred to the Tripartite Declaration. Failing that the Arabs would have to ask the United Nations for action, perhaps within the framework of Atoms for Peace. He did not question our own objections to the enlargement of the atomic club.

6. On the Jordan waters he gave me no clue/<sup>as</sup> to Arab intentions, and I thought it best not to question him directly. I said that it seemed to me a very awkward problem. The outside world would of course have been greatly relieved if some development scheme had been drawn up on lines acceptable all round. This had not proved possible, but although of course legitimate rights must be protected, it surely went against the whole trend of opinion everywhere to hold up all development. And after all, as my United States colleague had pointed out a year ago to M. Takla's predecessor, the Israelis could not be prevented from getting fresh water for the Negeb from the sea. He supposed gloomily that intensive research was being done on reducing the costs of this. But he reminded me that it was a basic part of the Arab case that the Jews were in illegal occupation of part of Palestine and therefore had no rights whatever there.

7. On the refugees, he thought that the Arabs would be satisfied with a simple resolution approving the report of the director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. This line would see them through for a couple of years. He said nothing about the expansion of the Palestine Conciliation Commission of the appointment of an Administrator of Arab Property in Israel, and agreed when I spoke warmly of Dr. Davis."

A/MIN.&DEPT. E.A.  
MIN.&DEPT. DEFENCE.  
J.I.C.

27th February, 1961

SEC A/Ss MR EASTMAN UN ER COMREL PAC&AM AM&SF S&SEA  
SA SEA E.AF&ME E AF ME@ INF DL

COLOMBO NEW DELHI ROME WELLINGTON

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20. 2. 61

## "Arabs Present Fresh U.N. Problem"

CAIRO (Associated Press).—Arab delegations to the United Nations intend to push a resolution before the General Assembly aimed at squeezing enough money out of Israel to support nearly a million Palestine Arab refugees.

The Arabs are likely to decide who are their friends and who are their foes on the way other Governments line up on the issue.

The Arab proposal will suggest diversion of income from Arab refugee property in Israel to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, which looks after those Arabs who fled their homes in the 1948 Palestine war.

Arab delegations will insist on the appointment of a custodian of Arab refugee property in Israel to collect income from this property and pass it on to UNRWA.

If this plan is adopted, the Arabs argue, Arab refugees will be able to live from income that is legally theirs, rather than from international charity.

The plan would also relieve the pressure from U.N. member States who are grumbling about the continuing burden.

Arab sources estimate this plan would yield around 90 million dollars (£A40.18 million) a year, or more than three times the annual budget of UNRWA.

Neutral observers say this is an over-optimistic estimate, but no one has exact figures.

The Arabs did leave behind in Israel some highly prosperous possessions in the form of vast tracts of citrus groves and buildings. Whole cities that were almost entirely Arab-owned, like Jaffa, Lydda and Ramleh, fell into Israel hands in the 1948 upheaval.

The new Arab proposal is expected to be presented in the Assembly spring session as an amendment to the resolution re-affirming the right of the refugees to repatriation or compensation.

Annually for the last 13 years, the U.N. has reaffirmed resolution 194 granting the refugees the right to repatriation or compensation, and it is expected to do so again this year.

The Arab amendment is sure to evoke a hot floor fight, however.

Israel certainly will oppose the Arab amendment and will use all its influence to have it defeated.

The Arabs already are privately serving notice that they will consider as a fresh sign of basic hostility any refusal by America and the West to support their amendment.

Arab sources here expect heavy support for the amendment, although they hesitate to predict that it will be carried outright.

To begin with, the 10-nation Arab bloc without question will vote for the amendment.

The Arabs confidently expect that the bloc, plus Yugoslavia and Cuba, will go along to demonstrate their political support of the Arabs.

The Arabs will work hard to line up backing from the newly-independent African states, particularly countries like Guinea, Mali and Ghana.

These States all have fairly good relations with Israel, but the Arabs believe they can back their amendment without violating any commitments to the Israelis.

Neutral observers here point out that the Arab proposal would be hard to implement, even if it passes and Israel agrees.

Income yielded by Arab refugee property is mostly in Israeli pounds, convertible neither into hard currency nor into the currency of the Arab States in which the refugees now live.

Arab sources say their first objective is to establish the principle of Arab access to their property income.

Once this is established, they are confident the technical details can be worked out.

P.A.  
[Signature]



COPY

OF LETTER FROM

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
750 THIRD AVENUE  
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

186

CONFIDENTIAL

5. The main contributing nations - United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand met informally to discuss this request and it was agreed that since there was no formal delegation, the best tactic would be to record, without presenting a vote, our understanding that these four individuals would speak on behalf of the Arab States. The Secretary, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, A.C.T. specifically sought clarification which brought from Secretary a denial that he had any special political committee of the Palestinian delegation's representation that he did not have the intention of confronting the Committee with a fait accompli. With this general understanding...

The Committee began its debate on the annual report of the Director of UNRWA on 14th November and completed the general debate thereon on 30th November. The item, however, was not concluded, as no draft resolutions were forthcoming, and the Committee agreed at the final meeting on December 19th that it should stand over until a later date.

2. Since in formal terms the agenda item called only for noting the Director's report, it was hoped, perhaps naively, that the discussion could be confined to the report itself and political polemics be kept to a minimum. All the contributing countries adopted this line in their statements but their view, as in the past, was not shared by the Arab delegations, or on this occasion by the Soviet bloc or by many of the Afro-Asians. Each one of the Arab delegations vied with the other in rehearsing the wrongs wrought on the Arab people of Palestine by Zionist aggression aided by the British "imperialists" and abetted and subsequently sustained by the United States "imperialists". In essence, the Arab demand was the same as during the past twelve years:- all the refugees who wish to be repatriated should be permitted to do so immediately and with or without Israel's consent; those not wishing to be repatriated should be compensated by Israel for their homes and properties illegally seized and from which they were driven by Israel. Israel's answer was similarly the same as in the past; the Arab refugees should be resettled in the host countries; Israel was prepared to negotiate with the Arab States on this matter and on the question of compensation but which must also include the question of compensation for those half million Arab Jews now living in Israel and who were equally forced out of their homes in the Arab lands.

3. The main interest of the debate was not, therefore, in the standard statement of views but in three moves of some political significance: the Committee's acceptance of a "Palestine-Arab delegation"; the attempt to appoint an Administrator of Arab property in Israel, preferably Dr. Davis himself, who would use income from such property for the sustenance of the refugees; and, thirdly, the attempt to expand the Palestine Conciliation Commission by six additional members on the ground that its failure was due to its "imperialist" composition and that a more equitable distribution, possibly along ideological rather than geographical lines, could make it a more effective instrument of the United Nations to force (rather than "facilitate" as its original Mandate prescribes) implementation of the many United Nations resolutions beginning with resolution 194 (III) (specifically paragraph 11).

4. On the 8th November, ten Arab countries had circulated a letter (A/SPC/48) requesting that "A Palestine-Arab delegation" should be heard by the Committee when the UNRWA item was discussed. As you are aware, in the past the Committee has annually listened to Dr. Tannous on the understanding that he represented in a somewhat undefined way the Palestine refugees by virtue of his office as Director of the Palestine-Arab Refugee Office in New York. The Israeli Ambassador (Mr. Conway) informed us that he believed this new attempt to be part of a scheme to lay the foundation for eventual United Nations recognition of a Palestine Government-in-exile. He asserted that the four individuals mentioned were members directly connected with the Grand Mufti's higher Committee for Palestine and we believe this to be substantially true.

Mr. Hall  
to claim

Original on  
852/12/10

5/8  
1

National Archives of Australia

CONFIDENTIAL

NAA: A1838, 181/4/4 PART 2



CONFIDENTIAL

5. The main contributing nations - United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands, France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand met informally to discuss this request and it was agreed that since there was little chance of obtaining a majority vote against hearing this "delegation", the best tactic would be to record, without pressing a vote, our understanding that these four individuals would speak as individuals having some undefined competence or connection with Palestine refugees. There was some discussion in the Committee along these lines and when Mr. Shukaiky of Saudi Arabia attempted to underline the "delegation" nature of the four men, Australia (Mr. Hood) specifically sought clarification which brought from Shukaiky a denial that he had attempted to raise the question of the Palestinian delegation's representative status and that he did not have the intention of confronting the Committee with a fait accompli. With this general understanding Ghory, and subsequently Tannous, were permitted to address the Committee. We made a point in our speech delivered on the 18th November describing Mr. Ghory "as one having a special connection with the Palestine Refugees". (The full text of the Australian statement was forwarded under cover of our memorandum no. 1187 of 18th November).

6. The Saudi Arabian delegation (Mr. Shukaiky) who opened and closed the Arab case in the debate was the one who first raised the question of expansion of the PCC by adding three representatives from the East European bloc and three from the uncommitted nations, i.e. one Afro-Asian, one from Africa and one from Latin America. This suggestion was taken up by many of the other Arab delegations and by Indonesia but not, perhaps for tactical reasons, by the Soviet bloc.

7. The idea of expanding the PCC, or at any rate of giving it some enlarged functions in respect of the refugees, was subsequently raised by the Arabs during the abortive negotiations with a view to an agreed draft resolution which took place after the conclusion of the general debate. The United States and United Kingdom, together with the other contributing states, were anxious to see such a resolution confined pretty much to the terms of that adopted at the XIVth session (to which the Arab States then agreed). However, when contact was made by the U.S. and U.K. representatives with the Arabs with this object, the latter made it clear that their terms for agreement this year would be a good deal higher. In particular, while not strongly pressing the reference to the PCC the Arabs fastened on to the idea of having some kind of custodian arrangement in respect of former refugee property incorporated into the operative part of any resolution. At first they proposed that the Director himself should be appointed custodian, but later were ready to drop this particular suggestion in favour of some kind of more general arrangement to the same end which was never very specifically defined. Such a proposal constituted, of course, something that was both novel and a long way outside the terms of reference within which the Committee was discussing the item, i.e., the annual report of the Director of UNRWA. Moreover, the Director made it very clear that neither he nor his Office would be prepared to take on such a responsibility.

8. The other contributing states, including ourselves, were kept currently informed by the U.S. and U.K. representatives of the efforts to persuade the Arabs to settle for something which would not introduce an obviously new element into the handling of the problem and would, by its nature, naturally pre-judge a great part of the Arab case. All were agreed that the Arab requirements for an "agreed" resolution could not be met in the form in which they were presented. We had the impression that the U.S. (Francis Willcox) was perhaps ready to go somewhat further in an effort to meet the Arabs, but in the end, approaching conclusion of business, the negotiations came to nothing and no draft resolution was before the Committee when it met for the last time on December 19th. On this occasion the representative of the Director of UNRWA read a statement in which Dr. Davis said that he took the general tenor of the discussion in the Committee to amount to an endorsement of his programmes for the ensuing year and would proceed on that basis; in fact, Dr. Davis never, himself, thought that a resolution was necessary this year at all and this view was in the event tacitly accepted by a good many delegations.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

At its final meeting the Committee therefore agreed without formal dissent that the item should be held over until a later date. The Arabs, backed by the Soviet Union, asserted that this meant until the resumed session in March. A reservation on this point was, however, expressed by Israel and Australia and the exact way in which the item would be taken up again and when, was left in a certain obscurity. However, there is little doubt that the Arabs could muster a majority, if necessary, for further discussion one way or another, of the refugee problem at the resumed session. It must be said that this, if it came about, would be for purely political reasons, in as much as UNWRA can perfectly well carry on the present basis until the XVIth Session, when, in accordance with last year's resolution, its activities must come up again for review in any case.

*McHood*  
for Delegation.

JLH/mb

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

ME

183

Name of Paper Mideast - Mirror

File No. ....

Published at Lebanon

Date 26. 11. 60

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REFUGEES' RATIONS

AMMAN -- It was announced on November 19 that the Jordanian government had agreed that UNRWA should be left free to implement its plan to withdraw ration cards issued in the names of deceased Palestinian refugees, as well as those held by refugees who were no longer in acute need, and reissue them to refugee children and adult refugees who had not been registered to date. The agency, for its part, agreed not to carry out any census of refugees.

On November 22, however, a Parliamentary legal committee set up to consider refugees' problems produced a report which contained recommendations somewhat at variance with these decisions. It advocated that no kind of investigation into refugees' earnings should be made without the explicit agreement of the Jordanian government, and that no ration cards should be withdrawn on the grounds of a refugee's income from any source.

The report endorsed the proposal that cards issued to deceased refugees should be cancelled, and cards given in their place to refugee children so far unregistered, however. It also recommended a general increase in the scale of rations provided by UNRWA.

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F.  
181/4/4



CONFIDENTIAL

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

182

CM:SHA

I.28185.

FROM:

Dated: 24th November, 1960.

1725

Recd.: 26th November, 1960

1133

Australian Mission to United Nations,

NEW YORK.

UN.1435.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Washington 1742, London Sav. 801.

Special Political Committee - U.N.R.W.A.

General Debate has continued slowly this week with many adjournments owing to consideration of Congo and Mauritania elsewhere. While most speakers have dealt with the report itself and the need for greater financial support, U.S.S.R. and Bulgaria came out strongly on Arab side with strong criticism of Israel and stressing need for political action by the United Nations. Neither took up, however, specifically the Arab proposal for expansion on ideological of the P.C.C. although both criticised it for its lack of success.

2. The Arabs are being more difficult than usual in accepting the United States draft Resolution (our 1389). They are insisting on the addition of two operative paragraphs (the first of which Lebanon referred to today in its speech). They would include the usual preambular paragraph referring to paragraph II of Resolution 194(III) (to which the United States and others would readily agree in view of past practice) omit operative paragraph 3 and include the following additional paragraphs:

"(6) Decides to appoint the Director of U.N.R.W.A. as an administrator of the refugees' properties in Israel to take care of the said property and to deliver the revenues thereof to the respective owners.

(7) Decides to expand the Palestine Conciliation Commission to include the following six members." (Unspecified as yet).

3. We are not yet certain of the voting strength supporting the Arabs on these suggestions but we are meeting on Monday with the other main contributors to discuss this. We assume you would wish us to oppose alteration in the P.C.C. and the suggestion that Dr. Davis should be Administrator of Arab property in Israel. Glad your views.

\* as received.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. MIN. & DEPT. IMMIGRATION TREASURY P.M.'s  
26th November, 1960

SEC A/Ss MR EASTMAN UNB BRO TA COMREL PAC&AM AM&SP S&SDA EAF&ME  
E AF ML INF

CONFIDENTIAL



## INWARD CABLEGRAM

PH

I.27625

Dated: 18th November, 1960.  
1905  
Rec'd: 19th November, 1960.  
1321

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN1396 CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Washington 1690, London Sav. 768.

Special Political Committee - U.N.R.W.A.

Speakers today were Australia, Greece, Canada, China,  
and Iran.

2. Australia (Hood) drew attention (as did Canada) to the need for wider financial support for U.N.R.W.A., stressed our present and past contributions, and mentioned that P.C.C.'s lack of success to date reflected not its composition but lack of co-operation from Governments concerned. Full text by bag.

3. At informal meeting of contributing Governments today, it was agreed that United States Draft Resolution (our telegram 1389) was generally acceptable, that United States canvass Arabs for support and then seek Indonesian and Pakistan sponsorship (last years sponsors).

MIN & DEPT. E.A.  
TREASURY  
IMMIGRATION  
P.M.'S

20th November, 1960.

SEC A/Ss MR EASTMAN UNO ER COMTEL PAC&AM AM&SP S&SLA  
E.F&ME E AF ME INF

G

CAIRO TEL AVIV



CONFIDENTIAL

180

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

JMF:JJ

I.27560.

Dated: 18th November, 1960.  
1610.Rec'd: 19th November, 1960.  
0830.

FROM:

Australian Embassy,  
TEL AVIV.

89

CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Australian Delegation to U.N. New York 10.

Arab Refugees.

Israel Government's view is that substantial discussion on the United Nations Relief Working Agency should be deferred until next year. It regards Davis report as retrograde step, but is prepared to vote for its adoption and let it go through without need for bitter debate. It does not like the proposal for the enlargement of the Commission, particularly the inclusion of Argentinian representative and will oppose it. It hopes Australia will take a similar attitude on each point.

2. I think Israel is apprehensive about the American intention to press hard for the admission of a token number of Arab refugees, which could present serious domestic, political and economic problems and will resist with all its resources. The Government will probably try to persuade the Americans to give them the extra year's respite pending the general views.

3. Relevant official told me that so far countries contributing funds, such as Australia, have not asserted themselves while those not contributing had been very vocal, but he felt they should now be more forceful in their public declarations on refugees.

McMillan.


MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M.'s

19th November, 1960.

SEC A/Ss MR. EASTMAN UN@ ER@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA  
EAF&ME E AF ME INF

G.

CAIRO LONDON TELAVIV WASHINGTON.



CONFIDENTIAL



INWARD CABLEGRAM ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

179

181/4/4

AH:JT

I.27179

Dated: 14th November, 1960.  
1945Rec'd: 15th November, 1960.  
1540

FROM:

Australian Embassy,  
WASHINGTON.3107. CONFIDENTIAL.Repeated U.N. New York and Ottawa. Copies to  
London, Cairo and Tel Aviv.U.N.R.W.A..

Sisco (Deputy Director United Nations Affairs) told us 14th November that State Department was strongly opposed to Arab request for "a Palestinian Arab Delegation" to be heard by Special Political Committee (U.N. New York's 1351) and if issue were pressed would vote against it. However, vote might be avoided: Mission in New York had put in some hard work over weekend contacting various Arab Delegates, and thought it had persuaded them to drop their scheme.

2. On the other hand United States had not opposed to hearing Tannous and others in their individual capacities.

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MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M'S.

15th November, 1960.

SEC A/Ss MR.EASTMAN LA UNO DRC COMREL PAC&AM  
AM&SP S&SEA E.AF&ML E AF MEC INF  
G  
CAIRO TEL AVIV



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM** **CONFIDENTIAL** 178

PH

I.27011

Dated: 12th November, 1960.  
1330  
Rec'd: 13th November, 1960.  
1502

FROM:

181/4/4

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN1351 CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Washington for information, repeated London  
Savingram 724, Ottawa cable 390.

U.N.R.W.A.

Special political committee will probably take up  
U.N.R.W.A. item on Tuesday.

2. The Secretariat has circulated a request from Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, U.A.R., and Yemen to the chairman of the special committee requesting that 'a Palestinian Arab Delegation composed of:- Emile Ghory, Dr. Izzat Tannous, Isa Nakhleh, and Khalil Tabari be heard by the committee when, item 26 'report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the near East', is discussed.'

3. Western Delegations and, of course, Israel are concerned at this request since:

- (a) three of the four individuals mentioned (according to the Israelis here) are believed to be members of the Grand Mufti's Higher Committee for Palestine:-
- (b) there is no attempt to describe these four as spokesmen for the Palestinian Refugees (as tannous was recognized in the past) but, by the use of the description 'Palestinian Arab Delegation', an attempt is apparently being made to give these third party status:- and
- (c) the request will at the least cause irrelevant debate in the committee and in fact may be hard to defeat.

MIN & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN & DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M.'S

14th November, 1960.

SEC A/Ss MR EASTMAN LA UNO ERO COMREL PAC&AM AMASP  
S&SEA E.A.F&ME E AF MEO INF

G

CAIRO TEL AVIV

**CONFIDENTIAL**



RESTRICTED

## INWARD SAVINGRAM.

:FPS

I.12988

Dated: 31st May, 1960

Rec'd: 8th June, 1960

FROM:

Australian Legation,  
TEL AVIV.SAV.5 RESTRICTED.MONTHLY POLITICAL SAVINGRAM - MAY, 1960.INTRODUCTION.

Internally, May was an exceptionally quiet month. The only incident was a minor air clash with U.A.R. Migs. Principal subjects of interest were the end of the U.A.R.-United States boycotts, the Summit Conference, and the capture of the noted war criminal, Eichmann, who bore heavy responsibility for the execution of Nazi Jewish - extermination policy.

1. SUEZ CANAL.

The end of the boycotts on U.A.R. and United States shipping was received with a sigh of resignation as for another (and for Israel rare) good thing come to an end. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was clearly relieved, since the enthusiasm in Israel for the development of the boycott situation placed them in an embarrassing situation vis-a-vis the United States. Such responsibility for the action of the United States seafarer's unions as should be attributed to Israel should go to the Histadrut; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not appear to have been a party to the operation.

2. DEFENCE.

This year's Independence Day parade in Haifa was routine. The only new weapons shown were a dozen U.S. 106 millimetre recoilless guns, and some SS-10 (Nord) guided anti-tank missiles, both of which have been in use for over a year. No Centurion tanks were shown, although it is understood that the United Kingdom this year made no objection. No new planes were revealed. The second Israel submarine purchased last year in the United Kingdom set out for Israel.

3. WORLD BANK.

The President, Mr. Eugene Black, and other advisers visited Israel in connection with the latter's requests for loans for port construction (Ashdod, Eilat, Haifa) and development of the Dead Sea potash works, reported to total some \$80 million. These loans are thought likely to be granted, but subject probably to the creation of port authorities independent of Ministerial control and denationalisation of the potash works.

4. SUMMIT CONFERENCE.

The failure of the Summit and the capture of a U.2 were widely commented upon, but all except the Communists gave general support to the Western and to the United States positions respectively. Most commentators were concerned lest a revival of the "cold war" might cause another extended period of crisis in the Middle East.

RESTRICTED

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176  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**RESTRICTED**  
**INWARD SAVINGRAM**  
- 2 - 1.12988

5. RELATIONS WITH AFRICA.

(a) NIGERIA.

The East Nigerian Minister for Health and Agriculture visited Israel for <sup>two</sup> weeks at the invitation of the Government.

(b) GHANA.

Mr. B. Quarco, organiser of the Builders' Brigades, visited Israel as a guest of the Minister of Defence.

6. ARAB REFUGEES.

Recent comments by Senator Fulbright and other international figures visiting Israel gave rise in certain sections of the press to requests for re-consideration of Israel's well-known and intransigent attitude to the Arab refugees problem. Mrs. Meir nevertheless reaffirmed recently that no change in Israel policy is contemplated.

7. DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN ISRAEL.

The legations of Panama and Finland were raised to Embassy level.

8. EXTRADITION TREATY.

An extradition pact was signed with Argentina.

9. GOVERNMENT.

Mrs. Meir left on 29th May for a five-week tour of the United States on behalf of the U.J.A. and Israel Bond drive.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE  
J.I.C.  
TREASURY  
TRADE (C - M)

9th June, 1960.

**RESTRICTED**



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

175

CW

0.4291

181/4/4

Sent: 11th March, 1960.  
1620

TO:

Australian High Commission,  
NEW DELHI.

115. CONFIDENTIAL.

Reference your telegram No.103. Tibetan refugees.

You will receive separate advice probably today of telegraphic transfer of £100,000 as Australian Government's contribution towards scheme outlined in your telegram No.79.

2. Please discuss with Indian authorities timing of public announcement. Parliament will be meeting until early April. Would there be any objection to us drawing upon the information in Dutt's letter to you of 20th February? This seems to provide a basis for a suitable factual statement which would not be embarrassing to the Indian Government.

-----

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
TREASURY  
P.M'S DEPT.  
P.M'S

14th March, 1960.

SEC A/Ss UN TA ER PAC&AM EA S&SEA E.A.F&ME E INF

*Mr. [Signature]*  
*this is entirely [Signature]*  
*204*



OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

174

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CW

0.4281

Sent: 11th March, 1960.  
1620

TO:

Australian High Commission,  
NEW DELHI.

114. CONFIDENTIAL.

From Authorising Officer, Prime Minister's  
Department.

Tibetan Refugees.

A£100,000 may now be paid to Indian Government.  
One million and sixty one thousand six hundred and thirty two  
point one seven rupees (1,061,632.17) is the conversion at the  
special Government rate. Treasury has arranged a special  
remittance of one million one hundred thousand rupees (1,100,000)  
to reach your account Monday 14th March.

Charge expenditure to Prime Minister's Department,  
Treasurer's Advance.

-----

PRIME MINISTER & DEPT. (58/869)  
TREASURY  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
P.M.'S

14th March, 1960.

SEC A/Ss UN ER PAC&AM EA S&SEA E.AF&ME E INF ER✓



In reply quote No. 230.5.  
Memo. No. 59/60.



173  
AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,  
TEL AVIV.

5th February, 1960.

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
CANBERRA. A. C. T.

ARAB REFUGEES IN JORDAN.

As you know, King Hussein has somewhat more constructive views than other Arab leaders on the integration of the Arab refugees, and for some time ex-Palestine Arabs have been able to acquire, under certain conditions, citizenship of Jordan. The conditions under which refugees may acquire this were recently eased, and, according to the Jordanian press, former citizens of Palestine in possession of a Mandatory passport may now acquire Jordanian citizenship without having to fulfil the normal residence requirements.

2. It is difficult to assess from here what significance, practical or political, this concession may have, but it follows closely on the King's recent attack on Arab leaders, when, according to Amman Radio, he charged them with continuing to use the Palestine refugees as pawns for selfish political purposes. According to the Israel press the Jordanian Prime Minister at the same time presented to Parliament (meeting in Jerusalem, now officially the second capital) the following five-point demand for the Arab League Council to consider at its forthcoming meeting on 7th February :

1. The Arab nations must stop exploiting the Palestine people for their own purposes;
2. The Palestine issue must be regarded as preparation for a struggle in which the Arabs must evaluate the enemy's manpower and resources potential as well as international feeling on the question;
3. The Palestine problem must be solved through the unified effort of the entire Arab world and not by minor territorial projects which digress from this collective aim;
4. The recognition of a united Jordan (annexation of western Jordan with Trans-Jordan) as an Arab country containing the majority of Palestinians;
5. After the liberation of the fatherland will have been achieved and plundered rights restored, the Jordan Government will welcome any move for self-determination on the part of Palestine Arabs, who will then be able of their own free will to decide what form of regime they want."

*Copy on 207/2/1  
copy passed to UN  
All Dis/2*

*Register - please file on 181/4/4 and R/S*

*[Signature]*  
(B. W. Woodberry)  
Second Secretary.

*Copy on 207/2/1*  
National Archives of Australia

NAA: A1838, 181/4/4 PART 2



COPY

OF LETTER FROM  
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
750 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

172

8th January 1960

File No. 210/1/3

Memorandum No. 29/60

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
Canberra. A.C.T

United Nations Relief and Works Agency  
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

....

Forwarded at the request of the Secretary-General  
is a copy of the resolution adopted by the Fourteenth Session  
of the General Assembly in connection with the item entitled  
"United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees  
in the Near East".

*ALS*  
*Amie - to rejoin.*  
*Aug. 20 852/12/10*  
*End.*

R. H. ROBERTSON

Acting Permanent Representative

RHR/fdb

F 181/4/4



UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
LIMITED

A/RES/1456 (XIV)  
19 December 1959

Fourteenth session  
Agenda item 27

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[On the report of the Special Political Committee (A/4342)]

1456 (XIV). United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees  
in the Near East

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957 and 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958,

Noting the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,<sup>1/</sup> in particular the expiration of the Agency's mandate on 30 June 1960,

Noting the recommendation of the Secretary-General and the Director of the Agency for the continuation of the Agency,

Noting with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), has not been effected, and that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

<sup>1/</sup> Official records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth session, Supplement No. 14 (A/4215).

59-31701

/...



Having reviewed the Agency's budget and noting with concern that contributions from Member States are not sufficient,

Recalling that the Agency, as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, enjoys the benefits of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for a period of three years with a review at the end of two years;
2. Requests the Governments concerned to co-operate with the Agency in efforts to rectify the situation described in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the Director's report;
3. Requests the Director of the Agency to arrange with the host Governments the best means of giving effect to the proposals contained in paragraph 47 of his report;
4. Requests the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to make further efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III);
5. Directs attention to the precarious financial position of the Agency and urges Governments to consider to what extent they can contribute or increase their contributions so that the Agency can carry out its programmes;
6. Directs the Agency to continue its programme of relief for the refugees and, in so far as is financially possible, expand its programme of self-support and vocational training;
7. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out the mandate of the Agency, and to the specialized agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees.

851st plenary meeting,  
9 December 1959.

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## INWARD CABLEGRAM 181/4/X

170

CONFIDENTIAL

:FPG

I.2536/7/8.

Dated: 5th February, 1960  
1700Rec'd: 6th February, 1960  
1319  
(Via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.UN74 CONFIDENTIAL.Repeated Washington for information, repeated London  
Sav.32, Ottawa cable 11.Following are some items in conversation today with  
Barco (Acting Permanent Representative of U.S.A. in absence of  
Lodge in U.S.S.R.).OUTER SPACE.

2. Barco repeated what was reported in our telegram No.69. Sobolev had said that when the Committee met at the end of March he would be able to indicate what the U.S.S.R. favoured for the Conference. Barco told me that U.S.A. still favoured limiting the first session of the Committee to organization of the Conference but if the session were delayed much longer the Committee would have to consider other matters at its first session.

3. I asked whether Barco could throw any light on possible reasons behind U.S.S.R. thinking about the date of the Conference. Was there some big achievement (such as putting a man into space or coming out with new weapons development as forecast by Khrushchev) which the Soviet Union might want to produce at the time of or before the Conference? If so U.S.S.R. might be delaying fixing a date until they were certain of when this achievement would be made. Barco did not know of any information on this.

PRESIDENCY OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

4. The U.S.A. (and the United Kingdom and Canada) had let it be known publicly this week that Boland would have their support. U.S.A. Embassies throughout the world had been instructed to inform Governments. Several countries had already indicated that they would support Boland. Nothing new had been received from India or similar countries.

5. I asked whether, though a Communist candidate was clearly out of the question this year he could envisage U.S.A. supporting one next year. Barco replied that, while it might be thought reasonable that a Communist should take his turn with other countries, it could be argued at present that Czechoslovakia was not a country which played its part as a loyal member of General Assembly since it was not contributing to U.N.E.F. (in the financial field, the General Assembly had powers of decision and not merely of recommendation). If the Communist Bloc were to make a move to pay such contributions it would naturally become more difficult for the U.S.A. to oppose the elevation of one of them to the Presidency.

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NAA: A1838 181/4/4 PART 2



## INWARD CABLEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 - I.2536/7/8.

MIDDLE EAST.

6. The U.S.A. did not have much information on what was happening in the Middle East itself. United Nations Secretariat was now taking a more relaxed attitude on military incidents but the United States press was still showing concern. If parties refused to withdraw from demilitarized zone, Hammarskjöld would take the matter to the Security Council and indeed he had very little alternative. However, nobody (including probably U.S.C.R.) wanted discussion the Security Council because they could not see what the Council could do and because discussion might be broadened to cover almost everything in Arab-Israel relations including the Suez Canal.

7. I asked about United States attitude on Suez Canal incidents. Barco said that the U.S.A. did not know the facts and was waiting for Hammarskjöld to establish whether cargo was genuinely P.O.B. or not.

8. I asked about latest American thinking on action by United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine in pursuance of resolution No. 1456 (XIV). Barco said that Washington was considering reactivating it for limited purpose of compensation. Documenting property had been completed and the State Department would probably favour asking the Commission to undertake next two stages namely determining value of property and method of compensation. Barco himself does not expect anything useful to be achieved by the Commission.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA.

9. Hammarskjöld has not yet spoken to United States about establishing an emergency fund for assistance to African states (which would be more along lines of O.P.E. X. than of normal economic and technical assistance). I outlined what I had heard (my telegram No. 65) and Barco said this would fit in with Hammarskjöld's general approach of the United Nations undertaking a political role under cover of technical functions (as in Laos). Barco thought the United States might favour something of the sort suggested but a lot would depend on details. Lodge had come back from Africa saying that the aid given through the United Nations would be more likely to be accepted than aid given bilaterally.

FUTURE OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY

10. I canvassed with Barco some of the problems that would arise when several more African states join the Assembly and when we cannot rely on majorities even for fairly important resolutions. Barco said this was being thought about just now in Washington where attention was being given particularly to ways of trying to ensure that new states would be more favourable to United States approach. I suggested we might start laying more emphasis on the fact that Assembly decisions were recommendations only, and said that perhaps the United States had gone too far in the past in creating the impression that the spirit of the Charter required members to observe Assembly resolutions. Barco said that the United States was also giving thought to getting acceptance of the idea that on certain subjects it would be better to aim at no resolution at all and for the Assembly to content itself with having a discussion.

Plimsoll.

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NAA: A1838, 1B1/4/4 PART 2



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

168

C O N F I D E N T I A L

- 3 -

I.2536/7/8.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE  
J.I.C.  
P.M.'S.

7th February, 1960.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

National Archives of Australia

NAA: A1838, 181/4/4 PART 2



CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

OF LETTER FROM  
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
750 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

167

Memorandum No. 1184/59

GUARD

F 181/4/4

UKon 6-7676

750 Third Avenue,  
New York 17  
12th December 1959

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
Canberra, A.C.T.

Special Political Committee  
Palestine Refugees

The Committee debated this item at fifteen meetings between 10th and 30th November, adjourned the discussion to allow negotiation of a resolution, and considered the resulting draft at two meetings on 7th and 8th December. The item was completed in Plenary on 9th December.

2. Well before the item came up, the United States delegation explained to ourselves and others that Congress would not agree to a simple extension of UNRWA's mandate. It was necessary that the Administration be able to point to some progress. They thought that the Secretary-General's economic survey was interesting but, when taxed, they did not have any suggestion to offer about how it might be taken up. They said that they would make it known in the lobbies that United States support for an extension of UNRWA's mandate could not be taken for granted even though United States relief for the refugees would, of course continue. It was important that, at least, the recommendations of the Secretary-General and of the Agency Director about improving the conditions in which UNRWA operated should be taken up. (You will recall that these related to rectification of refugee rolls, recognition by the host countries of the Agency's status and entitlements under the Privileges and Immunities Convention, transfer to host governments of administrative responsibility for education, and development of self-help programmes.) They said that they would not take part in the early stages of the debate but aim, by making their views known, at influencing the Arabs to moderate, and other delegations to constructive speeches on which they could build in the negotiation of a draft resolution.

3. This approach caused confusion for some time. It smacked of bluff since it was difficult to conceive that the United States would in fact refuse to co-operate in the extension of UNRWA's mandate. Also, the Americans could not or would not say what would satisfy them (or Congress). It looked as if the debate could be directionless and there was some scepticism about whether the Arabs, particularly against the background of the Secretary-General's proposals, would be moderate under pressure. We, the Canadians and the United Kingdom informally discussed the idea of drawing up a draft resolution to give direction to the debate (our telegram No. 1119). When we put this idea to the Americans they were opposed, on the ground that the existence of any draft would prejudice the issue of whether the Agency's mandate was to be extended and take the pressure off the Arabs. In view of this, we agreed to drop the idea.

4. Whether because of the American tactics or because only Israel was prepared to take it up, the Secretary-General's economic analysis did not become a major issue in the debate. In a memorandum circulated at the beginning of the session (A/4236) the Arab Governments had strongly criticised the Secretary-General's analysis. Mr. Hammarskjöld himself made only perfunctory reference to it in his statement to the Committee.

5. In the event, possibly because of the American tactics, the debate was comparatively mild. Even Shukairy of Saudi Arabia, who opened the debate, was almost moderate: we heard later that the other Arab delegations had warned him against being violent. Most of the Arab speakers traversed the same ground and Israel several times exercised the right of reply to put its case. The statements were, however, seldom

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NAA: A1838, 181/4/4 PART 2



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166

Memorandum No. 1134/59

12th December 1959

GUARD

emotional. The Arabs, while sticking to paragraph 11 of Resolution 194(III) generally appeared to concede that no immediate method of carrying out that resolution was in sight. The Delegate of the United Arab Republic made, without admitting it, an important concession in stressing that the refugees should be encouraged to self-help. He was also not too unforthcoming on the question of the Agency's legal status.

6. Putting the more extreme view, Shukairy proposed that the Palestine Conciliation Commission should be expanded and charged with implementing all the Assembly's resolutions. In the meantime it should take charge of and collect rent from refugee property in Israel. Also, the border villagers of Gaza and Jordan should be allowed to farm their lands on the Israel side of the border. Several Arab speakers (but not the United Arab Republic) supported this proposal. So did Guinea and Afghanistan. No-one else showed any enthusiasm.

7. Apart from the Arabs and Israel, there were some 30 speakers in the General Debate. Most of the Afro-Asians, Seven West Europeans, the old Commonwealth except South Africa, the Soviet and three Eastern Europeans, the United States, China and one Latin (Peru) took part. The debate was slow to get started as the United States asked other delegations not to speak until several of the Arabs had had their say. The United States statement itself was short and vague, its main purpose being to welcome and encourage the moderation of the debate.

8. The text of the Australian statement, made at the 153th meeting, was forwarded under our memorandum No. 1145, of 30th November.

9. All delegations accepted the need to extend the Agency's mandate. Most, waiting on a lead from the United States, were non-committal about the length of the extension. The United Kingdom statement was confined to support for the recommendations of the Secretary-General and the Director about the technical operations of the Agency. Western European and old Commonwealth delegations also supported these, but several went further and, some of them mentioning the Secretary-General's report, suggested that it was not realistic to imagine the repatriation to Israel of over one million refugees and that some combination of repatriation and resettlement should be sought. Ceylon and Liberia referred to the rigid attitudes of the parties and pleaded for a compromise. The Ceylonese delegate suggested that the Palestine Conciliation Commission should try to effect a compromise on all the issues between the Arab States and Israel. He was, however, after the Arabs had complained to Sir Claude Corea, subsequently disowned in the Committee by Sir Claude. A proposal by the Irish Representative that sample repatriation should be tried caught some attention, but came late in the debate, did not seem well thought out, and was not taken up.

10. On 23rd November Pakistan, with Indonesia co-sponsoring, had, to the annoyance of the United States delegation, introduced a draft resolution (A/SPG/L.33) which picked from the resolution of the previous session those parts most favourable to the Arabs, and provided that the Agency's mandate should be extended for five years. This draft never got off the ground as shortly afterwards the United States started serious negotiations, in which the United Kingdom representative (Bealey) participated, with the Arabs.

11. The result of these negotiations was a new draft, submitted on 5th December by Indonesia and Pakistan as a revision of theirs (A/SPG/L.33 Rev.1). This

- (a) provided for the extension of the Agency's mandate for three years with a review after two years;
- (b) requested the co-operation of the host governments with the Agency "in efforts to rectify the situation described in paragraphs 17 and 18 in the Director's report" (ration rolls);
- (c) requested the Director to "arrange with the host governments the best means of giving effect to the proposals contained

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NAA: A1838, 181/4/4 PART 2



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165  
12th December 1959

GUARD

- in paragraph 47 of his report" (legal status of the agency);
- (d) requested, in operative paragraph 4, the Palestine Conciliation Commission "to make further efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III)";
- (e) directed the Agency as far as financially possible to expand its programme of self-support and vocational training.

The draft also contained several of the stock paragraphs.

12. The Israeli delegation protested to the United States, ourselves and other delegations about the paragraph concerning the Palestine Conciliation Commission. They argued that it was backward-looking and that a further negative report would arouse agitation for expanding the Commission and including undesirables. The Israelis told us they would vote against this paragraph and abstain on the whole resolution. They asked others to abstain on the paragraph while voting for the resolution. The United States discounted the Israeli objections, on the grounds that the composition of the Palestine Conciliation Commission was "safe" and it was up to the Israelis to suggest some better move. They believed that opposition to this paragraph was less strong in Tel Aviv than in the Israeli delegation. In any case they were committed, as were the United Kingdom, to the draft and had persuaded the Arabs to agree to vote for it.

13. The vote was to have been taken on 7th December. Since many delegations had not received the draft in time to get instructions, as there was talk of an amendment to the paragraph in question, and since the United States had created some confusion about the Israeli attitude, a twenty-four hours' delay was agreed.

14. In the event no-one was willing to take the initiative on any amendment. The Israeli delegation maintained its opposition to paragraph 4, and several delegations decided to abstain on this. Since the United States and the United Kingdom were committed to vote for all paragraphs of the draft, as part of a "package deal" under which they had got some concessions from the Arabs, the Australian Delegation voted in favour of this paragraph on which the voting was 54 in favour - 1 (Israel) against with 17 abstentions (Burma, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, Guatemala, Iceland, Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Sweden, Thailand, South Africa, Uruguay). Costa Rica and Ethiopia later said they would have abstained if they had been present.

15. The only other paragraph voted separately was operative paragraph 5, calling on Governments to contribute to the Agency. Guinea called for a roll-call vote on this, on the ground that his government had made no decision to contribute. Voting was 64 in favour, none against, seven abstentions (Dominican Republic, Guinea, Liberia, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa).

16. The resolution as a whole was approved on a show of hands 71 in favour, none against, one abstention (Israel).

17. The item was taken in Plenary on 9th December and the resolution adopted 80 in favour, none against, one abstention (Israel). There was no request for paragraph votes.

*J. Rimsell*  
for Delegation

GUARD

CONFIDENTIAL

KDS/rab



OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

:MAC

O. 16524

Sent: 10th December, 1959.  
1128

(Via leased channel)

TO:

Australian Mission to  
the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

728. UNCLASSIFIED. IMMEDIATE.

Your UN 1437. Appropriation Act has been passed. Payment of contributions to UNRWA and UNHCR is expected to be made this month. Contribution to UNICEF and balance of our 1959 pledge to UNEPTA have already been paid. First half of our 1960 pledge to UNEPTA will be paid during January, 1960. Arrangements are also proceeding for payment of other contributions listed in Brief for Item 46, including \$50,000 for World Refugee Year.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (872/1/1 & 852/12/19)  
TREASURY  
IMMIGRATION  
P.M.'s

11th December, 1959.

SEC A/Ss UN@ TA ER E.A.F&ME AF&ME INF ADMIN FIN

181/4/4



Name of Paper London Times  
Published at London

File No. 181/4/4  
Date 8.12.59

ME  
163

## ISRAEL ADAMANT ON ARAB REFUGEES

### NO WHOLESALERE TURN

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

JERUSALEM (ISRAEL SIDE), Dec. 7

Israel's strong objection to the proposal—made worse from her point of view because it is supported by both the United States and France—to revive the now moribund Palestine Conciliation Commission appears to arise from apprehension that it presages some possible renewed pressure on her to give Arab refugees the choice to return to their former homes if they so desire.

Mrs. Golda Meir, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, at a meeting this morning with a group of British journalists now in the Middle East to investigate the situation regarding Arab refugees, gave them a blunt and unequivocal negative to a question whether Israel would accept any of these refugees. As part of an overall Israel-Arab settlement, she said, some few might be allowed in under a scheme for reunion of families, but that was all, although Israel was prepared to pay them compensation.

Explaining the reason for this, the Minister said that those who were children 11 years ago had in the intervening period been indoctrinated in their schools, through specially prepared text books, to hate Israel and to aim at her destruction. If she accepted these now grown-up people Israel would be committing suicide.

### DOING HER SHARE

Mrs. Meir indicated that Israel had done—and was still doing—her share of solving refugee problems by having in the past 11 years taken in nearly a million Jews who were refugees—if that word was defined as meaning people who could not stay in their own country but were forced to emigrate, destitute and without skill. The Arab States had land to spare, she contended, and could without much difficulty absorb Arab refugees, who had a common language, religion, and background. Her view was that they deliberately blocked a practical solution.

"Peace between Israel and the Arabs will come not when Arab rulers begin to love Israel," Mrs. Meir declared, "but when the heads of Arab States begin to love their own people; when they are concerned more for the lives of Arab children than for the death of Israel children."



*→ m. Rudman*  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

File No. *don* 162

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.**

Record of Conversation with **H.E. Mr. Moshe Yuval, Minister of Israel**

on **7th December, 1959**

Officers Present **The Secretary**

**B.C. Hill**

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

**Palestine Refugees.**

Mr. Yuval called on instructions to make representations regarding the draft resolution on Palestine Refugees (contained in New York's telegram UN.1378) which will be coming to a vote soon in the Special Political Committee. Mr. Yuval said his Government objected particularly to the terms of para. 10 of this draft resolution which requests the Palestine Conciliation Commission (U.S., France and Turkey) to make further efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of the resolution adopted on this item in 1948 (which laid down the principle of the right of Palestine Refugees to "repatriation or compensation"). Mr. Yuval maintained that if this draft resolution were adopted with this paragraph in its present form, Israel would be obliged to tell the P.C.C. that Israel had already stated its position fully in respect of "repatriation or compensation", in the light of the altered circumstances since 1948. (Mr. Yuval explained briefly what Israel had done in the past in this regard and what was being done at the present time). This would have the effect of stultifying the other positive steps contained in the resolution since the Arabs would make no move on the ground that Israel was frustrating the resolution in its basic provision. Mr. Yuval said that Israel would be prepared to cooperate with the P.C.C. if the reference to the latter in the draft resolution were in terms of its renewing its operations as a sort of "good offices" body, with the task of facilitating negotiations between Israel and the Arab Governments concerned.

2. The Secretary told Mr. Yuval that we would be favourably inclined towards an interpretation of the P.C.C.'s role in the sense of its facilitating contacts between the two sides but that we did not regard the provision in the present draft resolution as being such that we should vote against it. The Secretary said that we naturally favoured resolutions which, after all these years, seemed to offer some prospect of progress towards a solution.

3. After going through the provisions of the draft resolution to assess its positive content, the Secretary said he understood the objections of the Government of Israel to the role proposed for the P.C.C. and

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*18*  
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**CONFIDENTIAL**

FOLLOWING POSTS:

**Tel Aviv, U.N., N.Y.,  
Washington, London.**

Report prepared by *B.C. Hill*  
**(B. C. Hill)**

ACTION:

3825/58.

Matter referred to Minister on 7th December  
and telegram despatched to New York that evening.



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

161

undertook to bring Mr. Yuval's representations to Mr. Casey's attention. However, Sir Arthur doubted whether we could do much at this late stage in the proceedings and whether if we did attempt to help Israel on this, our action would affect either the terms of the draft resolution or the vote upon it.

4. Mr. Yuval finally suggested that the Australian Delegation might be so instructed that if the Israeli delegation were able to plant the idea of a "good offices" approach instead of the present request to the P.C.C., Australia would support it.

5. The Secretary made no commitment beyond saying that he would refer this suggestion to Mr. Casey.

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

160

BMW

I.22807

Sent: 9th December, 1959.  
1730

Rec'd: 10th December, 1959.  
0914

FROM: (via leased channel)

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN.1437. UNCLASSIFIED. IMMEDIATE.

For purposes of Pledging Conference Thursday  
for refugee programmes, grateful urgent advice whether  
relevant appropriation acts yet passed through Parliament.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M.'s

10th December, 1959.

SEC A/Ss UN@ TA ER EAF&ME ME INF

G

181/4/4



159

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

MMc

I.22753

Dated: 8th December 1959  
1550  
Rec'd: 9th December 1959  
1900  
(Via leased channel.)

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN.1422. UNCLASSIFIED.

Special Political Committee.

Palestine Refugees.

Draft Resolution passed 71 in favour none  
against 1 Abstention (Israel).

2. One separate vote on operative paragraph 4 54 in  
favour (Australia, United Kingdom, United States, New  
Zealand) one against (Israel) with 17 abstentions (Burma,  
Canada, Chile, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,  
Finland, Guatemala, Iceland, Netherlands, Peru, Philippines,  
Portugal, Sweden, Thailand, South Africa, Uruguay). Of  
ten delegations absent Costa Rica and Ethiopia later said  
they would have abstained.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
IMMIGRATION.  
P.M.'s,

9th December, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA UN@ PAC&AM S&SEA E.AF&ME ME INF  
G

181/4/4



## OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

CONFIDENTIAL

ENM/ENM

0.16362

TO:

Sent: 7th December, 1959.  
1817Australian Mission to United  
Nations,NEW YORK.

(via leased channel)

717 CONFIDENTIAL IMMEDIATE.Palestine Refugees - our 719.

In response to representations by Israeli Minister Yuval objecting particularly to terms of paragraph 10 of draft resolution in UN1378 regarding role of P.C.C., Minister has agreed that you could support role confined to "good offices" if this emerges as result of efforts of Israeli Delegation. You should not take initiative in this regard. Meanwhile instructions in our 719 remain valid.

-----

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (852/12/10)  
IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M.'s

8th December, 1959.

SEC. A/Ss LA UNO ER PAC&AM AM&SP  
S&SEA E.A.F&ME E ME INF

181/4/4



157  
F 181/4/4

-852/12/10

7th December, 1959.

UNRWA : Discussion in Special Political Committee

THE SECRETARY

The Israeli Minister, Mr. Yuval, is calling on you this afternoon, on instructions, to make representations about some aspects of the draft resolution on Palestine Refugees which has been introduced into the Special Political Committee. The resolution was evolved at the instance of the U.S.A. and has the support of all the Arab members (except Jordan, which has not yet agreed). It will probably come up for discussion in New York today (the General Debate ended last week).

2. Draft Resolution (copy attached). The main purposes of the resolution are to -

- a) continue UNRWA for a further three years (to July 1963) with a review at the end of two years;
- b) make some provision for progress towards rectifying the ration rolls situation to ensure that relief is received only by those refugees who are in fact entitled to it.
- c) make some provision for progress towards putting UNRWA's relations with the host countries on a sounder legal and practical basis;
- d) to bring the Palestine Conciliation Commission back into the picture as regards the implementation of the principle of "repatriation or compensation".

3. Palestine Conciliation Commission (France, Turkey and the U.S.A.). This was established by the General Assembly in resolution 194 (iii), which also enunciated the principle of repatriation or compensation. The Commission was given a wide mandate and was instructed, inter alia, "to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation" (G.A. Resolution 194 (iii), para. 11 - text attached). Due to the attitude of the Governments concerned, however, the Commission was unable to fulfil its mandate. At its Sixth Session (January, 1952) the Assembly noted this fact with regret; expressed the view that the Governments concerned had the primary responsibility for reaching a settlement of their outstanding difficulties in accordance with the Assembly resolutions; urged those Governments to make full use of U.N. facilities to that end; and called upon the Commission to continue its efforts to secure implementation of the Assembly's resolutions, and in so doing to be available to the parties to assist them in reaching agreement. Since that time the Commission has been reduced to such minor, if useful, matters as the question of blocked Arab refugee bank accounts.

4. Israeli Objections. Mr. Yuval this morning foreshadowed Israeli objections to paragraphs 4 and 10 of the attached draft resolution, concerning the principle of repatriation or compensation and the revival of the Commission's efforts to secure its implementation.



156

5. While willing to accept a general reference to past Assembly resolutions on Palestine, Israel apparently finds para. 4 over-explicit in view of its repeatedly-stated objections to the repatriation of the refugees (which is what para. 11 of G.A. Res. 194 (iii) refers to). This particular paragraph has, however, appeared in the G.A. resolutions (supported by Israel) on this subject from 1954-1958.

6. As for paragraph 10 of the attached draft resolution, Israel apparently objects primarily to the Commission being able to formulate proposals of its own for implementing "repatriation or compensation". According to Mr. Yuval, Israel would have no objections to a Good Offices Committee which would act as a channel for proposals put forward by the parties; but it could not accept the wide powers inherent in the Commission. *in the draft resol.*

\* the P.C.C. acting as

7. Australian Position. In the Special Committee debate, we took the line that it was unrealistic to think that the refugees would be able to exercise a choice between repatriation and compensation in the near future. The Assembly could not force the issue but could provide assistance in the negotiations between the parties, whose primary responsibility had been recognized in the 1952 resolution.

8. It is suggested that Mr. Yuval might be told that -

- a) while appreciating Israel's concern, and realizing the importance of the attitude of the parties for the success of the negotiations and the Commission's part in them, we could see no other way in which the Assembly could assist the parties;
- b) we would nevertheless bring his representation to the notice of the Australian Delegation to the U.N., although it was unlikely that at this late stage they would be able to accomplish much, especially as Australia had not taken a prominent part in the matter;
- c) if the resolution were adopted without amendment, we would hope Israel would not by its attitude reduce the Commission to a cypher but would take every advantage to work in with it in order to reach agreement with the Arab countries as soon as possible.



195

General Assembly Resolution 194(II) on  
Palestine

Paragraph 11: "The General Assembly -

Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations.

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## INWARD CABLEGRAM RESTRICTED

AH:

I.22521

Sent: 5th December, 1959.  
1200  
R'ed: 6th December, 1959.  
1056

FROM:

(Via leased channel)

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN1397. RESTRICTED.

United States Delegation say that Jordan has not yet agreed to the Draft Resolution in our 1378 but that in any case it will be put in today by Indonesia and Pakistan. It will probably come up Monday.

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MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M.'S

6th December, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA UNO ER PRO&amp;AM S'SEA L&amp;P&amp;ME E ME INF

181/4/4.



CONFIDENTIAL  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

BW:LS.

I.22362.

Sent: 3rd December, 1959.  
1825.  
Rec'd: 4th December, 1959.  
1020.  
(Via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN1377 CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED: Washington.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

Following telegram contains text given us by the United States Delegation of draft resolution agreed at referendum at meeting last night of United States and Arab Delegations. If text is confirmed at further meeting today, the United States Delegation are under instructions to say that they will vote for it provided the Arabs do likewise. The United Kingdom Delegation expects to be instructed to support this text. Other delegations do not appear to have been consulted.

2. If there is agreement with the Arabs the United States Delegation hopes that the vote can be taken tomorrow to avoid the possibility of the agreement coming unstuck.

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MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
P.M.'S.

4th December, 1959.

SEC. A/Ss LA UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA  
E.A.F&ME E ME INF

G.

181/4/4  
CONFIDENTIAL



152  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L

I. 22363.

Dated: 3rd December, 1959.

1845.

Rec'd: 4th December, 1959.

1051.

BW:MP

(via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN 1378. CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Washington.

Our preceding telegram.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

The General Assembly,

1. Recalling its Resolutions 194(111) of 11th December, 1948, 302 (1V) of 8th December, 1959, 393(V) of 2nd December, 1950, 513 (VI) of 26th January, 1952, 614 (VII) of 6th November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27th November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4th December 1954, 916 (X) of 3rd December, 1955, 1018(XI) of 28th February, 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12th December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12th December, 1958.,

2. Noting the annual report of the Director of the U.N.R.W.A.; in particular the expiration of the Agency's mandate on 30th June, 1960.,

3. Noting the recommendation of the Secretary General and the Director of the agency for the continuation of U.N.R.W.A.;

4. Noting with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of G.A.Res. 194(111) has not been effected, and that no substantial progress has been made in the program endorsed in paragraph 2 of Res.513(VI) for the re-integration of refugees and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern.,

5. Having reviewed the budget and noting with concern that contributions from member states are not sufficient,

6. Recalling that the Agency, as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, enjoys the benefits of the convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations,

7. Decides to extend the mandate of U.N.R.W.A. for a period of three years with a review at the end of two years,

8. Requests the Governments concerned to co-operate with the Agency in efforts to rectify the situation described in paragraphs 17 and 18 in the Director's report,

181/4/4

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

C O INWARD CABLEGRAM

I. 22363.

2.

9. Requests the Director of U.N.R.W.A. to arrange with the host Governments the best means of giving effect to the proposals contained in paragraph 47 of his report,

10. Requests the P.C.C. to make further efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of Res.194(III),

11. Directs attention to the precarious financial position of the Agency and urges Governments to consider to what extent they can contribute or increase their contributions so the Agency can carry out its programs,

12. Directs the Agency to continue its program of relief for the refugees, and, in so far as is financially possible expand its programs of self-support and vocational training,

13. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out the mandate of the Agency and to the Specialized Agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees.

MIN.&DEPT. E.A.  
IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M's

4th December, 1959.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

RESTRICTED

:MAC

C. 16277

Sent: 4th December, 1959.  
1823  
(via leased channel)

TO:

Australian Mission to  
the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

719. RESTRICTED. PRIORITY.

Palestine Refugees.

Agree you support resolution reported in your  
telegram 1378 provided United Kingdom and United States also  
support.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M.'s

7th December, 1959.

SEC A/Ss. LA UN@ ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA D.A.F&ME  
E ME INF

181/4/4



CONFIDENTIAL  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

149

BN.MMc

I.22113

Dated: 30th November 1959  
1930  
Rec'd: 1st December 1959  
1157  
(Via leased channel.)

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN.1343. CONFIDENTIAL.

Special Political Committee.

General Debate on Palestine refugees ended today and consideration of item suspended to allow negotiations on draft resolution.

2. Czech Item to come up tomorrow. Tentatively three meetings have been allotted to this, three to Indian Item and one more to refugees. The order as between the latter two items has not been decided.

3. As regards Czech Item, new draft resolution in name of Czechoslovakia and Roumania has now been introduced (see following telegram). This amounts to reversion to earlier proposal and will presumably be easier to deal with. Latins are drawing up amendments which would change all except first preamble.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.,  
P.M.'s,

1st December, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA UN@ ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA  
E.A.F&ME E ME INF

181/4/4



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM RESTRICTED 148

JG:HF

I.21889

FROM:

Dated: 26th November, 1959.

1425

Rec'd: 27th November, 1959.

1233

(Via leased channel)

Australian Mission to  
the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN1309. RESTRICTED.

Repeated Washington.

Special Political Committee.

Palestine Refugees.

General Debate will probably end on Monday.

2. Arab proposals to reactivate the P.C.C., with the specific task of collecting rent from abandoned property, have not received support except from Guinea.

3. Several Delegations have said that the Ceylonese suggestion that P.C.C. be charged with wider responsibilities deserves consideration, but no one has specifically endorsed it.

4. There has been general agreement that the Agency's mandate must be extended but vagueness about the length. Sweden has supported indefinite extension. The Netherlands has suggested two years. The Pakistan draft resolution suggests five years. The Canadians favour indefinite with review, probably by the Secretary-General, after perhaps three years. But they, like ourselves, will need to take United States views into account.

5. United States Delegation told us that they had made contact today with the Arab Delegations with a view to getting agreement on a Draft Resolution which would -

- (a) Extend the Mandate for two years;
- (b) Make some provision for progress towards implementing the Secretary-General's recommendations about ration rolls, etc.
- (c) call on the Palestine Conciliation Commission to discuss with the parties measures by which it could expand the scope of its activities within its existing terms of reference;

6. United States Delegation thought the Arab response encouraging. Either the Pakistan Draft Resolution would have to be extensively amended or, preferably, a new one substituted.

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Min. & Dept. External Affairs.  
Immigration.  
Treasury.  
P.M.'s.

27th November, 1959.

RESTRICTED

181/4/4.

SEC A/Ss LA UN ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME E ME INF



INWARD CABLEGRAM

147

:FPG

I.21882

Dated: 25th November, 1959  
2015

Rec'd: 27th November, 1959.  
0920  
(Via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN.1306 UNCLASSIFIED.

Repeated Washington.

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

In statement in general debate today Australia said there seemed no alternative to extending U.N.R.W.A.'s mandate, (did not discuss for what period) but Ration Rolls should be revised and the Agency's juridical status should be recognized. Also Director should discuss with host Governments Secretary General's recommendation that they should take over education. It did not seem possible, if only for lack of funds, for Agency to take responsibility for economic refugees. More contributors necessary even to maintain the Agency self-support programmes means of providing hope to the refugees. It was unrealistic to think that refugees would be able to exercise their choice in the near future. The Assembly could not force the issue but could provide assistance in negotiations between the parties, whose primary responsibility had been recognized in Resolution 512(VI).

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M.'S.

*Settlement?*

27th November, 1959.

SEC A/Ss MR.EASTMAN UN TA ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA  
E.AF&ME E ME INF INTELL

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TEL AVIV

181/4/4



OUTWARD CABLEGRAM ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

146

:MAC

O. 15836

Sent: 27th November, 1959.  
1628.  
(via leased channel)

To:

The Australian Mission to United  
Nations,  
NEW YORK.

693. CONFIDENTIAL.

Your UN1290 - UNRWA.

Our preliminary reaction is that Indonesian-Pakistani draft resolution ignores recommendations of Secretary-General and Director, and virtually seeks to perpetuate status quo. This unlikely to appeal to contributing countries.

2. Would appreciate your comments on draft resolution together with assessment of support it is likely to attract. What is attitude of Arabs and of United Kingdom and United States? Have the latter any alternatives in mind?

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MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
IMMIG.  
TREASURY  
P.M.'s

28th November, 1959.

SEC. A/Ss. LA UN@ AM&SP S&SEA PAC&AM E.AF&ME  
ME INF ER E

181/4/4



COPY

OF LETTER FROM  
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
750 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

145

30th November 1959

File No. 210/1/3

Memorandum No. 1145/59

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
Canberra, A.C.T.

Palestine Refugees

.....  
Attached is a copy of a statement made by the  
Australian representative in the Special Political  
Committee on 25th November 1959.

*For Angus*  
for Delegation

/fdb

*AME. - to refain.  
Orig. on 852/12/10.*

*F 181/4/4*



144

Palestine Refugees  
Statement in the Special Political Committee  
25th November, 1959  
by the Australian Representative (Mr. J.D.L. Hood)

Mr. Chairman,

The immediate question at issue in this debate is that of the continuation of United Nations assistance to the Palestine Refugees. I will address myself to this question.

We have before us the Secretary-General's proposals in document A/4121 and the Annual Report of the Director of UNRWA. Study of these documents leaves no doubt in the mind of my delegation that on humanitarian grounds United Nations support for the unfortunate Palestine Refugees must continue. The existence of over one million of these people is not a problem that can be left to liquidate itself in their present status of refugees. The numbers indeed are increasing. The level of subsistence among them is meagre. It would indeed have been worse had it not been for the devoted and efficient service of the Director of the Agency, his predecessor and his staff; for the assistance of the host governments; and for the efforts of many private agencies. The refugees cannot, as of now, provide for themselves, and continued assistance is necessary.

While considering the continuation of United Nations assistance through the established agency it is no more than proper to consider the recommendations and comments which have been made by both the Secretary-General and the Director about the conditions under which the agency has been operating.

The Secretary-General and Director have pointed out the anomalous state of the refugee ration rolls. Rations are being drawn on behalf of some 150,000 people apparently no longer entitled to them. As against this are some 105,000 eligible children unable to draw rations. We can understand that what the United Kingdom representative the other day called "a kind of rough justice" may well apply to mitigate the patent irregularity of this situation. We would nevertheless hope that the Director will be able in the future, with the co-operation of the governments concerned, to have the lists properly revised. It would in our view not be satisfactory practice or procedure to perpetuate the anomaly involved.

Again in his report the Director has rightly drawn our attention to the not always recognised burden assumed by the host governments on behalf of the refugees. He has pointed out the sort of problems, difficult ones, and different in various regions - which face the governments concerned in their dealings with the Agency. He has, however, also pointed out that in certain respects the Agency's day-to-day operations have been hampered by lack of recognition of its correct juridical status. The kind of questions which need to be settled are set out as a matter of fact in paragraph 47 of the Director's report, which has already been quoted and so I will not again read it out. I will say, however, that the Director's recommendations in this respect appear to us eminently reasonable, and we have been encouraged by the statement of the representative of the United Arab Republic, for example, to think that, so far as his government at least is concerned the problems may not prove intractable. We should certainly not, with equanimity, want to launch the Agency on a further lease of life without some prospect that the juridical difficulties it has encountered would be ironed out.

Again, Sir, the Secretary-General has suggested that in his words "primary administrative responsibility for the programme of general education could with advantage to all concerned be assumed

/by the host governments."



by the host governments." Now we realise that the host governments have in fact already assumed considerable responsibilities in this field. Also, that here again problems may vary from one region to another. We should think, however, that the subject of transfer to the host governments of primary responsibility, where appropriate, for services now provided by the Agency, is a subject which could usefully be discussed further between the governments and the Director.

The Agency, Sir, is rightly credited with using its limited resources with the maximum efficiency. The distressing thing is that these resources are so limited. This has direct relevance for another suggestion made by the Secretary-General, who drew our attention to the condition of the so-called "economic refugees." We cannot fail to have sympathy with the situation of these people, but it is difficult to see how, with its present resources, the Agency could in fact undertake responsibility for the more than 300,000 additional souls who are concerned in this description and do not fall under the mandate of the Agency. The decision is a hard one to take - but unless the Agency is provided with more funds it will continue to face immense difficulties in maintaining even its present programmes. The addition of a liability of at least another \$5,000,000 per year would seem not to be within the bounds of possibility.

My own Government has contributed what it can to the Agency. In all modesty I would express the hope that more governments will find it possible to contribute. We do not see any practical alternative to continuing to finance the operations of the Agency by voluntary contributions, but we hope that there will be a wide response made to the appeal again this year by the Director.

Despite its enforced limitations of budgeting the Agency has been able in the past year to make progress in the field of vocational training. We see some encouragement in the Director's judgment that the scholastic year 1958-1959 was an important one for the education of Palestine refugee youth. The developments which have given rise to that judgment are significant even if, so far, their scope is not very wide. We would agree with the representative of the United Arab Republic that it is necessary that more attention be given to the social, cultural and spiritual training of the refugees to prepare them for a useful, self-supporting life. This seems to us, in human terms, to be a very important point. I would not like to read into the statement of the Representative of the United Arab Republic more than this intention. Quite clearly he was referring to efforts to be made against the time when the refugees should be asked to exercise the choice offered them under the Assembly's resolution. It seems to me, however, that if we can think of the refugees as individuals and not merely as a collective noun, we are more likely to reach a sympathetic understanding of their situation and also more likely to find movement in a direction which will alleviate their plight.

The conception of the individual refugee has been at the base of many of the Assembly's resolutions on this question. It is the central point perhaps of resolution 194 which provides that each refugee would make his own choice under the conditions prescribed in the resolution. It is, I greatly regret to say, unrealistic to think that circumstances exist, at this moment, in which that choice could be made or implemented. As many speakers - among them representatives of Arab Governments - have said during this debate no immediate prospect of a solution is in sight. I do not intend to attempt any assessment of responsibility for this. It does, however, seem clear, as others before me have pointed out, that so long as the attitude of the parties remain as they have so far been expressed, no solution in a long-term sense can be discerned either on the part of the parties or on the part of the Assembly.

/ This is a deplorable



This is a deplorable situation for everyone, but most of all for the refugee himself. So long as no alternative is offered him but a choice which he is unable to exercise, and meanwhile he has to be content with nothing more than meagre subsistence, his life must be one of frustration. Particularly distressing, as the Director has pointed out, is the plight of the young people reaching maturity - some 30,000 each year. These young people must be given some hope. They must be given the prospect of leading their lives in dignity no matter into what community they may eventually settle when the opportunity occurs. They must meanwhile be given the training for leading a self-reliant life.

The magnitude of the effort required to achieve these conditions has been indicated in the Secretary-General's study - in his reference to the measure of investment likely to be necessary to enable the re-integration of the refugees - and I am not proposing to go any further at the moment into this aspect Mr. Chairman. But meanwhile the human factors seem to us to make it essential that the Agency's programme for vocational training, scholarships and individual assistance be developed to the greatest degree possible.

Expansion of these programmes in the degree required is not possible within the limits of the funds which have so far been made available to the Agency. We are glad to note that the additional funds which will become available through the World Refugee Year contributions will be applied in this direction specifically. This can, however, be little more than a palliative, and again the need of the Agency for further contributions by Member Governments is underlined.

As I have tried to confine my remarks to the immediate problems connected with the continuation of United Nations assistance to the refugees - the need for improvement in the conditions under which the Agency has operated; its urgent need for support by more governments and the necessity to offer to individual refugees through the Agency's programmes the means for leading a productive life - I reserve my delegation's right to comment at a later stage on the various suggestions which have been made on the broader aspects of the problem.

These, Sir, are the barest elements of the situation before this Committee deriving from the item on our agenda. But, Sir, concentration which I have given and, others before me, to some of the practical aspects of the problems of continued United Nations assistance, does not exclude on my part and certainly is not excluded on the part of others, a deep awareness of the wider political and emotional elements in the situation. Perhaps I may be forgiven a slight personal note, Sir, if I recall that I, myself, was a member of the Special Committee of the General Assembly in 1947 out of whose report arose the resolution of 1947 for what is called Partition of Palestine. At that time, Sir, all of us both in that Committee and those who took part in the ensuing debates in the Special Committee on Palestine of the General Assembly itself at Lake Success, were deeply conscious that whatever proposals might be set down on paper and indeed adopted by vote of the General Assembly would, given the situation from which they arose, not de facto work themselves out without deliberate and sincere adjustments within the area itself. The decision of the General Assembly in 1947 was not taken in vacuo. It was an arrangement devised to the best of the ability of the General Assembly in the light of its best intentions, and in what was already an existing situation of tension, to say the least. The so-called Palestine question in those days was not something suddenly discovered by any committee. It had existed and the subsequent situation of tension already existed long before 1947 - I need not go into that - but I say that in those days 11 or 12 years ago the Assembly showed this by its own resolutions. The Assembly was very conscious of the fact that the United Nations was not in a situation of arbitrament in this matter. The most it could do was to lend its authority to the

/recommendations taken in all



recommendations taken in all awareness of the dangers and difficulties. Nor is it any more now Sir, in a position of arbitrament in this particular situation confronting the Committee now which, of course, is a legacy of those times. And when it is suggested that by some form of words here duly adopted perhaps by vote - if a vote exists for any such formula - that the United Nations can exercise any direct influence at the present time in this question of Refugees it must be said Sir, that this is not a realistic approach, as the speaker who has just preceded me and others before me pointed out already. In 1952, the Assembly in one way or another recognized the primary responsibility of the parties for the adjustment of the differences. This responsibility exists in no less degree at this present time, Sir, and I think that it does no harm to add one more voice to that of others who have preceded me in this debate in underlining that fundamental fact, - it is a fact of the situation - that the primary responsibility lies within the area. Where assistance or facilities provided by the United Nations can be utilized at the wish and desire of the parties then indeed these facilities exist. One of them, of course, is the Palestine Conciliation Commission, and there are other facilities which I need not mention. If, Sir, we determine the course of action now in relation to the particular problem of continuation of assistance to the refugees that is our duty. If we can indicate beyond that particular limit that there is emerging in this General Assembly a strong and growing wish to see this problem together with other problems of the area settled by direct means between the parties themselves, then we will have, I think, expressed the utmost of our volition and abilities in this respect.

Sir,

Thank you.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

I.21725

:FPG

Dated: 24th November, 1959  
1550

Rec'd: 25th November, 1959  
2112  
(Via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN.1290 UNCLASSIFIED.

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

Indonesia and Pakistan have tabled the following draft resolution:-

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194(III), 302(IV), 393(V), 513(VI), 614(VII), 7204(VIII), 818(IX), 916(X), 1018(XI), 1191(XII), 1315(XIII),

Noting the annual report of the Director of United Nations Relief and Works Agency, and in particular the expiration of the Agency's mandate on 30th June, 1960,

Noting with deep regret that Repatriation or Compensation of the Refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194(III) has not been effected, and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

Noting the recommendation of the Secretary-General and of the Director of the Agency for the continuation of U.N.R.W.A. decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations relief and works agency for a period of five years,

Requests the Agency to continue its consultations with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interest of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of Resolution 194(III),

Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out the mandate of the agency and to the specialized agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M.'S.

26th November, 1959.

SEC A/Bs LA UNO ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SLA E.A.F&ML E  
ME INF

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181/4/4



## DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper.....*Times*.....File No.....*181/4/4*.....

139

Published at.....*London*.....Date.....*19. 11. 59*.....

**U.N.R.W.A. OFFICIAL KILLED  
IN CAR CRASH** *ME*  
BEIRUT, Nov. 18.—Mr. Leslie Carver,  
deputy director of the United Nations  
Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian  
refugees, was killed in a car crash out-  
side Beirut to-day.—*Associated Press*.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**RESTRICTED**  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

TWWP:ABJ.

I.21095.

Dated: 16th November, 1959.

1835.

FROM:

Rec'd: 17th November, 1959.

1940.

Australian Mission to the  
United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

(Transmitted via leased channel)

UN1218 RESTRICTED.

Special Political Committee - Palestine Refugees.

Committee has heard statement by Saudi Arabia, U.A.R. and Lebanon and replies by Israel.

Recreminations apart, following proposals have been made.

2. Saudi Arabia, (whose opening statement was regarded as surprisingly moderate) suggested:

(A) Reactivation and possible expansion of Palestine Conciliation Commission to carry out full implementation of Assembly resolutions.

(B) Measures to protect and collect revenue from property of refugees.

(C) Frontier villagers in Jordan and Gaza should be allowed to cultivate their lands on Israel side.

3. The U.A.R. suggested that the U.N.R.W.A. Budget should be incorporated in the United Nations budget or alternatively that an annual capital fund be established from the United Nations Working Capital Fund to be repaid from contributions to the Agency.

4. Lebanon suggested that Conciliation Commission collect from Israel rent and compensation for use of refugee property.

5. United States Delegation, with whom we are keeping in close touch, are not dissatisfied with progress so far. They regard qualified endorsement by U.A.R. of self-help programme as useful. Director on other hand is not very happy about U.A.R.'s failure to concede much on the Agency's status.

6. Our feeling so far is that in light of opening Arab statements as a whole and tone of first Israeli reply, some slight possibility of a constructive resolution beyond simple extension of U.N.R.W.A. mandate may exist.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
IMMIG.  
TREASURY  
P.M.'s.

18th November, 1959.

SEC A/Ss MR. EASTMAN UNO ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA E.A.F&ME  
E ME INF INTELL

G.

**RESTRICTED**

181/4/4



137

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

CW

I.20592/3

Dated: 10th November, 1959.

2020

Rec'd: 11th November, 1959.

1330

(via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Embassy,  
WASHINGTON.

2547. CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

Repeated Australian Mission New York.  
U.N.W.R.A.

Sisco (Director United Nations Political Affairs) called us in on 10th November to explain United States tactics in U.N.W.R.A. Debate which begins tomorrow and to express the hope that Australia would support United States attitude.

2. He said that State Department in recent years had come under increasing Congressional pressure to work towards the eventual winding up of the Palestine Refugee Programme. United States was putting up 70 percent of the funds for this programme and had so far provided 250 million dollars for Palestine Refugee Relief. Mandate of U.N.W.R.A. came to an end on 30th June next year and State Department felt it was even more important than in the past to get some concrete indication of progress towards winding up problem.

3. Unlike in previous years the United States had so far been non-committal about the kind of resolution which should be sought this year. United States was hoping that the Arabs themselves might come up with some suggestions. As a minimum the United States wanted the Arabs to agree to the three principal recommendations in the Secretary General's report namely.

(1) There should be some rectification of relief rolls which were now padded with the names of people who either did not exist or who had employment elsewhere.

(11) Host Governments should take over the responsibility for education. (United States would prefer a broader turnover of responsibility to host Governments but education would be a start).

(111) There should be a maximum co-operation between U.N.W.R.A. officials and the Arab Government. (There had been too much friction between them in the past).

4. The United States understood that there was some move among the Arabs to adopt a more positive approach this year.

5. The tactics which the United States intended to follow in debate were to let the Arabs speak before giving any consideration to a resolution. The United States hoped that Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway and other contributor countries would also agree to refrain until it was seen what the Arabs might produce.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

181/4/4



136

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

-2-  
I.20592/3

6. Sisco said that we could be assured that United States had no intention of cutting off assistance completely when U.N.W.R.A.'s mandate came to an end on 30th June but the State Department would need to have something to show to Congress even if it was only acceptance of the modest recommendations of the Secretary General's report. There were three aspects of this year's resolution which United States would need to watch. First was timing; and second was to ensure that any resolution did not provide for the indefinite continuation of U.N.W.R.A.; and the third was incorporation of the three principal recommendations of the Secretary General's report.

7. The United States had heard that Engen (Norway) was floating a resolution behind the scenes probably on behalf of Hammarskjöld but United States for reasons given above thought this was premature. Sisco said they were making this approach to us because they hoped that Australia would not associate itself with any resolution which did not include the Secretary General's modest recommendations.

8. We undertook to report the above to you and to the Australian Delegation in New York and we suggested that the United States should make contact with Delegation in New York on the matter.

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A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M'S

11th November, 1959.

SEC A/Ss UNO ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.A.F&ME E ME  
INF  
G  
TEL AVIV

CONFIDENTIAL



135

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS **RESTRICTED**  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

/ENM  
FROM: Australian Mission to  
United Nations,  
NEW YORK.  
Sent: 9th November, 1959.  
1940  
Rec'd: 10th November, 1959.  
1858  
(via leased channel)

UN1154 RESTRICTED.

Special Political Committee.

As the Canadians considering switching to support the Indians obtained postponement of apartheid vote until Tuesday. Australia made explanation of vote today in terms of your telegram 630.

2. Committee will commence Arab Refugees Item Tuesday with statements by the Secretary General and the Director General of U.N.R.W.A.

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A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
P.M.'s

11th November, 1959.

|       |      |          |        |        |       |
|-------|------|----------|--------|--------|-------|
| SEC.  | A/Se | UN@      | COMREL | PAC&AM | AM&SP |
| S&SEA | SA   | E, AF&ME | E      | AF     | INF   |

G

LONDON                  PRETORIA                  WASHINGTON

181/4/4



134

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

GW:HP

I.20431

FROM:

Dated: 6th November, 1959.

1610

Rec'd: 7th November, 1959.

1858

(Via leased channel)

Australian Mission to the  
United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN1119. CONFIDENTIAL.

Arab Refugee.

We have talked to Davis, (Director-General U.N.W.R.A.), whose view on handling of Item appears to be as follows:-

Extension of U.N.W.R.A. mandate for only short period e.g. two or three years would be unsatisfactory inter alia, because good staff would leave and proper arrangements with Arab Governments would be impossible. Assembly Resolution should not try to force on the Arab Governments all the recommendations in his and the Secretary-General's report. He believes that, with authorisation from the Assembly to negotiate, he can reach satisfactory arrangements about revision of ration rolls, and transfer of education to host Governments. He thinks Assembly demands on these points would be counter-productive. He does think, however, that the Assembly should insist on recognition by the host Governments of the Agency's proper status if confidential negotiations, which are now going on between the Secretary-General and U.A.R. on this point, are not successful. He clearly does not see any immediate future for the Secretary-General's proposals for large scale economic development in the area.

2. Since the United States is apparently not prepared to take any initiative early in the Debate, we have tentatively spoken with the United Kingdom and the Canadians about the possibility of drawing up a Draft Resolution along the lines indicated by Davis for discussion with the United States and other Delegations.

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A/Min. & Dept. External Affairs.  
P.M.'s.

8th November, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA MR.EASTMAN UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA  
EAF&ME E AF ME INF INTELL

181/4/4

**CONFIDENTIAL**



## INWARD CABLEGRAM

AH:

I.17784

Sent: 2nd October, 1959.  
1805  
Received: 5th October, 1959.  
1712  
(Via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN859. UNCLASSIFIED.

General Debate.

Following are main points of statement by New Zealand (Shanahan) on 2nd October:

- (1) Disarmament. It is realistic to welcome and encourage direct relations among the great Powers. New Zealand believes that the Ten Power Committee will be "well placed to promote negotiations among the four Powers themselves", but does not consider the United Nations should remain inactive. Disarmament proposals by the United Kingdom and the Soviet to this Assembly are "most interesting and important" and demand "careful study and thorough discussion". Shanahan gave brief analysis of the main features of both proposals.
- (2) Germany and Berlin. Shanahan welcomed recent statement by Eisenhower and Khrushchev that negotiations on Berlin would be reopened "with a view to achieving solution which would be in the interests of all concerned".
- (3) Hungary. Shanahan regretted that "repressive policies have not abated" and that "the Soviet and Hungarian authorities have continued to defy the United Nations".
- (4) Tibet. Brutal repressive measures ... cannot be ignored by this Assembly.
- (5) Laos. Similar to situation in Lebanon last year. "My Government is gratified that the Security Council has responded promptly to appeal recently made by the Government of Laos".
- (6) U.N.E.F. Must be maintained.
- (7) Palestine Refugees. New Zealand continues to support U.N.R.W.A., but entitled to expect "full co-operation of countries in the area in seeking to achieve more satisfactory and permanent solution".
- (8) Suez. The New Zealand Government "remains firmly of the view that the Suez Canal should be operated under a system which treats ships of all nations alike".

.... /2

181/4/4



INWARD CABLEGRAM

- 2 - I.17784

- (9) Trusteeship. Shanahan spoke of developments in West Samoa towards independence.

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A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE  
MIN. & DEPT. TERRITORIES  
P.M.'S

6th October, 1959.

SEC A/Ss MR.EASTMAN UN@ ER COMREL PAC&AM EA AM&SP  
S&SEA SA SEA EAF&ME E AF ME INF DL MT INTELL

G

LONDON WELLINGTON



## INWARD CABLEGRAM

BMW

1.17509

Sent: 28th September, 1959.  
2310  
Rec'd: 1st October, 1959.  
1601

FROM: (via leased channel)

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN.815. UNCLASSIFIED.

General Debate.

Following are main points from speeches afternoon  
28th September.

2. Lebanon.

(I) Opposition to Sahara tests.

(II) United Nations cannot remain indifferent "ruthless and pitiless" war in Algeria. Views of provisional Government of Algeria should be sought. Rights of self determination should be "reflected in fact".

(III) United Nations has duty of assisting Palestine refugees. Lebanon vitally concerned. Refugees comprise 10 percent of total population. "Fundamental obligation" of United Nations is to provide for repatriation.

(IV) Defended right of U.A.R. to refuse passage through Suez of Israeli cargoes. Branded Israel as "aggressor" state.

3. South Africa (Louw)

(I) Re-stated South Africa's rights under Article 2(7) which is "clear and explicit".

(II) Spoke of "relatively peaceful evolution" South of Sahara - emergence of new states, etc. political stability not sufficient, economic viability must be assured.

(III) Quotes History to prove rights of white man in South Africa (e.g. European migrants arrived about same time as Bantu immigrants). "We are South Africans rooted in the soil of South Africa".

(IV) Criticized lack of understanding of achievement of metropolitan governments in raising living standards of colonies in Africa.

(V) Emphasized need for co-operation of states South of Sahara on matters of common concern. Spoke of work of C.C.T.A. for pooling and exchange of scientific and technical information. South Africa has played important part in this work.

(VI) Condemned newspaper, television and cinema distortions of "human relations" between whites and non-whites in South Africa. Quoted examples.

181/4/4



130

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

- 2 -

I.17509

(VII) Defended policy of segregation of races in South Africa. Aim is to prevent serious "racial clashes" which would inevitably accompany mingling of races. Policy takes account of special needs of Bantu population (Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 and Bantu Education Act of 1953).

(VIII) Explained legislation passed by last South African Parliament to provide self-Government for the six ethnic groups of Bantu race.

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A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE  
P.M.'s

2nd October, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA MR.EASTMAN UN TA ER COMREL  
PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA EAF&ME E AF ME  
INF DL INTELL

G

LONDON PRETORIA



**OUTWARD CABLEGRAM**

ENM:ABJ.

O.12713.

Sent: 26th September, 1959.

TO:

1756.

(Transmitted via leased channel)

Australian Mission to the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

528 RESTRICTED. PRIORITY. *F 18/4/4*

Your 768 and 793.

Economic Section of Minister's statement.

The general trend of the speech seems effective and well-conceived and ends on a positive note in suggesting that Eco Soc focus its attention each year on a major topic for discussion. Detailed comments are as follows:-

(a) Paragraph 4 - Australian immigration and development. Third sentence might claim too much. Since the end of the second world war, Australia has maintained a high rate of immigration at between one and two per cent of her total population each year.

(b) paragraph 7 - the United States. Language in second and third sentences might be a little too strong. You might like to consider something along following lines:

"There has been, on occasions, a slowing down in the rate of growth of the United States economy, and on each of these occasions, fears have been aroused that a depression might develop, with consequent difficulties for other countries. But the recessions have been short-lived and the slackening of economic activity in the United States has never been as severe as some feared it would be".

(c) paragraph 8 - commodity instability and agricultural protection. Suggest second and following sentences be re-written as follows:-

"Unfortunately I must substantially agree with the Secretary-General when he states that not much progress has been made in dealing with the problem of commodity instability. Some progress certainly has been made, but not as much as we would like. In so far as it results in an overall reduction in agricultural protectionism, my Government agrees with the Secretary-General, the World Economic Survey 1958 and the G.A.T.T. group of experts that industrial countries could significantly improve export markets for the under-developed countries by selective reductions in agricultural protectionism. A beginning must be made in dealing with this problem. My Government, and, I am sure, all countries which depend on primary products for an important part of their foreign exchange earnings, would like to establish a clear and continuing trend towards the reduction of agricultural protectionism over a wide range of primary production. The trend in recent years towards increasing agricultural protectionism in industrial countries is a cause for concern to those countries themselves - because they must pay more for agricultural products. But it can also mean severe economic difficulty for the primary exporting countries whose foreign markets

**RESTRICTED** ..2..



OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

2. 0.12/15

and foreign income are constantly being eroded".

2. Except for those on agricultural protectionism, above comments are not of major significance. We have had some consultations with other Departments concerned but unfortunately it is extremely difficult to get final inter-departmental clearance on Saturday. We will complete our consultations urgently on Monday morning and cable any necessary revisions of above. However, our expectation is that any revisions would be minor.

3. We have no comment on Middle East Section.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
TRADE (C)  
PRIMARY INDUSTRY (C)  
N.D.  
IMMIG.  
P.M.'S.

28th September, 1959.

SEC A/Ss UN ER@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA E.A.F&ME E INF

RESTRICTED



127  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

/ENM

FROM:

Australian Mission to  
United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

Sent: 25th September, 1959.

1320

Rec'd: 26th September, 1959.

0830

(via leased channel)

UN793 UNCLASSIFIED.IMMEDIATE

Minister's Speech.

As Minister will be speaking on Wednesday morning  
and will be leaving for Washington on Sunday for S.E.A.T.O.  
Council he wants to settle final version of speech on Saturday.  
Consequently if you have any comments he would appreciate them  
today.

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A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.

26th September, 1959.

SEC. A/Ss UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SEA  
E.A.F&ME E INF DL MT INTELL

181/4/4.



181/4/4 126

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

:FPG

I.17054

Sent: 24th September 1959  
1900

Rec'd: 25th September, 1959  
1045  
(Via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN.784 UNCLASSIFIED.

GENERAL DEBATE.

Following are main points from speeches 23rd September:-

YUGOSLAVIA.

- (1) There has recently been improvement in international atmosphere. We must take full advantage of this. "Cold War" must end.
- (2) Agreement on Disarmament essential. Role of United Nations not diminished because of negotiations by Great Powers outside the United Nations. Yugoslavia accepted composition of ten power body based on parity.
- (3) Insistence on controls should not be allowed to impede agreement on disarmament.
- (4) Even before agreement on global plan for disarmament, should be possible to reach separate agreement on such issues as reduction in military budgets and a "thinned out" zone in Central Europe.
- (5) Algerians should be given right of self determination. Negotiations should be conducted on basis of equality.

IRELAND.

- (1) Certain restricted areas, particularly those where interests of great powers clash, should be guaranteed by standing United Nations force. Non nuclear nations in such areas would undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons and to subject themselves to United Nations inspection. In return, nuclear powers and all other members of United Nations would bind themselves to defend members of area from attack.
- (2) Example of approach suggested would be Germany and Berlin. Ireland could not see "any peaceful solution acceptable to both power groups for the problem of European security, unless a re-united Germany together with Poland and other Eastern European countries agree to become an area of law, free from foreign troops, free from weapons of blitzkrieg and mass destruction, and subject to United Nations inspection and guarantee". This would be prototype for similar areas elsewhere.
- (3) Ireland hoped for agreement amongst nuclear powers not to give nuclear weapons to non-nuclear powers, and for agreement amongst non nuclear powers not to make or accept nuclear weapons. There should be United Nations inspection.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

125

- (4) Ireland hoped that eventually present nuclear powers would agree to abolish nuclear testing, to cut-off production, and to accept effective inspection.

JORDAN.

- (1) Establishment of ten power body on disarmament was "Practical and constructive step".
- (2) France's intention to explode atomic bomb was set-back to hopes for cessation of tests. Deplored dangers of "Fall out".
- (3) Welcomed Cyprus settlement and co-operation of United Kingdom Government.
- (4) Problem of "West Irian", although not on agenda, would always be of concern to Jordan because of merits of question and Jordan's good relations with Indonesia.
- (5) French colonialism and tyranny in Algeria should cease. Two parties concerned should enter into negotiations.
- (6) United Nations had failed in its duty towards Palestine refugees.
- (7) Large scale Immigration into Israel was causing Arab States serious concern and made settlement of refugee problem more difficult.
- (8) Jordan was preparing detailed reply to Secretary-General's report on refugees and was guided by following principles:-
  - (a) Refugee problem could not be separated from main Palestine question.
  - (b) Problem was political, not economic.
  - (c) Right of refugees to return to Homelands must not be challenged.
  - (d) Relief should continue to be responsibility of United Nations.
- (9) Jordan supported United Arab Republic's refusal to allow Israel transit through Suez Canal.
- (10) Uruguay and Guatemala both supported freedom of transit through international waterways for all nations. Former specifically named Israel.

A/ MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE  
MIN. & DEPT. SUPPLY  
P.M.'S.

25th September, 1959.



*Original of Bergalich  
No 16*  
181/4/4  
CONFIDENTIAL 24

ARAB REFUGEES.

I have now read Mr. Hammarskjöld's proposals concerning U.N.R.W.A. (A/4121) and had a brief discussion of it with the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This discussion was rather inconclusive; the Director-General was naturally not enthusiastic about the document, but showed no violent reaction against it such as Mr. Hammarskjöld's performances usually evoke here. Also, he showed no disposition to quarrel with the economic basis and analysis which are the substance of the paper, the refugee problem and Palestine problems being explicitly excluded.

Discussion of the paper in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not yet concluded, but I have found an attitude to it almost of detachment. One senior officer even regards it as in effect addressed to the Arabs, whose reactions, it must be admitted, have been more lively than Israel's.

The Israeli objections, although the Director-General did not mention them to me, were reflex and quite predictable. There is some slight difference, it is true, between freedom of choice in the sense of a straight out option to enter Israel or not, on the one hand, and the freedom of choice to "voluntarily accept integration into the productive life" referred to in paragraph 17 of the Secretary-General's proposals, but the substance of each probably amounts to much the same thing. The Secretary-General it is true trails the suggestion that a de facto economic integration "would not prejudice any rights established by the resolution".

The Secretary-General referred (as indeed he was bound to), to the General Assembly resolutions which are in point i.e. those referred to in the second paragraph of the Introduction. Whilst it is recognized that in present circumstances this is inevitable, the comment may be properly made that United Nations resolutions, like bottled wine, however excellent the vintage, tend to go off after a time. Mr. Hammarskjöld, I think, recognised this in another context in his comments that the Security Council resolution of 1951 on Suez arose from a different set of circumstances and he did not think that the Council would now be in a position to re-affirm it in the same terms. The passage of time and consequent alteration in many fundamental conditions since establishment of the State of Israel has had I think, an analogous influence on these two General Assembly resolutions, and the time may come when account will have to be taken of this formally. The General Assembly resolution concerning Jerusalem is another example of the same phenomenon.

Mr. Eban is reported as conveying the view that it was psychologically and politically unsound to set no date for the end of U.N.R.W.A.'s mandate, as there would "be no pressure on the Arab Governments to seek or accept some solution of the refugee problem in the way of re-settlement or rehabilitation". It should not be overlooked that the same situation would also exempt Israel from pressure to take steps on its part to bring a solution of the refugee problem any nearer.

Similarly, there is nothing new in the Israeli attitude about the future highlighting of the "considerable expropriated property" of Jews abroad, as well as the reference to the "some 400,000 Jewish refugees from Arab countries", although the Israeli speaker may well have put it forward as something fresh. There is much that one could say about this. In the first place an Israeli insistence on a settlement in respect of such expropriated Jewish property before they paid for their own expropriated Arab property would reveal the hypocrisy of their accusations that "the Arab Governments clearly regard these people as a vital pawn in the political game in the Middle East"; it is clear that they would be making a settlement of personal claims, made by individuals who have lost specific properties, dependent on the behaviour of Governments which the claimants cannot control and in some cases not even

CONFIDENTIAL

/influence.



CONFIDENTIAL

123

influence. In other words, Israel would be seeking to influence the governments through the refugees, which is precisely what it accuses the Arab governments of doing.

It is also relevant, with respect to glib Israel references to the hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees which Israel has received, that there is a fundamental difference between their status and that of the Palestine refugees. This difference is that, broadly speaking, the Jews who are here on the whole want to be here, in their national home, among Jews, and living a Jewish life; at all events the overwhelming majority of them feel better off in some vital respect here than where they came from; they are not living for the day when they can go back to the situations they left behind them in Morocco, or Egypt, or Poland, or Roumania. On the other hand, broadly speaking the Palestine refugees do not want to be where they are, and do not feel better off in some vital respect than they felt in their old homes. Further, the raison d'être of Israel is to offer a home to all Jews wishing to go there, and Mr. Ben-Gurion recently called for a million more Jews to enable him to "finish the job".

If Israeli behaviour in respect of the Templar properties can be taken as any guide to their eagerness, readiness, willingness, or even good faith in the matter of compensation for the Arab properties, the prospect seems pretty bleak.

There may be differences of emphasis in presentation, but Israel will continue to push the idea of re-settlement in Arab countries as the only possible solution. It is perhaps because the Hammarskjöld proposals for "integration" are discussed in the context of what can be done in the whole region - predominantly Arab - that Israeli reactions are so mild. They may well feel that the proposals show that their own case is capable of being put into effect.

Tel Aviv Memorandum No. 266

17th July, 1959.

CONFIDENTIAL



F 181/4/4.

122

AUSTONAT,  
NEW YORK.

*Passed through Mr. Hall to  
Mr. Allen (UN) who will clear  
with Mr. Blakeney + Mr. Hume.  
SLS 25/9*

*Mr. Blakeney + Mr. Hume decided  
26/9 no comments on draft  
speech necessary  
SLS 26/9*

CONFIDENTIAL

APW

Your U.N. 780. MIDDLE EAST.

Suggest -

- (a) insertion of "political" in second sentence between "many of the" and "tensions";
  - (b) third sentence be redrafted: "Similarly, in the economic sphere the initiative and a large portion of the finance for the peaceful economic development and stability of the region must come from the countries of the region themselves, although obviously considerable outside assistance will also be required";
  - (c) deletion of "and I.....from efforts" in sixth sentence and substitution of "but its solution will help".
2. Reason for 1 (b) is that it may be undesirable to create impression that Arabs can rely on rest of world to finance their economic development. In his report on refugees Hammarskjöld specifically mentions that half finance for economic development he envisages must come from Middle East countries themselves.
3. Reason for 1 (c) is that it could conceivably prove possible to solve refugee problem in isolation, e.g. on basis of return to Israel of nominal number, payment of sufficient compensation to rest and Arab agreement to latter's settlement in Arab states.
4. No comments on paragraph on Suez Canal.

*Not sent*

25/9/59



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

124

:FPG

I.16990

Dated: 23rd September, 1959  
1750

Rec'd: 24th September, 1959  
2204

(Via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN.780 UNCLASSIFIED.

Following is draft section of Minister's speech on the Middle East on which we would appreciate any comments you might have. On the economic side of this past statements by Prime Minister have been kept in mind.

BEGINS:-

The Affairs of the Middle East have engrossed the attention of the General Assembly and of other bodies of the United Nations since the very inception of this organization and I do not feel that I should fail to record our continuing interest in its economic and political development. Many of the tensions and problems can only be tackled by those directly concerned when the proper conditions and atmosphere exist but the United Nations and others can help to bring about these favourable conditions. In any event the peaceful economic development and stability of the region will need considerable outside assistance. One item on our agenda is the question of Palestine refugees. This is of great importance to the countries of the region and, as a vast humanitarian problem, demands the sympathetic attention of all of us. It is not a question that is going to be solved quickly, and I do not believe that it can be solved in isolation from efforts to solve other problems in the Middle East, for example the raising of standards of living and promotion of economic development throughout the Middle East. This is one of the points made by the Secretary-General in his report on the United Nations relief and works agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East. It is the political disputes that tend to attract the attention of the outside world, but not the least fundamental problem in the Middle East is to increase production at a faster rate than the rise in population in certain Arab countries.

Another question that has remained before our attention during the past year, though it is not an item on the Agenda of this session, is freedom of transit through the Suez Canal. This is of concern to a large number of countries at both ends of the Canal - European and Asian as well as others such as Australia and the Americans - who need to use this important waterway for their international trade. I do not intend to go over any of the incidents that have occurred during the past year, mostly related to Israel, but in view of these I wish to record again that we believe in free passage through the Canal for all countries without exception.

A/ MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
P.M.'S.

25th September, 1959.

SLC A/Ss LA MR.EASTMAN UNO LR COMREL PAC&AM AM&SP  
S&SEA SA SEA E.A.F&ME E INF INTELL  
G



In reply quote No. 230.11 & 230.5.  
Memo. No. 310/59.



181/4/4

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION.  
TEL AVIV.

27th August, 1959.

175/14/20/4/1.

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
CANBERRA. A. C. T.

CONVERSATION WITH MRS. MEIR : SUEZ : REFUGEES.

As reported by my telegram no. 45, I called on Mrs. Meir on the 25th August. She has only recently returned from her South American tour, and pending her departure soon for New York to attend the General Assembly is busily engaged in electioneering.

2. She began by referring to the Egyptian seizures of mails and cargo at Port Said on the 23rd and 24th August, of which the first press reports had appeared that same day. She gave me the details reported in my telegram no. 45 - presumably received from news agency reports. Somewhat to my surprise, neither she nor the Ministry had considered, in the case of the mail, the technical aspects of rights, duties and so forth concerning the custody of mails in transit, under the International Postal Convention, nor, in the case of the meteorological instruments and literature, was she able to tell me whose property they were at the time of seizure, though she initiated inquiries there and then. (According to today's paper these were consigned c.i.f. Haifa, which is of course extremely relevant to the good faith and implementation of the so-called Nasser terms.) Although we talked around this for some little time she made no request for any action.

3. She then turned to the Suez question and asked "What are we going to do about Suez?" I may interpolate that I have never seen her, nor Mr. Comay, the Assistant Director-General of the Ministry also present, looking so glum. They both gave the impression of being stumped for any further ideas on how to handle this problem. She explained that Israel's friends in the Security Council had so far dissuaded Israel from taking the matter there, and then, without attributing the suggestion to Mr. Hammarskjold, spoke along the lines reported in paragraph 3 of my telegram no. 41 of the 4th August, namely that Israel should present its case in extenso in the course of the general debate at the forthcoming General Assembly, and get as many friendly countries as possible to make supporting remarks in their speeches. The precedent for this course of action is the situation at Sharm-e-Sheikh on the Straits of Tiran; on the occasion of the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, the chief maritime powers made statements on the right to freedom of passage through those waters, and this has been at least an element in Israel's continued enjoyment of that right.

4. She specifically asked me to transmit her request that Australia would speak in support of the universal right of freedom of passage through the Suez Canal - she mentioned neither the "Inge Toft" nor Israel's particular difficulties.

CONFIDENTIAL



5. The Israeli delegation can be expected to approach our mission in New York, who will be aware of the situation from my telegram, and no doubt sufficiently instructed by your telegram no. 604.

6. Mrs. Meir mentioned that Israel, as befitted its size and importance, usually spoke towards the end of the general debate, and in this connexion said that she was specifically asking friendly nations who intended to make the kind of remarks desired, not necessarily to wait until Israel had spoken on the subject. For example the United Kingdom usually spoke early in the debate and they had firm assurances from Mr. Selwyn Lloyd that he would make the kind of remarks Israel was asking for. She added explicitly that although they would act as aforesaid in the general debate in the Assembly, no final decision had been reached not to go to the Security Council.

7. We then turned to the refugee problem and Mr. Hammarskjöld's proposals concerning U.N.W.R.A. Although the Ministry has presumably by now come to its considered conclusions on this document, there is little to add to their first impressions which I have already reported. They regard the document as primarily not addressed to Israel, but to the Arab states (in view of the emphasis on economic development in their territories and of consequent integration of the refugees) and to the United States of America (who will presumably provide most of the finance). She said that they thought that the document was constructive; the only criticism she made was that the Secretary-General's plans for the area contemplated the allocation of a considerable amount of the capital to be raised to the United Arab Republic. She took exception to this, as neither Egypt nor Syria are harbouring any refugees. I infer from this that whereas the Hammarskjöld proposals envisage the integration of the refugees in the area as a by-product of the economic strengthening of the area as a whole, Israel will try to orient his suggestions in the direction of making integration of the refugees in areas outside Israel the principal objective to be aimed at.

8. I mentioned in passing the suggestion of payment of individual compensation in respect of individual properties referred to in my memorandum no. 308 of the 25th August, 1959, but she brushed this aside saying that even if this were done the refugee problem as a whole would remain.

9. The final topic which we discussed was the delay which has occurred in the taking of delivery by Ceylon of the two Israel frigates at Eilat which it has purchased. The Ceylonese mine-sweeper carrying the crews which are to sail these vessels back to Ceylon has been waiting for some time at Aden in circumstances of some obscurity. The story first put out was that it was held up by engine trouble; this being denied, it appeared that there was probably some political reason connected with the attitude of the United Arab Republic to the passage of the vessels - either the mine-sweeper or the frigates or all of them - through the Straits of Tiran.

10. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself does not know the whole details but the most likely explanation is that Ceylon informed the United Nations (in right of UNEF at Sharm-e-Sheikh) of its intention, and got a rather Hammarskjöldian reply that "other interests" were also affected; on this, the Ceylon authorities seem somewhat imprudently to have asked the Egyptian authorities either

CONFIDENTIAL



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3.

TEL AVIV.

118  
for their consent or whether they had any objection - a question which obviously would be extremely difficult for Egypt to answer in the sense of giving general agreement. In fact Egypt appears to have given no answer at all, which has put the Ceylon authorities in a hole, where they still remain. I asked Mrs. Meir whether Israel was pressing Ceylon to take delivery. She said that although they would be very glad if delivery could be taken soon, Israel was not actually pressing. I gather that a substantial portion of the purchase price has been paid.

11. Finally, arising out of this, she shed all her glumness and lassitude and said with considerable brightness and determination that the positions with respect to the Straits of Tiran and Suez Canal were entirely different. Concerning the Straits, Israel had an undoubted right of free passage, and when withdrawing from Sinai had told the General Assembly that it would treat any interference with such rights as cause for measures for self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. She said that nobody should be under any illusion about that. Israel would not consult its friends or the United Nations, or seek anyone's permission, or wait twenty-four hours before taking positive action, should the occasion arise.

*B. C. Ballard*

(B. C. Ballard)  
Minister.

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In reply to No. 230.5.  
Memo. No. 308/59.



AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,  
TEL AVIV.

25th August, 1959.

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
CANBERRA. A. C. T.

Archbishop Georges Hakim, who is the hierarchical head of the Greek Catholics in Israel, and is also an Arab, has just returned from his first visit to the new Pope. Interviewed at Haifa on his return, he had some general comments to make on relations between the Vatican and Israel, and also some interesting remarks about the refugee problem.

2. He advocated the resettlement in their present places of residence of all refugees who would agree to it. He went on "the Israel Government should offer individual compensation for property to everyone ready to accept it in return for foregoing all claims on Israel. I believe that at least 10 to 20 per cent. would accept such compensation and the problem would thus be greatly reduced." This is certainly the first time in recent years - and possibly the very first time - that any public figure has advocated the payment of compensation to individuals in respect of individual properties. This, as I have mentioned in earlier correspondence, is a proposal that Israel has never made. I have always thought that it had a lot to commend it, and agree with the Archbishop that it would in all probability initiate some reduction of size and intensity of the problem.

3. The Archbishop is also quoted as saying that he did not believe that many refugees would wish to return to their former homes in Israel. When thinking of "return" he said, they envisaged a return to pre-1948 conditions which no longer exist. When this was made clear to them, many would agree to the compensation offer, he thought.

*B. C. Ballard*

(B. C. Ballard)  
Minister.

*11/8/59  
by letter to  
H.S.L. 1/2/59  
for photo to V.N. to return*

*F 181/4/4*





File No. ....

## EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with Mr. T.W.L. MacDermot, High Commissioner, Canadian High Commissioner.  
on 25th August 1959  
Officers Present: Mr. D.J. Munro Mr. J.A. Forsythe  
Mr. H. H. H. H.  
Mr. H. H. H. H.  
→ 3. F 181/4/4.  
MAIN SUBJECT(S): Agenda of Forthcoming General Assembly.

The following main subjects were discussed:-

### 1. U.N.R.R.A.

Mr. MacDermot asked our views on the Secretary-General's report to be presented to the forthcoming Assembly. Mr. Munro said that as a regular contributor to the Refugees fund, we were entitled to expect some progress towards a settlement. In the meantime we recognized the need to continue international assistance to the refugees as proposed in the Secretary-General's report.

Other aspects of the report, whilst constructive in theory, no doubt presented practical difficulties, particularly of finance. For example, would the U.S.A. be called upon to put up the very large requirement of external capital needed? Would Australia be asked to contribute? The Secretary-General also pointed out in his report that the economic plan he proposed to assist the integration of the refugees in the Arab economies required agreement on basic political difficulties in the area.

This of course presented great difficulties; it was our understanding however, that some of the Arab countries would not be seriously opposed to the report, although they might not say so publicly.

### 2. Election of the President.

Mr. Munro explained that there was only one candidate (Salomé of Peru). He was regarded as being generally helpful to the West.

### 3. Security Council.

Mr. Munro stated that we would support Ceylon as the Commonwealth candidate for the Commonwealth seat to be vacated this year by Canada. Mr. MacDermot asked whether Ghana had withdrawn. Mr. Munro said that we understood she had withdrawn, but that Ghana had requested support for 1961.

Concerning Japan's seat (originally the East European seat) we understood that the East European bloc

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Mr. Blakeney

#### FOLLOWING POSTS:

New York, London for External,  
Washington, Ottawa.

Report prepared by J. A. Forsythe

ACTION:  
5962/58

National Archives of Australia

NAA: A1838, 181/4/4 PART 2





- 2 -

115

would present a candidate, either Rumania or Poland. From our point of view, Poland would be the most acceptable of West European candidates. We understood the bloc would determine its candidate at the end of this month. Mr. MacDermot commented that New Zealand were inclined to favour the restoration of this seat to the West European bloc. Mr. Munro said we had not been called upon to decide the principle since there was as yet no rival candidate.

4. ECO. SOC.

Mr. Munro stated that we would support India for ECO. SOC. Japan was campaigning for support, and had approached us several times. We had explained to the Japanese that we were supporting India for what we regarded as a Commonwealth seat. However, we appreciated the fact that Asia was under-represented, and we expected to make reference to this in the general debate this year. We would favour expansion of ECO. SOC. and the Security Council in view of increases in membership since the establishment of these organs.

5. Trusteeship Council. This was likely to prove a most difficult issue at the forthcoming Assembly.

Mr. MacDermot asked our attitude towards the question of the future composition of the Trusteeship Council. Mr. Munro explained that we had on balance supported the "freezing" proposal although there were obvious constitutional difficulties. If need be, Australia could "live with" a council of 10 instead of the present number of 14. However, we recognised the desirability of maintaining an effective composition of Trusteeship Council, so as to avoid having authority-trusteeship matters passed increasingly to the 4th Committee of the General Assembly. The important objective in our view at this stage was to obtain the support of a number of influential non-administering powers (e.g. India) and our delegation in New York had recently been instructed to consult with other delegations with a view to reaching early agreement on this issue.

6. Article 73(e). (Transmission of Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories).

In reply to a question, Mr. Munro stated that we had no difficulty ourselves, under this article. We were already providing information on Papua and Cocos Island. The U.K. had made certain proposals to try to meet the difficulties of Portugal, France etc. We had asked our Mission in New York for their advice on these proposals.

7. Disarmament.

Mr. Munro referred to the difficulties associated with the Irish item concerning the dissemination of nuclear weapons. He mentioned some of the reservations we had e.g. the difficulties of establishing an effective inspection system, and said that in our view the resolution would meet with a lot of opposition in the Assembly. In particular, the Soviet group could be expected to oppose it, because it sanctioned the NATO-type arrangement for the transfer of nuclear weapons with the supplying state retaining control over them. The position of France was also likely to be a complicating factor, as the Irish resolution accepted France as a nuclear power. There was likely to be strong opposition to this from the Soviet and from the Afro-Asians.





114

- 3 -

Mr. Munro referred to the Secretary-General's remarks that he would request the inscription of a general item on Disarmament, if this question were not inscribed by a member of the U.N. One of the things to be discussed would be continuing U.N. machinery on disarmament to take the place of the present unwieldy 32 member commission. It had been proposed that a new and smaller commission might be set up to keep in touch with the proposed 10 nation body which appeared to have been agreed upon at Geneva by the Foreign Ministers of the Big Powers. Mr. Munro said he might be able to say something more about our views on this at an early date.

8. Representation of China in the United Nations.

Mr. Munro confirmed that we would again support the "moratorium".

9. Algeria.

Mr. Munro said this was likely to prove a most difficult item at the forthcoming Assembly. A resolution calling for independence failed by only one vote at the last Assembly. With the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom, we felt that France should play a greater part herself in the debate in defence of her policies in Algeria, and we had suggested that Mr. Casey, who was now in Paris, might take this point to the French authorities, if the question of Algeria were raised with him.

10. Korea.

We thought this item should be "played" quietly this year in view of difficult political situation within the R.O.K. and the latter's recent differences with Japan. We would expect the usual type of resolution (re-affirming U.N. objectives and calling upon the Communist authorities to accept these objectives) to be adopted.

11. Hungary

Mr. Munro recalled that we had requested inscription of this item last year, but said that we would not ask its inscription this year. We thought appropriate reference could be made to this issue in the general debate, and felt that Sir Leslie Munro's mandate should be extended.

12. Tibet.

In answer to a question, Mr. Munro said that we did not favour inscription of a separate item on Tibet, although we had not actively attempted to dissuade other countries from inscribing a separate item. We felt that the events in Tibet had had their impact upon Asian countries, in particular India, and that no useful purpose would be served in having a separate debate on the item in the United Nations. We knew of no proposal to place Tibet on the agenda although we understood that the Philippine Representative in New York had, on a personal basis, been sounding out a number of delegations on this score.

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113

- 4 -

13. Laos.

Mr. Munro outlined to Mr. MacDermot latest developments concerning Laos in relation to possible United Nations action, in particular the proposal that the Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference should ask the Secretary-General to send an observer or a fact-finder to Laos.

In answer to a question, Mr. Munro said that Ngon Sananikone had had a general discussion with the Secretary-General, but we knew of no specific agreement reached. We were inclined to the view that, if the situation deteriorated, some United Nations action should be undertaken.

14. Outer Space.

Mr. Munro said that we supported the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space.



CONFIDENTIAL

112

## INWARD SAVINGRAM

BMW

I.14698

Sent: 21st August, 1959.

Rec'd: 24th August, 1959.

FROM:

(via leased channel)

Australian Embassy,  
WASHINGTON.SAV.471- CONFIDENTIAL.

Copies Austunat and London.

U.N.W.R.A.: Secretary-General's Report.

Ludlow (United Nations Advisor Near East Affairs) in recent conversation expressed disappointment with the Secretary-General's report, principally, because it envisaged continuation of U.N.W.R.A. for indefinite future and had not included proposals for bringing this programme to an end. He said the United States had advanced several proposals regarding future of U.N.W.R.A. to the Secretary-General but the latter had ignored them in his report. (Ludlow would not reveal details of United States proposals).

2. Ludlow said that the United States had not yet decided how it should approach this item at the forthcoming session of United Nations General Assembly but to satisfy Congress, the United States probably would have to express disappointment that the Secretary-General envisaged continuation of U.N.W.R.A. without time limit, and stress need for consideration of proposals to terminate U.N.W.R.A. The United States would also probably be critical of rather grandiose economic schemes proposed in the Secretary-General's report which the United States would no doubt be expected to finance. (Ludlow also mentioned that the State Department had been rather annoyed by the fact that the Israel and the Arab States had been given opportunity to comment in private on the Secretary-General's report when it was in draft, whereas the United States and other contributing countries had not).

3. We subsequently discussed the Secretary-General's report with their officers in the Office of Near East Affairs. Wahl (Lebanon/Israel Affairs) in commenting on the Israeli attitude to the report said that the Israelis had in the first instance been highly critical of the Secretary-General's support for principle of "free choice" by Arab refugees. However, after the Arabs themselves began to attack the report, the Israelis had changed their tune and were now praising it for its "positive" approach to the problem. The Arabs were criticising the Secretary-General's proposal that aid for refugees should be channelled through Arab Governments, as proposal for "integration" of refugees in countries in which they were at present residing. This was anathema to all Arab countries.

CONFIDENTIAL

181/4/4



CONFIDENTIAL

111

## INWARD SAVINGRAM

- 2 -

I.14698

4. Wahl said the recent technical meeting of the Arab League in Beirut to discuss the Secretary-General's report and prepare recommendations for the Arab League Foreign Ministers' meeting at Casablanca was probably more notable for opportunity it provided for warring Arab factions to make their peace with each other than for any positive contribution towards settling of the refugee problem. He said it was at this meeting that Jordan and the U.A.R. had finally been able to agree upon restoration of relations even though both states had been interested in resuming relations for several months previously.

5. Atherton (Iraq/Jordan Affairs) said that Iraq had traditionally shown little interest in the Arab refugee problem and their only contribution at recent meeting in Beirut was to express pique that earlier proposal of theirs for next the Arab League Foreign Ministers Meeting to be held in Baghdad had been ignored in favour of invitation to meet in Casablanca.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY

24th August, 1959.

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175/11/20/4  
181/4/4  
175/11/20  
175/2/1

Record of Conversation with: The Israeli Minister (Mr. M. Yuval)  
on: 17th August, 1959

Officers present: Mr. F.J. Blakeney  
Mr. B.G. Dexter

Main Subjects: Suez Canal Transit  
Hammaraskjold's Report on Refugees  
Arab Bellicosity  
Elections

Mr. Yuval appeared not to have briefed himself as well as usual, and to be out of touch with some recent developments.

#### SUEZ CANAL TRANSIT

2. Mr. Yuval said that the Israelis were disappointed with Hammaraskjold's approach: he had apparently only listened to the Egyptians, and then reported their terms to the Israelis, but had not tried to modify those terms. Israel was still undecided what action to take.

3. Mr. Blakeney suggested that the reported UAR offer of 2nd August to release the "Inge Toft" with cargo for return to the Mediterranean seemed to provide a way out of the immediate impasse. Mr. Yuval said that he knew of no such offer apart from references in press reports, and thought it unlikely that one had been made. (Comment: We have information, however, that such an offer was made by Ali Sabri).

4. Mr. Yuval, speaking personally, said that the only course now seemed to be to take the question to the United Nations in some form. There was still time to inscribe an item on the agenda. Mr. Blakeney enquired whether Israel had yet considered whether the best approach in the United Nations might not be for Israel to treat the matter in the general debate instead of inscribing a separate item. The position of other countries could be similarly registered and the U.A.R. would see where the balance of world opinion lay. The effect of such a presentation of international opinion on the U.A.R. might well be greater than would result from a possibly bitter and acrimonious special debate. (Comment: We have information that Hammaraskjold had suggested such a course of action to Israel, and that at the official level in Israel there was a disposition to follow his advice.) Mr. Yuval replied that he thought that such a course would be fruitless, and that Israel would instead be obliged to have recourse to inscription in the General Assembly or to the Security Council.

#### HAMMARSKJOLD'S REPORT ON REFUGEES

5. Mr. Yuval said that he had studied the Secretary-General's report further since his last visit. The Arab countries were discussing it sporadically, but it seemed impossible for them to convene a meeting attended by all Arab League members: Iraq, Jordan and Tunisia continuously absented themselves. Insofar as there was any general Arab reaction, it was that Hammaraskjold's plan would result in a de facto settlement of the refugee problem, to the detriment of the refugees' claims for repatriation and compensation. Mr. Yuval felt that if the plans were successfully implemented, this would be the case - and absorption of the refugees

SECRET



SECRET

129

was clearly what Hammarskjold was aiming at. However, there were practical difficulties in implementing the development plan. Where should the huge investment begin? The UAR would want a large share, but it was certain that, concerned as it was with over-population, it would not permit the absorption into Egypt of the refugees crowded into the Gaza strip. Similarly investment in Iraq would be unlikely to result in any appreciable absorption. Investment in Lebanon and Syria could only have a marginal effect on the refugees. Jordan would provide the best scope, since any investment there would directly affect the wellbeing of the refugees, who formed such a large proportion of the population. But would the Arab countries agree to Jordan's obtaining the lion's share? Some sort of Arab unity seemed necessary before the plan could make much headway.

6. On the other hand, agreement on and implementation of the Hammarskjold plan would result in a great improvement in the atmosphere in the Middle East not only through removing one major point of friction (the refugees), but also by securing some degree of inter-Arab cooperation. Israel had nothing to fear from such cooperation: it was, on the contrary, when relations between the Arabs were worst that Israel was most persecuted by them, as each Arab country felt itself obliged to show itself more Arab (and hence more anti-Israeli) than its neighbour. This was, he thought, the explanation behind the Suez Canal stoppages, Iraqi discrimination and recent bellicose statements by Nasser.

#### ARAB BELLICOSITY

7. Nasser's statements had allegedly been "provoked" by a recent article by General Dayan. He had written that the Israel Government's policy of seeking to compromise over the Suez Canal transit issue was completely wrong; instead, force should be met by force, evil by evil. This article had immediately been countered by an article by Eban, who supported the Israeli Government's search for a solution by quiet diplomacy. However, Nasser had accepted Dayan's view - which was after all only the view of one citizen and certainly not that of the Government - as the Israeli view, and had in four speeches abused Israel with increasing violence, culminating with his diatribe of 26th July to the effect that all Arabs desired only a decisive battle with Israel in order to exterminate it. The incentive for such outbursts would be largely removed through Arab cooperation, such as would be required for the implementation of Hammarskjold's plan.

8. Mr. Yuval said that the continuance of such violent hostility was dangerous to the area as a whole. It served to perpetuate the present situation and prevent the growth of any cooperation between the Arabs and Jews. One instance of this was in the sphere of civil aviation. Efforts to establish an I.C.A.O. control centre for the area in Cyprus had failed, and each country maintained instead its own control centre. So far there had been no real trouble, but the scope for dangerous incidents was obvious. For instance, within the last month Israel had forced down a Lebanese airliner en route from Cairo to Beirut which had entered its control area; the plane, which was carrying UN personnel, had been allowed to continue its journey a few hours later. (Mr. Yuval added that there was considerable doubt in Israel about the legality of this interception, since the plane had been flying through the Israeli control area only, and not over Israeli territory.)

#### ELECTIONS.

9. Mr. Yuval said that the elections would now be held a fortnight early, in October. Mr. Blakeney commented that the standard of some of the candidates, such as Dayan and Eban, seemed very high. Mr. Yuval agreed, but said that he did not think that the presence of such candidates would greatly affect

SECRET



SECRET

186

the results of the elections. There seemed to be a balance between the left and the right, and this balance had been generally confirmed in the recent Histadrut (Trade Union) elections in which about one-third of the country's voters were involved. Any movement would probably only be between parties of the left or between parties of the right.

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*B.G. Dexter*  
Report prepared by  
B.G. Dexter

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In reply quote No. 230.5.  
Memo. No. 292/59.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

17 AUG 1959

181/4/4  
CANBERRA

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,  
TEL AVIV.

5th August, 1959.

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
CANBERRA. A. C. T.

ARAB REFUGEES.

I have just received the record of Mr. Yuval's conversation in the Department of the 8th July last (181/4/1) on the Hammarskjold report on assistance to the Palestine Refugees, and find it of interest and significance that his reaction, at that early stage and without instructions, are like those which I have reported from here, namely that it leaves Israel's withers unprung, and that its proposals would fall to be implemented chiefly by the Arabs.

2. I venture to draw attention to two or three slips or inaccuracies in the conversation (or the record), lest they turn out to be misleading later on.

(a) The reference to the "Armistice Commission" in paragraph 7, as the authority having complete records of ownership and boundaries etc. is presumably a slip. There are, or at least were, four Mixed Armistice Commissions, but none of these had any competence in the matter of refugee property and compensation. The authority presumably meant is the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, whose reports and activities were dealt with fairly fully in my M.D. No. 4 of the 18th October, 1958.

(b) The statement in paragraph 8 that "Israel would not negotiate with Arab governments" is so surprising that I feel it must be the result of a misunderstanding. I feel that any Israeli objection to negotiation would not be to negotiating with Arab governments, but to a piecemeal approach to the whole Arab-Israel problem. Starting from the unhappy fact that none of the neighbouring Arab states recognizes Israel, the position is that it is they who will not negotiate with Israel, with respect to the refugees or anything else. Israel has repeatedly expressed willingness and desire to negotiate with the Arab Governments on a general peace settlement, and although I cannot recall any specific call for a meeting to negotiate on the refugee problem in isolation, prima facie Israel would be favourably disposed to discuss some individual issues for the sake of getting to the same table with the Arabs and thereby acquiring some measure of recognition, or setting a precedent tending in that direction.

(c) The reference in paragraph 9 to payment of compensation "to the refugees" is no doubt conversational

*Copy passed to UN.  
18/8/59*

*to  
1. Mr. Holt to see  
2. C.P. - end  
9/2(c).*



but it should not be overlooked that Israel has never made any proposal whatsoever for the payment of compensation to individuals or groups of individuals in respect of individual properties. This too was discussed in my above-mentioned M.D. No. 4/58, from paragraph 11 onwards. My memorandum 534 of the 18th November, 1958, suggested that the Israeli offer of "unconditional" compensation made at the last General Assembly did not amount to very much, and I think that is still true. Individual Israelis have received, in the aggregate, millions of dollars of restitution and compensation payments from Germany, but Israel has not paid a penny to any claimant outside Israel in respect of any property retained, confiscated or appropriated by Israel. I think that Israel's dilatory and obstructive attitude with respect to payment for the Templar properties is connected in some way with the larger question of Arab refugee properties, since the assessments of values on which any payment ultimately made in respect of the Templar properties is based cannot fail to be relevant to the assessment of the value of the much larger volume of Arab refugee property.

*B. C. Ballard*

(B. C. Ballard)  
Minister.



COPY

105  
OF LETTER FROM  
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
750 THIRD AVENUE  
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. 157/23

12th August, 1959.

Memorandum No. 729/59

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
Canberra, A.C.T.

Middle East: Interview with Permanent Representative  
of Jordan

Attached for your information is a record of conversation  
today between the Permanent Representatives of Australia and Jordan.

2. Copies are also being sent to the Australian Embassy,  
Washington, and to the External Affairs Officer, London.

*J. Russell*  
Permanent Representative

3. I mentioned that the report on the situation in Jordan was one of the most important items on the agenda of the General Assembly, and I noted as follows:

Frank, that this was now being worked out in Jordan. In the meantime negotiations were going on here in New York. I said that the situation was going on here in New York. I said that the situation was going on here in New York. I said that the situation was going on here in New York.

4. We had some discussion of the situation in Jordan. I said that the situation was going on here in New York. I said that the situation was going on here in New York. I said that the situation was going on here in New York.

5. Rifa'i said that there had been a move on the part of the Government of Jordan to re-establish diplomatic relations with Jordan and to develop friendly relations with the Government. This naturally involved the resumption of relations with Jordan. However the Government of Jordan, though not at the moment able to respond at all positively, was nevertheless looking at the situation with some objectivity and was not blind to realities. Rifa'i thought that the resumption of relations would depend on the progress of stability in Iraq and on the development of that country's policy.

6. I said that one of the things that had surprised me about the revolution in Iraq was that Nuri es-Said and the other Iraq leaders had apparently not been aware of the conspiracy. Rifa'i said that there had been signs of what was happening but the Iraq leaders had refused to take them seriously. King Hussein of Jordan and the Jordanian Chief of Staff had warned the Iraq Government that something was brewing (though they had not been able





CONFIDENTIAL

104

Record of Conversation with the Permanent Representative  
of Jordan, Mr. Abdul Monem Rifa'i

1. After a preliminary exchange of pleasantries, Mr. Rifa'i said he had just received a telephone call from the Columbia Broadcasting System to the effect that a government of Palestinian Arabs had been set up on U.A.R. soil and had received the blessing of Nasser. Rifa'i said that it was impossible to say anything definite about this until he had seen the actual text, but if true it could mean one of two things:-

(a) It was a move to establish a new tactical position in the United Nations. He had heard rumours of such a possible development for some time. The thinking behind it was that the Palestinian Arabs might proclaim a state of their own and then ask to be heard before the United Nations, saying that they represented one of the two states established by the United Nations by its decision on partition. They would ask the General Assembly to put that decision into effect, regarding the Palestinian Arab Government as representing one of the two states contemplated by that resolution. Rifa'i said that such a situation would naturally impose considerable difficulties for Jordan, as the "Palestinian Arab Government" would be claiming jurisdiction or sovereignty over territory which was now part of Jordan.

(b) The alternative explanation was that the move was associated primarily with the forthcoming General Assembly consideration of UNRWA. The move would be designed to give the Palestinian Arabs representative to speak for them as distinct from individual Arab Governments, whose interests and views might not always coincide (in the eyes of the refugees at any rate) with those of the refugees themselves.

2. I commented that the report on UNRWA would from the point of view of Jordan be one of the most important items on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, and I sought an indication of Jordan's views. Rifa'i said that this was now being worked out in Jordan. The Foreign Ministers of the Arab States would meet at Casablanca on 1st September to consider UNRWA. In the meantime consultations were going on here in New York among delegations from Arab countries. Rifa'i said he hoped that there could be talks with other interested Governments before the Assembly considered the item. It would be a good thing if agreement could be reached first without a protracted or difficult debate in the United Nations.

3. We had some discussion of the situation in Iraq, including the revolution last year. Rifa'i said that it had not been really a revolution - it had been a conspiracy to seize power. Now that Kassem and his group had power, they did not know what policy they wanted to pursue. It could not be said to be a nationalist revolution, because the leaders of the former Iraq regime, such as Jamali, were strong nationalists and patriots. Rifa'i thought there were still troubles ahead for Iraq, because the militarymen who were running affairs were not necessarily able to cope with political and other non-military problems.

4. Rifa'i said that there had been a move on the part of Iraq to re-establish diplomatic relations with Jordan and to develop relations generally between the two governments. This naturally involved strong emotional feelings in Jordan - it was for example a matter of family as far as the King was concerned. However the Government of Jordan, though not at the moment able to respond at all positively, was nevertheless looking at the situation with some objectivity and was not blind to realities. Rifa'i thought that the resumption of relations would depend on the progress of stability in Iraq and on the development of that country's policy.

5. I said that one of the things that had surprised me about the revolution in Iraq was that Nuri es-Said and the other Iraq leaders had apparently not been aware of the conspiracy. Rifa'i said that there had been signs of what was happening but the Iraq leaders had refused to take them seriously. King Hussein of Jordan and the Jordanian Chief of Staff had warned the Iraq Government that something was brewing (though they had not been able





- 2 -

103

to pinpoint the individuals concerned) but the Iraq leaders had laughed and refused to take these warnings seriously. They had been confident that their own prestige was such that no movement against them would be successful. Jordanian leaders on the other hand had taken precautions and had successfully come through the attempted revolution there, which was one of two prongs in a movement intended to cover both Iraq and Jordan.

6. Rifa'i also said that Nasser was forced to keep stirring things up in order to maintain his authority. He continually had to bring forward new issues in order to keep the Egyptian people's minds away from internal matters. I raised the question of whether Syria was going to remain firmly within the U.A.R., and Rifa'i expressed some doubts on this point. He said the Syrians had a very high opinion of their own qualities, and regarded themselves as being superior to other Arabs. He did not think that they would for long accept a position of subordination to the Egyptians. It had been argued that if Egypt had not stepped in, Syria would have gone communist. Rifa'i said there was a lot to be said for that point of view, but it was not necessarily true. He did not think that communism would ever be a strong or lasting movement among the Arabs. It never had been so in the past. The Moslem religion was a barrier among Arabs to the growth of communism - not simply organized religion in the sense of going to church, etc., but more the frame of mind that was created in Arabs by being brought up in their faith from childhood. He said that occasionally the Communists made some ground among Arabs but they lost it again very quickly. I commented that the difficulty was that, if the Communists ever gained power, it would be very difficult to dislodge them again, whatever public opinion might be in the country concerned. Rifa'i did not think that the Communists would get very far. He also said that it was very significant that Communists had almost made no progress at all among the Palestinian refugees, despite the bad conditions under which the refugees lived and which one might have thought would be fertile ground for communism.

12th August, 1959.

*J. Plimsoll*  
J. Plimsoll



181/4/C . 99

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

HD:JMF:JT

I:14215

Dated: 13th August, 1959.  
1731  
Rec'd: 14th August, 1959.  
0830

FROM:

Australian High Commission,  
PRETORIA.

97. CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed Canberra 97, repeated Savingram New York,  
London, Washington.

Louw informed me on 12th August;

(a) South West Africa; he saw no prospect of progress in view of the limited terms of reference of the Good Offices Committee. South Africa would have nothing to suggest and would await any suggestions from the Committee.

(b) Apartheid and Indian issues; South Africa expected no new developments and would adhere to its usual line.

(c) Security Council; South Africa satisfied with outcome. They assume Ghana now not likely to stand.

(d) Vice Presidency; India has promised support and South Africa optimistic.

(e) Dutch New Guinea; Louw said in view of the lack of support for South Africa by the Netherlands he was considering whether South Africa could continue to support the Netherlands on the New Guinea question (if it arose).

(f) U.N.E.F.; Louw concerned with continuing cost, with no progress towards a solution. He is considering suggesting reviewing the situation.

(g) Arab Refugees; Louw interested in the Secretary General's proposal. South Africa this year likely to make contribution which would be small, in view of the Unions' commitments to C.C.T.A. and to the natives in South Africa.

(h) Recognition of Communist China; Louw is moving toward the view that it would be more logical for South Africa to recognise and also to trade.

(i) Antarctic; Louw will attend the opening of the conference, but due to leave 17th October. Mentioned United States pressure for South Africa to take more action in the Antarctic. They are considering action in the meteorological field in conjunction with Norway. He mentioned South African defence people not interested in Antarctic. Suggest you send by the next bag latest situation and any views you wish Louw to consider. He leaves 28th August.

...Davis.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**



CONFIDENTIAL  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
P.M'S.

14th August, 1959.

CONFIDENTIAL





F 181/4/4 97  
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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.  
CANBERRA

In reply quote No. 568/6

7th August, 1959.

CIRCULAR MEMORANDUM NO. 54/59

ALL POSTS

MINISTER'S BACKGROUND PRESS CONFERENCE, MELBOURNE  
THURSDAY 6th AUGUST 1959

Following for your information are notes on a background press briefing by the Minister of newspaper and radio representatives in Melbourne on Thursday, 6th August, 1959. The newspaper and radio representatives present were -

|             |   |                               |
|-------------|---|-------------------------------|
| Mr. Tebbutt | - | Melbourne Herald              |
| Mr. Daly    |   |                               |
| Mr. Wilkie  | - | Melbourne Sun                 |
| Mr. Alston  |   |                               |
| Mr. Grant   | - | Melbourne Age                 |
| Mr. Kewitt  | - | New Zealand Press Association |
| Mr. Hooper  |   |                               |
| Mr. Rowe    | - | A.A.P./Reuters                |
| Mr. Homfray |   |                               |
| Mr. Drake   | - | Radio Australia               |

2. In his introductory review the Minister made the following points -

(A) Foreign Ministers' Conference

"Very little if anything had been achieved. There was little - if anything - to add to what had already been published. The narrowing down of subjects at issue, however, might be useful as a shoehorn for a summit or similar high level conference. The Geneva Conference narrowed down early to the issue of Berlin and kept to that problem. It failed chiefly because of the Russian attitude of what one might describe as the '18 months' ultimatum' and the German Committee. The West could not agree to these two things."

(B) Exchange of Visits by U.S. and Soviet leaders:

"The Khrushchev-Eisenhower meetings are not a movement from the Foreign Ministers' Conference to a Summit Conference. I think the meetings will be useful for lessening tension but you must make up your own minds whether or not these meetings will lead to a Summit Conference."

CONFIDENTIAL



## (C) Laos:

After explaining the background of the Geneva Agreement of 1954, the Minister continued: "The International Supervisory Commission, comprising representatives of Poland, Canada and India, which was set up under this Agreement came to an end about a year ago. The Laotian Government was very keen to bring the Commission to an end. The integration within the country of the Pathet Lao forces and the civil servants who had served in the northern provinces administered by the Pathet Lao had seemed to be going on reasonably satisfactorily until two former Pathet Lao battalions had revolted and bolted to the jungle in the north-east. The Royal Laotian Army set out in pursuit - how vigorously I do not know. As you know the Vietminh, through Hanoi Radio are telling their story while the Laotians in telling their story are alleging that Vietminh troops have crossed the border. There is not solid irrefutable proof that Vietminh troops have in fact crossed the border. The Communists want the International Supervisory Commission reconvened. The Laotians are against this. No other country has recently come out firmly and publicly one way or another although earlier several of them seemed to favour reconvening the Commission.

"Laos is a small but strategic country and the matter is therefore of much more importance than the number of troops or people presently involved would indicate.

"I personally can't see much against reconvening the Commission but the Laotians do not want it because they would regard it as a step backwards towards nursery status. Phoui Sananikone, the chief man in Laos and a good friend of mine, is against reconvening the Commission and consequently I won't say publicly what I have just told you.

"The possibilities concerning Laos as I see them are -

- (i) Reconvening of the International Supervisory Commission
- (ii) Evidence of interest in the situation there by the United Nations and perhaps sending U.N. observers there
- (iii) 'Quiet diplomacy' by the U.N. Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjöld, which might mean him or one of his trusted officers going to the trouble spots and talking to both sides."

The Minister concluded his remarks on Laos by saying - "There is no likelihood - and by God I hope there won't be - of SEATO becoming involved."

## (D) Antarctic Conference:

"We have three main aims at the forthcoming Antarctic Conference - freedom of trade in science in the area, non-militarization and the freezing of claims. The first two objectives won't be difficult to achieve but the Russians have been difficult about the freezing of claims. However, I talked to Firubin at Broadbeach and detailed our views. He said he did not know much about Antarctica and later I sent him a long and detailed letter on the subject. To my intense astonishment a reply came agreeing to all I had put up. It may be part of the thaw and twilight period but if words mean what they say, there are good prospects for the conclusion of a satisfactory Antarctic Treaty. Of course, some problems are bound to crop up. For example, the Russians may well ask why the Conference should be confined to 12 nations. However, there are different formulae for dealing with that."



## (E) Housing of Soviet and Australian Embassy Officials:

"The arrangements about quarters for the Soviet Embassy officials in Canberra and our people in Moscow are going ahead reasonably well. We are helping them in Canberra and they are helping us much more in Moscow. Of course, they have much greater resources."

## (F) United Arab Republic:

"You may have received a report - emanating oddly enough from Edinburgh - to the effect that Australia has approached the U.A.R. for the resumption of diplomatic relations. The truth is that for some months we have taken up the desquestration of Australian assets in Egypt and have a diplomatic officer in Cairo in a consular guise. The desquestration and other matters have now been pretty well cleared up. However, there has been no formal approach by either side for a resumption of diplomatic relations so you can do a certain amount of discounting of the Edinburgh story."

## (G) Israeli cargoes through Suez:

"You have seen the reports about the U.A.R. stopping the shipment through the Suez of Israeli cargoes. The United Nations has not done anything publicly about this problem but Hammarskjöld by his 'quite diplomacy' has been active."

## (H) Palestine refugees:

"Hammarskjöld is supposed to be bringing up at the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly a solution for the permanent settlement of these unfortunate people. His scheme will require a great deal of money - something like a billion U.S. dollars over ten years. Most of it will have to come from the United States. The organization looking after these refugees comes formally to and next year and steps therefore will have to be taken to ensure its continuance."

## (I) Iraq:

"The situation in Iraq seems to have improved. It is better because Kassem has woken up to the fact that the Communists are poor friends really."

## (J) Colombo Plan:

After explaining about the forthcoming Conference in Djokjakarta, the Minister distributed the précis Mr. Osmer White, of the Melbourne Herald, had prepared of his detailed report on his recent tour around the Colombo Plan area. The Minister added that Mr. White was now engaged on writing a booklet, or booklets, on the Colombo Plan film made up of material taken by Mr. Fitzpatrick who had toured with Mr. White. Mr. Casey went on to say: "I have asked Mr. Callinan, a senior and well-qualified engineer, to go to South-East Asia for about six weeks to investigate new forms of initiative we might adopt for helping Colombo Plan countries. I had a long talk yesterday with Mr. Callinan, who will be setting off soon on his tour."

## (K) Indonesia:

"The Prime Minister's statement, in very broad terms in the course of a television interview screened last weekend, on a united New Guinea has provoked a statement by Dr. Subandrio. No reply is likely to be forthcoming from either the Prime Minister or myself because we don't want to start a slanging match. If we

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we reply, Subandrio will probably have to say something more and so it will go on." The Minister then referred to recent events in Indonesia. He explained that the Supreme Advisory Council consisted of 45 members under the chairmanship of President Sukarno. Although the Council had Communist Party members and most of its members were what were described as "leftist progressives", the Masjumi and P.S.I. were not represented. The National Planning Council of 77 members under the Chairmanship of Mohn Yamin, "a fairly sinister figure", was an organization representing chiefly regional and functional interests. Eighty per cent of its members were "unknowns" about whom Mr. McIntyre had little or no information.

(L) South Viet Nam:

"The elections in South Viet Nam will be held on 30th August. The situation there is not as bad as is sometimes believed. Certainly there is corruption there - it is endemic in South-East Asia - but I think there is less corruption in Viet Nam than in other countries in the area. Security is also fairly good on the whole although infiltrating Communists cause trouble from time to time. It is Communist policy to murder local officials. Their attacks are spasmodic and are designed to hit at the morale of officials, particularly those serving in remote areas. Although Viet Nam is not the home of established democracy, the situation there is not too bad and should not be exaggerated. I have been very impressed by General Sam Williams, of the American MAG, who is helping to bring the Vietnamese Army to a high pitch of efficiency. When one is speaking of Viet Nam, you should realise that Diem - and the Government before him - were never a party to the Geneva Agreement of 1954."

(M) Language proficiency of Departmental Officers:

After referring to a recent article in the 1st August issue of the Sydney fortnightly review, Nation, and other recently published criticism on the language proficiency of Departmental officers, the Minister said: "We have to realise that most of what one might term the exotic languages are useful solely in one country. Hindi, for example, is not much use outside India. Similarly, Thai, Urdu, Cambodian, Vietnamese and Burmese and so on are spoken only in relatively small areas. Malaya, which is closely akin to Bahasa Indonesia, is more widely spoken and so is Chinese. It is just not possible for us with our limited resources to have people proficient in the local language at all our Asian posts. We can't do more than cope with it on an ad hoc basis. Personally, I am more concerned that our diplomatic people should learn the broad and better languages such as French and German rather than the exotic languages."

(N) Algeria:

"Algeria will be a problem at this year's United Nations General Assembly. The countries wanting the issue debated failed in their objective last year by a margin of one vote. France has invoked Article 27 which may affect us one of these days."

(O) Nigeria:

"On his way to the United Nations in New York, I arranged for Mr. Plimsoll to visit a number of countries in Asia and Africa. He spent some days both in Ghana and Nigeria. We are beginning to take an intelligent interest in those African countries approaching independence. They seem bound to join the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations thus increasing its membership from 20 to 33 in a total membership of 82. I hope to put a small Australian High Commissioner's Office in Lagos when Nigeria attains independence."



3. The substance of questions put to the Minister and his replies follow -

(A) Australian Ambassador to Moscow:

"It is primarily for our convenience that we have not yet appointed an Ambassador. We have a number of moves of our important men coming up in the next six months or so and this is one of them. It has no political significance. We shall send a career man there. I have an appropriate man in mind but can't name him now. I will be meeting Mr. Kurdyukov in Canberra next Monday and he will go through the hoops with the Governor-General later in the day."

(B) Staffing at Saigon Embassy:

Asked by Mr. Wilkie, if the situation in Laos would mean that Mr. Forsyth, our Ambassador-designate to Saigon, would proceed there earlier than planned, the Minister replied: "I should like Mr. Forsyth to attend the Heads of Mission meeting beginning in Bangkok next week. I will be in on its final stages. Mr. Forsyth has not served for any long term before in an Asian post and it would be bonoficial for him to attend this Bangkok meeting. We are well informed about what's going on in Laos although we have not a post in Vientiane. Our people go there regularly from Saigon. We are getting regular reports from our own people and also from our British, American and other friends."

(C) Attitude of other Countries to Laos:

"At an early stage India and the United Kingdom appeared to want the International Supervisory Commission called together again but there has been no recent enthusiasm shown by the West for this idea. They may feel that if the Communists want this course taken there must be a catch to it."

(D) Reply to Dr. Subandrio:

Asked by Mr. Tebutt if the Government would make any non-publicised reply to Dr. Subandrio through Mr. McIntyre, the Minister replied: "We have given Mr. McIntyre a copy of the verbatim report of the Prime Minister's telecast on this matter but we have told him to sit on it until we decide what to do. As I said earlier we don't want a continuing controversy."

(E) Visits to Bonn and Paris:

Asked by Mr. Wilkie if he has any specific diplomatic issues to take up in Bonn or Paris, the Minister replied: "No, but I want to get a clear picture of the economic set-up in Europe which is fairly complicated at the moment. I also want to see General de Gaulle whom I used to know well in the Middle East. I want, too, to get the German and French views on issues coming up at U.N., particularly the French views on Algeria."

(F) U.K. Election:

"I think the Conservatives will win the next election in the U.K. which most observers seem to think will be in October although no firm date has yet been set. I think the visit by Mr. Khrushchev will help the Conservatives and more than counter balance the losses caused by the African debates."

CONFIDENTIAL



6.

(G) President Nasser:

Asked by Mr. Bruce Grant if there were anything behind President Nasser's 'exterminate Israel' statement, the Minister said: "The U.A.R. had been letting Israeli goods go through the Canal but the Israeli's public proclamation of this upset Nasser. To revert to what I said earlier on the question of our relations with the U.A.R., the Canadians have been very good in representing us in Cairo. Ultimately we will be back there diplomatically and so will the United Kingdom. This will be because it is of advance to us because neither the U.K. nor ourselves has any great love for the blue eyes of the U.A.R."

(H) Language proficiency:

Asked if he had taken up the matter of payments for language proficiency among Departmental officers with the Public Service Board, the Minister replied: "I am always writing to Sir William Dunk on this subject. We are certainly less generous than other nations. For example, we offer a very small reward to anyone learning Chinese although this would take an officer at least 18 months to learn on top of his ordinary duties. I think the Public Service Board should also offer inducements to our people to learn French and German. It is not a condition that people joining our service must have one language other than English before they join us. As I said we haven't the resources of the Soviet to train people for years in little used languages. The United States has a pressure cooker school for teaching languages in Washington and I will have a look at this school when I'm there."

(I) Visit to Moscow:

"I should like to go to Moscow sometime. I have not ever been there. There is no reason why there should not be an exchange of Parliamentary delegations between the two countries. A number of our scientists have visited Russia and Sir Hudson Fysh recently spent about ten days there."

(J) Burma:

"I do not know any particular reasons for the defections of Communists in Rangoon. By the way, an election is likely to be held in Burma in March or April next year."

(K) Wireless receivers:

Asked by Mr. Homfray if Australia would be providing more receivers for Asian countries under the Colombo Plan (Mr. Homfray also said he understood Mr. Bruce Wight M.H.R. had recommended this to the Minister), Mr. Casey replied: "More supervision is needed of our Colombo Plan and in various fields, including the provision of radio receivers."

(L) Communist China:

"There are, as you well know, opinions for and against our recognition of Communist China. I am well aware of the growing importance of Communist China, but, on balance, I do not think it wise to recognise the country diplomatically at the moment. Recognition is not a unilateral act and our recognition would have to be hedged by the qualification that it applied only to the Chinese mainland. Moreover, such action on our part might

CONFIDENTIAL



91

CONFIDENTIAL

7.

embarrass and offend the United States as well as Malaya, the Philippines and other countries. We have also to think of Formosa. Our recognition would be far more significant than our situation as a small country of ten million people would make it appear. I don't think we could recognize Peking as well as Taipeh. Peking says it would be necessary for Formosa to be de-recognized. With regard to China's representation at a Summit or similar high level conference a lot of things can be done de facto that it is inappropriate to do de jure.

*J M McMillan*

(J.M. McMillan)  
for the Secretary

*for [unclear]*CONFIDENTIAL



230.5.

Memo. No. 268/59.

21st July, 1959.

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
CANBERRA. A. C. T.

ARAB REFUGEES.

... Since my memorandum no. 266 of the 17th July was written, the enclosed article by the Economic Editor of the "Jerusalem Post" has appeared. Close as the "Jerusalem Post" is to the Mapai party, there is no reason to think that this article is the product of a briefing by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although the political content of the article can be taken to be a fair sample of Israeli reactions.

2. Of the essence of the Secretary-General's economic proposals, analysed in the latter half of the article, the writer's view seems to be summed up in the following words:

"Will the Sheikhs of Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar invest their fabulous fortunes in dams and villages for Egypt's fellaheen or in factories and road construction in Jordan?"

3. So far as political discussion of the proposals goes, I draw attention to the following two passages:-

"In other words, the Secretary-General holds that the refugee problem is not a political one, concerning Israel, but an economic one, and thus of prime concern for the Arab states themselves"; and

"Mr. Hammarskjold's novel approach to the refugee problem is thus to attempt to solve it by doing nothing specific to solve it, and concentrate instead on promoting general economic and social development in the Middle East region. He points out, in fact, that even if nothing is done to change the present antagonistic set-up in the Middle East, it will change beyond recognition by the mere force of progress, and present problems and animosities will be rendered obsolete in a dozen years."

4. This interpretation of the Secretary-General's proposals can be so easily reconciled with Israeli insistence on resettlement as opposed to return, that I should expect their public comments on the report to be directed towards securing the acceptance of such an interpretation.

*Orig with UN.*

(Sgd) B. C. Ballard

*F 181/4/4*

(B. C. Ballard)  
Minister.



CONFIDENTIAL

89

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

181/4/4.

RECORD OF CONVERSATION.

With : The Israeli Minister (Mr. M. Yuval)

On : 8th July, 1959.

Officers present : Mr. Munro  
Mr. J. Forsythe  
Mr. B.G. Dexter

Main Subject : Palestine Refugees : Hammarskjold's Report.

Mr. Yuval said that he had so far seen only portions of the Secretary-General's "Proposals for the Continuation of United Nations Assistance to Palestine Refugees" (A/4121 of 15th June, 1959). He had not had any comments from his Ministry, and merely wished to discuss the document generally on the basis of his own knowledge. Mr. Munro said that copies of the document had only recently been received in the Department, and it had not yet been put to full study.

2. Mr. Yuval commented that it was a "realistic" report. The principal point was that the United Nations should continue to provide relief while the need existed, but undertake a scheme of reintegrating the refugee population into the productive life of the area. The Secretary-General was proposing two alternative development plans; the more complete plan, costing \$5,100 millions, would end in 1970; the alternative or "cheaper" plan would run to 1965.

3. Mr. Yuval thought that these aspects of the proposals would be acceptable to Israel. However, he doubted whether the Arabs would accept the proposals, judging by the hostile "unofficial" reactions so far in press and radio.

4. Mr. Yuval said that there would be difficulties in implementing the recommendations of the report, including the problem of finding finance. On the other hand, large-scale development in the area would do much to solve the problem of the refugees.

5. He reaffirmed that repatriation of the refugees in Israel was out of the question. While Israel had accepted over the years some 25,000 Arab refugees in order to reunite them with their families, it could not contemplate mass immigration by the refugees.

6. When asked whether this attitude was consistent with resolution 194 (III) of the General Assembly of 1948,\* Mr. Yuval replied that Israel

\* Footnote: This resolution reads :

"11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible."

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

. 2 .

considered that there were two parts to the resolution, viz., that the refugees should be permitted to return to their homes, but also should wish to "live at peace with their neighbours". This latter condition had never been met. Furthermore, with the passage of time, the opportunity for the refugees to return had passed. By now it was impracticable to talk of returning home, since the immigration of a large group of Arabs would threaten Israel's security. In any case, the refugees' homes and properties had in many cases physically disappeared and in all other cases conditions had changed considerably.

7. In these circumstances, Mr. Yuval said, Israel had at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly offered unconditioned compensation to the refugees for their permanent settlement outside Israel (whether in the Middle East or overseas). Previously, Israel had offered compensation, but only as part of a general Middle Eastern settlement. The removal of the condition regarding a general settlement was important. Israel realized that the payment of this compensation would be a heavy burden. The Armistice Commission, which had almost complete records of ownership and boundaries, estimated the figure at \$250 millions. However, the United States and others had in the past offered to assist Israel to meet her compensation obligations by extending credits.

8. Mr. Yuval mentioned that one problem was that there was no-one to negotiate with regarding compensation. Israel would not negotiate with Arab Governments, but the refugees themselves had been unable to produce spokesmen. Whenever some leaders did pretend to speak for the refugees, they were denounced by the refugees. Mr. Yuval suggested the establishment of "some international organization" to represent the refugees.

9. After some discussion, Mr. Yuval agreed that the present Israeli offer of compensation was not entirely unconditional. One condition was that the compensation should be paid to the refugees only for their permanent settlement (elsewhere than in Israel). Another was that Israel itself had substantial counter-claims regarding properties which Jewish immigrants from Arab countries had been forced by those countries to leave behind, and would expect these counter-claims to be offset against the Arab claims.

#### Distribution

|             |                 |
|-------------|-----------------|
| Secretary   | U.N. Branch     |
| A/S Div. I  | E.A.M.E. Branch |
| A/S Div. II | E.R. Branch     |
| A/S Div. IV | Legal Advisor   |

#### Following Posts

Tel Aviv  
United Nations Mission, New York.  
Washington  
London  
Ottawa  
Accra  
Wellington

*B.G. Dexter*  
Report prepared by :  
B.G. Dexter.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL 81

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

181/4/4.

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. 2 .

considered that there were two parts to the resolution, viz., that the refugees should be permitted to return to their homes, but also should wish to "live at peace with their neighbours". This latter condition had never been met. Furthermore, with the passage of time, the opportunity for the refugees to return had passed. By now it was impracticable to talk of returning home, since the immigration of a large group of Arabs would threaten Israel's security. In any case, the refugees' homes and properties had in many cases physically disappeared and in all other cases conditions had changed considerably.

7. In these circumstances, Mr. Yuval said, Israel had at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly offered unconditioned compensation to the refugees for their permanent settlement outside Israel (whether in the Middle East or overseas). Previously, Israel had offered compensation, but only as part of a general Middle Eastern settlement. The removal of the condition regarding a general settlement was important. Israel realized that the payment of this compensation would be a heavy burden. The Armistice Commission, which had almost complete records of ownership and boundaries, estimated the figure at £stg.100 millions. However, the United States and others had in the past offered to assist Israel to meet her compensation obligations by extending credits.

8. Mr. Yuval mentioned that one problem was that there was no-one to negotiate with regarding compensation. Israel would not negotiate with Arab Governments, but the refugees themselves had been unable to produce spokesmen. Whenever some leaders did pretend to speak for the refugees, they were denounced by the refugees. Mr. Yuval suggested the establishment of "some international organization" to represent the refugees.

9. After some discussion, Mr. Yuval agreed that the present Israeli offer of compensation was not entirely unconditional. One condition was that the compensation should be paid to the refugees only for their permanent settlement (elsewhere than in Israel). Another was that Israel itself had substantial counter-claims regarding properties which Jewish immigrants from Arab countries had been forced by those countries to leave behind, and would expect those counter-claims to be offset against the Arab claims.

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United Nations Mission, New York.  
Washington  
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Wellington

*B.G. Dexter*  
Report prepared by : B.G. Dexter.

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION

CONFIDENTIAL 85

F → 181/4/4

With : The Israeli Minister (Mr. M. Yuval)  
On : 8th July, 1959.

Officers present : Mr. Munro  
Mr. J. Forsythe  
Mr. B.G. Dexter

Main Subject : Arab Refugees; Hammarskjold's Report.

Mr. Yuval said that he had so far only seen portions of the Secretary-General's "Proposals for the Continuation of United Nations Assistance to Palestine Refugees" (A/4121 of 15th June, 1959). He had not had any comments from his Ministry, and merely wished to discuss the document generally on the basis of his own knowledge. Mr. Munro said that copies of the document had only recently been received in the Department, and it had not yet been put to full study.

Mr. Yuval commented that ~~the principal point was~~ <sup>it was a "naïve" report</sup> ~~that the United Nations should continue to support the refugees~~ <sup>provide relief which</sup> ~~all the time and to all the extent necessary, pending~~ ~~reintegrating the refugee population into the productive life of the area.~~ ~~Another major point was that~~ The Secretary-General was proposing two alternative long-term development plans for the area, ~~for~~ <sup>means of</sup> integrating the refugees. The more complete plan, costing \$5,100 millions, would end in 1970; the alternative or "cheaper" ~~xx~~ plan would run to 1965.

Mr. Yuval thought that these aspects of the proposals would be ~~acceptable~~ acceptable to Israel. However, he doubted whether the Arabs would accept the proposals, judging by the hostile "unofficial" reactions so far in ~~the~~ press and radio.

Mr. Yuval <sup>said that there would be difficulties in implementing the</sup> ~~queried whether finance for the schemes proposed~~ ~~recommendations of the report, including the problem of finding finance, would be forthcoming.~~ <sup>On the other hand, large-scale</sup> development in the area would do much to solve the problem of the refugees.

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5. He reaffirmed that repatriation of the refugees in Israel was out of the question. While Israel had accepted over the years some 25,000 Arab refugees in order to reunite them with their families, it could not contemplate mass immigration by the refugees.

6. When asked whether this attitude was <sup>consistent</sup> not in conflict with resolution 194 (III) of the General Assembly of 1948,\* Mr. Yuval replied that Israel considered that there were two parts to the resolution, viz, that the refugees should be permitted to return to their homes, but also should wish to "live at peace with their neighbours". This latter condition had never been met. <sup>furthermore</sup> With the passage of time, the opportunity for the refugees to return had passed. By now it was impracticable to talk of returning home, since the immigration of a large group of Arabs would threaten Israel's security. <sup>homes and properties had</sup> In any case, the refugees <sup>had</sup> in many cases <sup>physically</sup> disappeared and in all other cases <sup>changed</sup> considerably.

7. In these circumstances, Mr. Yuval said, Israel had at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly offered <sup>unconditional</sup> compensation to the refugees for their permanent settlement <sup>outside Israel</sup> ~~elsewhere~~ (whether in the Middle East or overseas). Previously Israel had offered compensation, but only as part of a general Middle Eastern settlement. The removal of the <sup>condition</sup> qualification regarding a ~~general~~ general settlement was important. Israel realized that the payment of this compensation would be a heavy burden. The Armistice Commission, which had almost complete records of ownership and boundaries, estimated the figure at £stg.100 millions. <sup>However,</sup> The United States and others had in the past offered to assist Israel to meet her compensation obligations by extending credits ~~and other means~~.

8. After some discussion, Mr. Yuval agreed that the present Israeli offer of compensation was not entirely unconditional. One condition was that the compensation should be paid to the refugees only for their permanent

\* Footnote:

This resolution reads :

"11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible."

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CONFIDENTIAL 83

*then in Israel*  
settlement (elsewhere). Another was that Israel itself had substantial counter-claims regarding properties which Jewish immigrants from Arab countries had been forced by those countries to leave behind, and would expect those counter-claims to be offset against the Arab claims.

Distribution

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| A/S Div. 4    | <del>E.R. Br.</del> |
| Legal Adviser |                     |

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*Hellup*

Report prepared by : B.G. Dexter

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

181/4/4. F

RECORD OF CONVERSATION.

With : The Israeli Minister (Mr. M. Yuval)

On : 8th July, 1959.

Officers present : Mr. Munro  
Mr. J. Forsythe  
Mr. B.G. Dexter

Main Subject : Palestine Refugees : Hammarskjold's Report.

Mr. Yuval said that he had so far seen only portions of the Secretary-General's "Proposals for the Continuation of United Nations Assistance to Palestine Refugees" (A/4121 of 15th June, 1959). He had not had any comments from his Ministry, and merely wished to discuss the document generally on the basis of his own knowledge. Mr. Munro said that copies of the document had only recently been received in the Department, and it had not yet been put to full study.

2. Mr. Yuval commented that it was a "realistic" report. The principal point was that the United Nations should continue to provide relief while the need existed, but undertake a scheme of reintegrating the refugee population into the productive life of the area. The Secretary-General was proposing two alternative development plans; the more complete plan, costing \$5,100 millions, would end in 1970; the alternative or "cheaper" plan would run to 1965.

3. Mr. Yuval thought that these aspects of the proposals would be acceptable to Israel. However, he doubted whether the Arabs would accept the proposals, judging by the hostile "unofficial" reactions so far in press and radio.

4. Mr. Yuval said that there would be difficulties in implementing the recommendations of the report, including the problem of finding finance. On the other hand, large-scale development in the area would do much to solve the problem of the refugees.

5. He reaffirmed that repatriation of the refugees in Israel was out of the question. While Israel had accepted over the years some 25,000 Arab refugees in order to reunite them with their families, it could not contemplate mass immigration by the refugees.

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considered that there were two parts to the resolution, viz., that the refugees should be permitted to return to their homes, but also should wish to "live at peace with their neighbours". This latter condition had never been met. Furthermore, with the passage of time, the opportunity for the refugees to return had passed. By now it was impracticable to talk of returning home, since the immigration of a large group of Arabs would threaten Israel's security. In any case, the refugees' homes and properties had in many cases physically disappeared and in all other cases conditions had changed considerably.

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*B.G. Dexter*  
Report prepared by : B.G. Dexter.

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*Mr. Dexter should see this draft. It is quite interesting*  
RECORD OF CONVERSATION

*18/4/4*  
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With : The Israeli Minister (Mr. M. Yuval)  
On : 8th July, 1959.

Officers present : Mr. Munro  
Mr. J. Forsythe  
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Main Subject : Arab Refugees: Hammarskjöld's Report.

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2. Mr. Yuval commented that as he saw it the principal point of the report was that the United Nations should continue to support the refugees "for all the time and to all the extent necessary, pending the reintegration of the refugee population into the productive life of the area". Another major point was that the Secretary-General was proposing two alternative long-term development plans for the area as a means of integrating the refugees. The more complete plan, costing \$5,100 millions, would end in 1970; the alternative or "cheaper" plan would run to 1965.

3. Mr. Yuval thought that these aspects of the proposals would be ~~unacceptable~~ acceptable to Israel. However, he doubted whether the Arabs would accept the proposals, judging by the hostile "unofficial" reaction so far in the press and radio.

4. Mr. Yuval queried whether finance for the schemes proposed by Hammarskjöld would be forthcoming. On the other hand, large-scale development in the area would do much to solve the problem of the refugees.

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5. He reaffirmed that repatriation of the refugees in Israel was out of the question. While Israel had accepted over the years some 25,000 Arab refugees in order to reunite them with their families, it could not contemplate mass immigration by the refugees.

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7. In these circumstances, Mr. Yuval said, Israel had at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly offered unqualified compensation to the refugees for their permanent settlement elsewhere (whether in the Middle East or overseas). Previously Israel had offered compensation, but only as part of a general Middle Eastern settlement. The removal of the qualification regarding a ~~general~~ general settlement was important. Israel realized that the payment of this compensation would be a heavy burden. The Armistice Commission, which had almost complete records of ownership and boundaries, estimated the figure at £stg.100 millions. The United States and others had in the past offered to assist Israel to meet her compensation obligations by extending credits and other means.

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Tel Aviv  
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Report prepared by : B.C. Dexter

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4/5/2

Memo no.. 687

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
Canberra A.C.T.

Major H. de V. Rubin - Assistance to Arab  
Refugees in Jordan



AUSTRALIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE  
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,  
LONDON, W.C.2

25th June 1959

77

Please refer to our memorandum No.472 of 28th April on this subject.

2. Earlier this month the Foreign Office passed to us the attached copy of a letter from the Deputy Director of UNWRA to the Counsellor of the U.K. Embassy in Beirut, saying that we might show this to Major Rubin. The Foreign Office added that the Deputy Director's opinion was that there was no difficulty about making contributions from Jewish sources into the general funds of UNWRA and then assigning equivalent sums to specific projects. It might not be easy for Major Rubin to get a Lebanese visa, if he were indeed of Jewish background, but the U.K. Embassy would be prepared to help and would certainly hope that a visa could be obtained. Should Major Rubin be returning to London, Mr. Beith, of the Levant Department would gladly see him again.

3. Major Rubin's solicitor in London, Mr. F. L. Moss of 115-116 Strand W.C.2., now informs us that Major Rubin's health has unfortunately seriously worsened and that he has been compelled to fly back to Australia. He will therefore have to postpone his Jordan project for the time being.

4. We have told Mr. Moss that, if he is in touch with Major Rubin, he might advise him to get in touch with you as and when he decides to take up his project again. We have added that we have sent to you the comments of the Deputy Director of UNWRA.

(J. R. Rowland)  
for Senior External Affairs Representative



File No. 210/1/3.

Memorandum No. 527/59.

M. E. Section for file  
29/6.

76

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
Canberra, A.C.T.

F 181/4/4.

Palestine Refugees

I refer to our memorandum No. 452 of 26th May, 1959, in which we recorded a conversation with Mr. Eilan of the Israeli Mission concerning the Secretary-General's draft of a memorandum on the above subject.

2. The memorandum has just been distributed and two copies are attached; further copies will be forwarded in next Tuesday's bag.

3. Shortage of time has prevented us from giving the document any more than a cursory perusal; a fortiori we have not yet been able to discuss the contents of the document with any of the Missions most directly concerned with its contents. However, it may be pointed out that the Secretary-General's main recommendation is that UNWRA should be continued pending progress in the economic field and that certain "essential improvements" should be made in the continued work of the Agency. It may also be observed that Mr. Eban's representations to the Secretary-General would not appear to have met with success. It will be seen in paragraph 17 of the document that the Secretary-General is of the opinion that

"No reintegration would be satisfactory, or even possible, were it to be brought about by forcing people into their new positions against their will. It must be freely accepted, if it is to yield lasting results in the form of economic and political stability. The views now voiced by spokesmen of refugees would seem to indicate that the refugees would not voluntarily accept integration into the productive life unless they have been given freedom of choice in accordance with the United Nations decision.....However, it should be noted that a de facto economic integration - that is, an integration which does not result from a choice in accordance with the resolution - would not prejudice any rights established by the resolution."

4. Secondly, the 12th paragraph of the document contains the following passage :-

"I strongly and unreservedly recommend the continuance of the United Nations activities in support of the refugees, for all the time and to all the extent necessary, pending the reintegration of the refugee population into the productive life of the

area for which there are



Fourteenth session

PROPOSAL FOR THE CONTINUATION OF UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE TO  
PALESTINE REFUGEES

Recommendation by the Secretary-General

area for which there are economic reasons to hope in connection with its general development."

At the time of the consideration of the proposal for the continuation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), I undertook to make such proposals for the continuation of United Nations assistance to Palestine refugees as I might consider appropriate or necessary to put forward to the General Assembly. It was understood that in the preparation of such proposals I would look into the economic conditions of UNRWA, whose present mandate is due to expire on 30 June 1959.

After a careful examination of the problem of the Palestine refugees from various aspects, I recommend the continuation of UNRWA as suggested by the General Assembly, for "reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation or resettlement." It is pointed out in the report that the General Assembly should be kept informed from the choice of the refugees themselves.

I base my recommendation on an examination of the three problems of the refugees: political, political and economic. The political problem is dealt with in Part I of the report. Part II contains recommendations for certain arrangements which would constitute improvements in the continued work of UNRWA. In preparing this report for the General Assembly, this report is limited to the work of United Nations assistance to the refugees; thus, no proposal is made for the solution of the Palestine problem as a whole, nor for the refugee problem as such, but only for the work of UNRWA. However, a development along the lines of the recommendations might lead to a solution of such problems as the refugee problem for all concerned.

7/1/59



UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



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15 June 1955

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Fourteenth session

PROPOSALS FOR THE CONTINUATION OF UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE TO  
PALESTINE REFUGEES

Document submitted by the Secretary-General

INTRODUCTION

At the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, in the course of its consideration of the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), I undertook to make such proposals for the continuation of United Nations assistance to Palestine refugees as I might consider helpful or necessary to put forward to the General Assembly. It was understood that in the preparation of such proposals I would look into the technical operations of UNRWA, whose present mandate is due to expire on 30 June 1960.

After a careful examination of the problem of the Palestine refugees in its various aspects, I recommend the continuation of UNRWA pending, as expressed by the General Assembly, the "reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation or resettlement...". At present, this is envisaged in the other relevant General Assembly resolution as resulting from the choice of the refugees themselves.

I base my recommendation on an examination of the three predominant factors in the refugee problem - psychological, political and economic - which follows as part I. Part II contains recommendations for certain arrangements which would constitute improvements in the continued work of UNRWA. In keeping with my undertaking to the General Assembly, this report is limited to the question of United Nations assistance to the refugees; thus, no proposals for a solution of the Palestine problem as a whole, nor for the refugee problem as such, are set out in this paper. However, a development along the lines herein discussed might facilitate steps toward a resolution of such problems with justice and equity for all concerned.

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PART I  
GENERAL ANALYSIS

1. Previous resolutions of the General Assembly on the subject of the Palestine refugees, the recent annual reports of the Director of UNRWA and relevant debates in the General Assembly reflect the predominant factors in the refugee problem. As generally recognized, these are psychological, political and economic in nature. An understanding of the problem is easier if the different aspects are considered separately first. I shall begin with a consideration of the economic aspect because this establishes a framework within which the political and psychological aspects can be viewed more constructively.
2. Viewed from the economic angle, the reintegration of close to one million Palestine refugees into the productive life of the Near East presents problems similar to those faced in all cases of reintegration into economic life of a largely unemployed population. This will be true wherever and however the reintegration takes place in the Near East. We can, therefore, concentrate our attention for the moment on an economic analysis, dealing with the area as a whole.
3. As complete an analysis as available information permits, together with the supporting statistical data, is annexed hereto. It reviews key economic indicators and projections with regard to all of the countries concerned in the Near East and for the area as an economic unit, primarily for the ten-year period 1960-1970.
4. As it appears from these statistics, the national income per capita in all the Arab countries remains very low, although the rate of increase of the national income now in some cases is fairly high. At income levels like these, it is not to be anticipated that reintegration of a refugee population, over and above the absorption of the natural population increase, could be brought about if it had to be accompanied by a lowering of the income per capita. If this did happen, the result might well be a fall in the rate of capital formation, thus hampering still further an increase of income.

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5. In these circumstances, it is realistic to assume that the reintegration of the refugees in the Near East would have to run parallel to an increase in the national income at least proportional to the number reintegrated. That, in turn, would require that the added population can be productively employed with at least capital equipment equivalent to the one available to those already in productive life. The conclusion is that the reintegration must go hand in hand with such a new capital formation. If the reintegration, in practice, would have to be co-ordinated with some increase of the per capita income - which seems to be, if not necessary, at least highly desirable - the increase in national income and in capital formation would, of course, have to be more than equivalent to the addition to the population.

6. Given the present economic situation in the area, we can, in general terms, state that the reintegration of the refugees through normal economic processes into the productive life will, for the immediate future at least, require capital imports sufficient to render possible an increase in national income and capital formation preferably more than proportional, but at least proportional to the increase in population. From an economic viewpoint, such capital imports would represent sound investment in an area with great potentialities and great needs for a more diversified production. In the long run, with increasing revenues from oil in some parts of the region, the emphasis would switch from capital imports to investment of surpluses in the areas where reintegration takes place.

7. The capital formation will to a large extent have to take the form of agricultural and industrial investments. The agricultural investments would have to take place in semi-arid areas of low natural productivity, which probably would require fairly great amounts in order to be put into satisfactory production. The Israel experience of the capital needed per head of the population for such a development of investments is in this context of interest. I refer to the annex regarding these and other relevant data.

8. An additional factor that has to be taken into account is that it is likely that agriculture, in order to remain competitive, will have to be highly mechanized, which, in turn, will render necessary the opening up of new areas of production, with ensuing investment, in order to absorb the agricultural population set free in the process of mechanization.

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9. The population increases foreseen in the area are considerable. On the other hand, the natural resources of part of the region may in the years ahead yield considerably increased income in foreign exchange. Thus, and quite apart from the refugee problem, a significant degree of general economic development for the area as a whole will be required and possible. In general, the region can be seen as economically viable in the long run provided there is a fair degree of mobility of capital or labour, or both, among at least some of its parts. This will be encouraged if the area can begin soon economic development of appropriate scope, thereby providing attractive investment opportunities for a significant portion of such surplus capital as may become available from its natural resources.
10. Viewed from an economic angle, the reintegration of the Palestine refugees into productive life, although it must be considered as a fairly long process, is perfectly within reach provided that the area can be developed through sufficient capital formation; the recent acceleration in the rate of progress and the great natural resources are encouraging elements. However, capital imports would probably have to be considerable, if it is found desirable that reintegration be furthered without considerable delays.
11. Viewed in the perspective of what has been said, the unemployed population represented by the Palestinian refugees should be regarded not as a liability but, more justly, as an asset for the future; it is a reservoir of manpower which in the desirable general economic development will assist in the creation of higher standards for the whole population of the area. It follows that, irrespective of the fact that humanitarian reasons would urgently call for continued assistance to the refugees, such assistance is strongly indicated as a sound part of any programme of economic development for the area.
12. In the light of these considerations, and disregarding for the moment both political and psychological factors as well as the humanitarian aspects of the problem, I strongly and unreservedly recommend the continuance of the United Nations activities in support of the refugees, for all the time and to all the extent necessary, pending the reintegration of the refugee population into the productive life of the area for which there are economic reasons to hope in connexion with its general development. This will require the prior, or at least concurrent, resolution of political and psychological problems, to which the discussion can now turn.

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72

13. There is the question of where the integration of the refugee population can or should come about. Short of further and intense studies it is impossible to say where that could best be achieved from an economic viewpoint. The absence of these studies, however, should not delay the general development to which reference has just been made. This can and should proceed on the basis of information already available. There is no immediate danger of over-development in any particular part of the area.

14. The question of where integration should be sought has, as is well known, an important political aspect. In resolution 194 (III) the General Assembly:

"11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible."

The stand thus taken by the General Assembly would involve integration of refugees into the productive life of Israel as well as of the Arab countries in accordance with the choice of the refugees themselves. This stand has been consistently maintained by the Arab Governments concerned. However, Israel, stressing that the resolution relates to "refugees wishing ... to live at peace with their neighbours ...", has limited itself to offering, with conditions, a form of compensation to former landowners in the country and does not exclude an extension of the uniting of families scheme under which former Arab residents have already come back to Israel territory.

15. The economic development which has been presented here as necessary to an integration of the refugees requires that we overcome various political difficulties which now hamper progress in the desirable direction. One of them is the Palestine problem in its various aspects; another one the problem of inter-Arab relationships; a third one the problem of an Arab economic co-operation so framed as to render possible the exploitation of the natural resources of the area to the full benefit of all the countries in the area. In the two last aspects mentioned, important progress has been registered. Attention may be drawn especially to the decision of the Economic Council of the Arab League to implement a previous decision regarding an Arab development fund and to establish a preparatory council for Arab economic unity. However, fairly complete mobility of capital within

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the area can only be regarded as a long-range objective - not an immediate possibility. Regarding the Palestine problem no progress towards a solution is now in view.

16. While, under prevailing conditions, there is nothing to prevent internal economic development in each of the countries from proceeding to the extent possible, at least a gradual approach to the solution of the political problems mentioned above is a condition for that degree of development, on a regional or on a national basis, which is attainable and highly desirable in view of the unsatisfactory level of income in the area. In these circumstances, it is not adequate to direct attention primarily to the relationship which exists between these political problems and the question of the refugees. In fact, a solution of those political problems should be sought, inter alia, in order to create conditions for a sound general economic development in the area, irrespective of its significance for the reintegration of the refugees. If the problems are solved sufficiently well to provide for such conditions, the proper political setting would probably ipso facto be created also for a solution of the refugee problem in its political aspects.

17. Although the refugee problem may, usefully, in the first instance be studied in economic and political terms, it is basically a human problem. No reintegration would be satisfactory, or even possible, were it to be brought about by forcing people into their new positions against their will. It must be freely accepted, if it is to yield lasting results in the form of economic and political stability. The views now voiced by spokesmen of refugees would seem to indicate that the refugees would not voluntarily accept integration into the productive life unless they have been given freedom of choice in accordance with the United Nations decision - or in some other acceptable way - as they now regard such freedom as the means through which the wrong that they consider themselves to have suffered could be put right and their individual self-respect safeguarded. However, it should be noted that a de facto economic integration - that is, an integration which does not result from a choice in accordance with the resolution - would not prejudice any rights established by the resolution. In view of this serious psychological problem it is to be hoped that in the course of the lengthy process which must be anticipated in the economic sphere, ways will be found to bring about a mutually satisfactory adjustment of stands and reactions on all sides which would resolve these psychological difficulties by the time when integration of most of the refugees becomes an economic possibility.



18. It follows from the preceding argument that my previous recommendation for the continuance of the work of UNRWA is not conditioned by political considerations although such considerations may lend added strength to the economic reasons on which I base my recommendation. The perspective is not a discouraging one, provided that the world is willing to assist the region in its economic development and provided, further, that, step by step and as economic conditions permit, progress regarding the political and psychological obstacles is sought in a constructive spirit and with a sense of justice and realism.

19. Just as I support the continuance of UNRWA pending progress in the economic field, I recommend, after a careful study of the technical operation of UNRWA, certain arrangements which seem to me to be indicated as essential improvements in the continued work of the Agency. In part II of this paper, I will turn to those improvements, the main significance of which is that the UNRWA operation should be so conducted as to be in harmony with the general view of the refugee problem which I have set out above.



PART II

Technical considerations

1. The technical matters to which I would invite the General Assembly's attention fall under four main headings: who is to receive assistance; how should this be administered; of what should it consist; and the status of the administering authority - UNRWA.

(a) Recipients of assistance

2. The annual reports of the Directors of UNRWA<sup>1/</sup> have made frequent references to a problem under this heading which has given serious and continuing concern. I refer to the facts that (a) there are at present a considerable number of persons who receive assistance from UNRWA to which they are not now entitled, and (b) there is an approximately equivalent number of persons who are entitled to assistance but who cannot be given it because of limited funds. In the first category are mainly those who receive assistance on behalf of the unreported dead, those who are fraudulently registered as refugees, and those who are now earning incomes sufficient for self-support; in the latter category are mainly certain children and some persons who have lost a previous source of income and become in need. According to the best estimates available, the numbers in the two categories are, as indicated, approximately equal and there is therefore no question, for the present at least, of misuse of internationally contributed funds. Moreover, from a purely economic point of view, the only

<sup>1/</sup> Reports of the Director of UNRWA and special reports of the Director and Advisory Commission to the General Assembly:

Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 19;

Ibid., Sixth Session, Supplements Nos. 16 and 16A;

Ibid., Seventh Session, Supplements Nos. 13 and 13A;

Ibid., Eighth Session, Supplements Nos. 12 and 12A;

Ibid., Ninth Session, Supplements Nos. 17 and 17A;

Ibid., Tenth Session, Supplements Nos. 15, 15A and 15B;

Ibid., Eleventh Session, Supplements Nos. 14 and 14A;

Ibid., Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 14;

Ibid., Thirteenth Session, Supplement No. 14.

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76

relevant question is need, and on this basis, it is clear that most of those who receive assistance, with the exception of those with steady incomes, do need it.

3. What must be of concern to an agency of the United Nations, however, is the equity with which available assistance is distributed. If UNRWA were to be terminated at the end of its present mandate in 1960, matters could be allowed to stand as they are; but the indefinite continuation of UNRWA makes it necessary and desirable, particularly from the point of view of the refugees themselves, that the position be regularized.

4. This should consist in the application in full of what UNRWA has in fact endeavoured to do over the past several years, but with only partial success. It should be recalled at this point that UNRWA's working definition of a person eligible for its services is someone who lived for two years prior to the outbreak of the conflict in 1948 in that part of what was then Palestine and has become the State of Israel, and who lost both his home and his means of livelihood as a result of that conflict and is in need of assistance. This definition is not contained in any resolution of the General Assembly but has been stated in Annual Reports of the Director and tacitly approved by the Assembly. It has in fact two parts: The first concerns the status of a person as a bona fide refugee, and this of course does not change; the second has to do with a refugee's economic position or need for assistance, which can change from day to day. This distinction provides the key to a system of administration satisfactory to all concerned.

5. What is specifically required is a rectification of the present rolls on the basis of the first part of the definition, that is, the deletion from the rolls of those who are ineligible or those who are no longer eligible (the fraudulently registered and the undeclared dead) and the addition thereto of those who are eligible (mainly the children and adults not previously registered). Since births have exceeded deaths over the past several years, this process cannot help but result in an increase in the ration rolls. Thereafter, arrangements must be in effect for keeping the rolls current. It will be essential to have the full co-operation of the host Governments and the refugees on the one hand and, on the other, assurances by the contributing countries that UNRWA has sufficient funds.

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6. The application of the second part of the definition - the determination of need - is and ought to remain an entirely distinct process administratively. The fact that this is a problem at all, that is, that there is a fairly significant number of refugees receiving assistance which they do not need, is ample evidence of the willingness and the desire of the refugee to work and become self-supporting whenever he can. What is important, particularly in terms of the analysis in part I, is that the refugee be encouraged to take advantage of economic opportunity when it occurs, and for this purpose he must have the assurance that he can again claim assistance if and when he needs it within a reasonable period. It must be recalled at this juncture that in the present state of economic development throughout most of the Near East, the kind of economic opportunity that is available to any unemployed population is to a very large extent casual or seasonal or, if of a longer term nature, often subject to sudden change. Moreover, wages offered to a refugee are usually based on the assumption that he will continue to receive assistance from UNRWA. All of this means that income is often precarious, and considerable flexibility of administration is consequently essential.

7. UNRWA has developed the technical means for handling this matter through what it calls the graduated income scale. Such scales have been worked out appropriate to the level of income and cost of living in each of the host countries. They are so designed that assistance is withdrawn progressively as income rises and, as an incentive, the amount of additional income which brings with it a reduction in the particular service is always greater than the value to the refugee of that particular service on the open market. Again, the full co-operation of the host Governments and the refugees will be required and sufficient funds must be assured so that UNRWA can employ the scales with the necessary flexibility.

8. Although not strictly speaking within the terms of reference of the present study, I cannot let this occasion pass without referring to certain groups of persons who are excluded by a technicality from the receipt of assistance from UNRWA, i.e., those who have lost their means of livelihood but not their homes, under UNRWA's definition. They have been variously called "economic refugees" or, in UNRWA's more technical language, "other claimants for relief". A full report



was prepared by the Director of UNRWA and submitted to the General Assembly in 1955.<sup>2/</sup> These persons include particularly the frontier villagers in Jordan, certain of the Bedouin and the Gaza poor, that is, mainly persons who still have their homes, but whose means of livelihood have been lost or greatly affected. The stand of the General Assembly is understood to be that UNRWA should not give these people assistance. There is, however, no doubt that many of them are in greater need now than some of the refugees in UNRWA's care. In simple humanity, something should be done for them.

(b) Administration of assistance

9. There are, in logic, two ways whereby assistance from the United Nations can be administered: by the Governments of the countries in which the refugees live (on the basis of a financial subsidy), or by an organ of the United Nations itself. The latter alternative also offers two choices, at least theoretically: to continue UNRWA or to create a new organization to take its place. UNRWA has the experienced personnel, has demonstrated its efficiency and has gained the confidence of the refugees and the host Governments in its integrity. There would seem to be no reason to change and every reason to retain the organization as such. There are, therefore and in fact, only two alternatives: administration by the host Governments or by UNRWA.

10. Heretofore, because of the underlying philosophy of short-term assistance, the question of whether UNRWA should administer all or any part of the assistance was hopelessly entangled in political considerations. The establishment of the principle of long-term assistance to the refugees removes all grounds for consideration of the matter from a political angle; the way is clear for an examination of the question on purely technical grounds but in the broadest sense, i.e., what is the most efficient and effective way of providing assistance, taking into account the interests of all concerned. It is also possible to see the problem as not entirely one of hard and fast distinctions between administration by UNRWA or by host Governments, but to envisage an acceleration of a trend toward methods which already exist of a sharing in the administration between UNRWA and the host Governments.

<sup>2/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Session Supplement No. 15A.

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11. From this point of view, it seems clear that for the present UNRWA should continue to have at least primary administrative responsibility for the food programme, the construction, maintenance and sanitation of camps, and the health programme. This is because of the technical skills and/or the degree of administrative centralization required for efficient operation. UNRWA should also continue for the present to have primary administrative responsibility in that part of the self-support field requiring special technical skills not yet available in sufficient quantity in the area, such as vocational training and the economic analysis which provides the basis for installation grants and the like.

12. Primary administrative responsibility for the programme of general education, however, could with advantage to all concerned be assumed by the host Governments. There is relatively little in the way of centralized management required since the present programme has been carefully geared to the curricula and standards of host countries. The transfer and subsequent integration of staff (to the extent the host countries, as the new employers, wished) along with buildings and equipment into the host countries' present systems would be a relatively simple matter administratively since a considerable amount of integration has already taken place, and the host countries are already making a substantial financial contribution which has never been adequately acknowledged. Arrangements would, of course, have to be made whereby UNRWA contributed an annual subsidy on the basis of appropriate assurances as to the accountability of funds. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization could be counted on to continue its present practice of providing technical guidance.

(c) Types of Assistance - programmes of self-support

13. It is customary to describe UNRWA's programmes under two headings: relief, including general education; and rehabilitation or self-support, including especially vocational training and individual grants.

14. In recommending the indefinite continuation of assistance by the United Nations, I had in mind the continuation of the relief programme at at least the same standards that now prevail. If these could be raised there would be a net



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gain for all concerned. UNRWA's efficiency in the use of funds provided is already well known; less fully appreciated perhaps is the extent to which many refugees augment assistance by their own efforts but still live at the edge of subsistence. Nor, I believe, is it at all appreciated the extent to which the UNRWA type relief operation can in fact be regarded as a form of much needed technical assistance for the area as a whole. For example, the health programme not only cares for the individual refugee, it also introduces new standards and concepts of such care for the refugee population as a whole; hut construction meets a current and obvious need; it also provides training in construction and in community development; even the administration, involving some 10,000 refugees in all, including doctors, nurses and teachers, can be regarded as a training programme for persons in the skills just mentioned as well as in civil administration. I do not wish to push this point too far, but it is worth mentioning in relation to an operation which is all too often viewed pessimistically because it is called relief. More correctly, it finds its place in the broader context of general economic assistance discussed in part I.

15. The second part of UNRWA's programme has, of course, an even more direct role to play in this economic development. In paragraph 11 of part I, it was shown that the Palestine refugees can and should be regarded as an asset for the future. This will be true in proportion to the extent that the refugees have been adequately trained and equipped to take advantage of the economic opportunities that emerge.

16. UNRWA's specific experience is in harmony with the foregoing generalization. Because there has not been a satisfaction of the political and psychological aspects of the problem, the refugees have refused to participate as a group in large-scale projects designed specifically for them since they feel this would mean giving up rights. Nor was it ever realistic to have assumed that they could or should be the exclusive beneficiaries of such projects at the expense of the indigenous population. The refugees do, however, welcome opportunities to become self-supporting as individuals. To this end, they can be helped by UNRWA through its programmes of vocational and agricultural training for young people and individual financial grants for adults in order to take advantage of

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economic opportunities they have found on their own initiative. UNRWA has already developed the skill for carrying out and expanding these programmes. It is to be hoped that similar but more varied programmes might also become feasible in the future. Thus far the obstacle to the expansion of the training and grants programmes has been mainly financial; UNRWA has been able in the past two years to collect barely enough money to maintain its relief and education programmes. It is accordingly absolutely essential that it receive sufficient funds over and above these in order to implement a programme of self-support of appropriate scope.

(d) Agreements with host Governments

17. It will be appropriate - if UNRWA is to continue as recommended here - for all of the present agreements with the host Governments to be reviewed and revised or renegotiated to the extent necessary. UNRWA, which is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations and an agent of the General Assembly, in accordance with the stand of the General Assembly, must have an appropriate status and be provided with the facilities, including non-interference in matters of internal administration, to ensure maximum efficiency in operation and in the use of internationally contributed funds. It is my conviction that this can be achieved without the scale of UNRWA's operations posing problems to the host countries touching on their national sovereignty. In this context, the United Nations Charter and the Convention on Privileges and Immunities will, of course, be the basic instruments.

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Economic dimension

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ANNEX

Economic dimensions of the problem of the Palestine refugees

1. A first essential step in a broad consideration of the problem of the Palestine refugees is to determine its economic dimensions. This can only be done against the background of the recent rate of economic growth of the area and of its potentialities for further growth. If for the purpose of this first step we were to regard the refugees as representing a largely unemployed population not integrated into the surrounding economy, we could determine what, in purely economic terms, the reintegration of an unemployed population of this magnitude would involve. More specifically, what is attempted here is to obtain an approximate measure of the amount of capital investment which this process would require and, in particular, the amount of external capital needed, under the general condition that present rates of economic growth of the area should at least be maintained and if possible accelerated. The analysis does not go beyond this stage and therefore does not enter into any discussion of lines of action. Nor does it take any account of the political and psychological aspects of the problem which must, of course, be given their due weight in any final analysis. It merely attempts to establish what in any given circumstances would be minimum economic requirements for a solution of the problem.
2. Per capita incomes in the area remain low and therefore, if we are to be realistic in appraising these minimum requirements, we must take it as a condition that the reintegration should be accomplished without any lowering of per capita income. This means that national incomes in the area would have to grow at least fast enough to compensate both for the natural increase in the population and for the reintegration of the refugees. If this result were to be achieved only at the expense of a fall in per capita income, the rate of capital formation would also be expected to decline, thus hampering still further the increase in income.
3. Thus, the reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Middle East requires an increase in national income at least proportional to the number

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reintegrated. Actually, it is highly desirable that national income should grow at a greater rate than this in order that the relatively low per capita incomes should also be able to grow. To achieve such a result, any addition to the labour force must be supplied the necessary means of production in the form of capital equipment and land, over and above what is necessary to maintain the existing stock, so that national income would grow more than in proportion to the added population.

4. In recent years, some economic growth has been experienced throughout the area. Statistics indicating the extent and nature of this growth are available. It will be sufficient here to recapitulate the salient points. Since 1950, gross national product has increased markedly in all countries of the area for which data are available - the increases being greatest in Iraq, Israel and Syria. On a per capita basis, income has risen less rapidly because of population growth.

5. The two major factors influencing the rate of economic growth are the level of capital formation and the increase in the population. Population has been growing throughout the area by natural increase at a rapid rate of from 2 to 3 per cent per annum, and in Israel also by large-scale immigration. Gross capital formation has also been increasing throughout the area and has been at a high level in some parts of it. Expressed as a percentage of gross national product, gross capital formation has varied considerably in different countries of the area. It has been lowest in Egypt, varying from 10 to 16 per cent, and highest in Iraq where in 1956 it had risen to nearly 27 per cent, and in Israel where it has fluctuated around 26 per cent in the years 1953-56, after having reached the exceptionally high level of nearly 42 per cent in 1950. Since in all the countries of the area for which data are available there has been in recent years an increase in per capita incomes (slight in the case of Egypt, but significant in Lebanon, Iraq, Israel and Syria), gross capital formation has been large enough both to provide for the maintenance of the existing stock of capital and to add sufficient new equipment to employ productively a growing labour force.

6. The capital which has been necessary to bring about the results described above has been derived from a variety of sources and no single generalization

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applicable to all countries in the area can be made on this subject. Taken as a whole, the area has been a net importer of capital. However, only Israel and Jordan are dependent on foreign sources for a major part of their capital, and in both countries direct foreign aid represents a major part of the capital inflow. Between 1950 and 1958 Israel received about \$2,400 million in this way, \$1,000 million being accounted for by official United States financing and by German reparations, and the remainder by donations and loans provided largely through Jewish organizations in the United States and elsewhere. Jordan, during the same period, received some \$200 million in official United States and United Kingdom aid. Lebanon also depends on external sources of capital largely in the form of a sustained flow of immigrant remittances without which domestic saving would fall considerably short of investment. Capital imports into the United Arab Republic have been relatively small; thus, Syria has financed most of its investment from domestic savings, and Egypt has been able to live very largely on its own means with the help of previously accumulated sterling balances. With the possible exception of Saudi Arabia, the major oil-producing countries have had a surplus of capital over and above their own needs and opportunities for investment; Iraq, though involved in considerable development plans, has not until recently been able to invest the whole of its income in productive projects; because of lack of local investment opportunities, the oil-producing sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf, foremost among which is Kuwait, have been accumulating substantial capital surpluses.

7. In the light of the facts described above, it is possible to assess more precisely the economic dimensions of the problem of the reintegration into the economic life of the area of approximately one million additional people. To do this it is necessary to make some fairly simple projections into the immediate future of trends in population growth, national income and other significant economic magnitudes. It should be emphasized that this appraisal is not a forecast of what will happen, but a projection, on what appear to be the most reasonable assumptions, of certain significant trends. By this means the economic order of magnitude of the problem, and therefore of the steps needed to overcome it, are established in as rational a manner as is possible.

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8. The essential conclusions of this study can be stated in fairly simple terms, though the calculations and procedures by which they have been reached have been complicated and laborious. However, a brief account may be given here of the procedures employed in arriving at the conclusions set out in the following paragraphs.

9. Using the year 1955 as a base year, the growth of the population and labour force was projected for each country to 1970. On the basis of the estimated results for the years 1950-1956 and other considerations, gross national product was then projected for each country. Gross and net domestic savings were projected for the same period. Estimates were made for each country of the amount of new investment needed to employ an additional worker, and this figure, together with the estimated increase in the labour force, provided the basis for an estimate of total investment needed to employ the additional labour force and achieve a modest increase of per capita income. Taking into account both domestic savings and the expected inflow of private foreign capital and outstanding foreign official financial commitments, and comparing the result with the total investment required to absorb the labour force at an accelerated rate of development, an estimate was reached of the additional foreign investment needed. The Palestine refugees were then taken into account by considering those among them of working age as an additional labour force to be reintegrated into the economy, necessitating an additional investment the size of which could be simply calculated on this established basis. In order to arrive at more realistic quantities, the figures were also broken down into five-year periods.

10. Put in the simplest and most general terms, the analysis indicates that for the area as a whole the labour force, exclusive of the Palestine refugees, may be expected to increase by 5.6 million between 1960 and 1970. For this increase in the labour force to be absorbed into productive employment so that per capita incomes will continue to increase at a modest rate will require over the period new net investment from all sources of approximately \$12,000 million.

11. The funds necessary to finance such investment may be considered as coming from two major sources: domestic savings and various flows to the area from outside. Total availability of capital, however, varies substantially from country to country. Some countries of the area are capital-deficit countries even excluding any investment for the reintegration of refugees; others, the

major oil-producing countries,  
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major oil-producing countries, are capital-surplus countries because of the revenues arising from an expected increase in oil production. The capital-deficit countries are those of greatest population concentration and include those in which the refugees are situated. Their dependence on outside capital to finance part of their development, in order to achieve a modest rate of increase in per capita income, is likely to increase. Both provinces of the United Arab Republic, which in recent years have been able very largely to finance their own development, will no longer be able to do so and will have to rely increasingly on outside capital to finance the employment of their growing labour force. Lebanon may also be expected to look to outside sources for some of its development. Jordan, as in the past, will have to rely on foreign aid for almost the full amount of its investment. Israel, especially in view of its officially estimated further inflow of immigration, will stand in need of capital imports on a large scale as in the past.

12. In contrast, oil income in the oil-producing countries is expected to increase substantially during the period under consideration. This is especially true in the latter period of the 1960-1970 decade. Iraq, which since 1952 has been self-sufficient for capital needs, will probably become a capital-surplus country; so will Saudi Arabia, though to a lesser extent; Kuwait, along with the other oil-producing sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf, will experience a vast increase in the size of its present capital surplus. Depending on whether the lower or the higher oil-revenue estimates are utilized, the over-all surplus is expected to be in the order of magnitude of \$5,300 million or \$8,200 million, respectively, in the period 1960-1970.

13. Considering for the moment the area as a whole, and assuming perfect intra-regional mobility of capital, total availability of investment resources in the area would depend on the selection of oil-revenue estimates. If the lower estimates are used, gross savings of the area would be \$17,600 million. Of this quantity some \$5,400 million would be required to make good depreciation of capital so that about \$12,200 million would be available for new net investment. Adding to this the flow of foreign capital estimated at \$1,850 million, we have a total net availability of capital in the area as a whole of approximately \$14,000 million. This leaves a net surplus of \$2,000 million. If, however, the higher oil-revenue estimates are used, the net surplus of capital in the area becomes \$5,000 million. It is to be noted, however, that the availability /...



of capital surpluses shown above represents a highly favourable and therefore an extreme view. The other extreme is that oil-revenue surpluses do not become available for investment in the capital-deficit countries of the area. Under this alternative assumption, and in order to achieve modest increases in per capita incomes, the capital-deficit countries of the area will need approximately \$3,000 million in the period 1960-1970.

14. It is useful to remember that the Middle Eastern countries included in this study fall, mainly from an economic point of view, into three groups: the oil-producing Arab countries, the non-oil-producing Arab countries, and Israel. Our analysis shows that, for Israel to provide employment opportunities for the increase in the labour force (inclusive of official estimates for immigration) in the period 1960-1970, it will need a total capital investment of approximately \$2,000 million. Out of this quantity, a foreign capital inflow already assured is expected to meet about one half, leaving a deficit close to one billion dollars which, for the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed would be obtained by Israel, as in the past, from sources outside the area. Thus, the \$3,000 million capital deficit referred to in paragraph 13 above, exclusive of Israel, become \$2,100 million.

15. If, for the sake of clarification, we now concentrate on the non-oil-producing Arab countries (United Arab Republic, Lebanon and Jordan), we discover that in the period 1960-1970 they are expected to save close to \$6,800 million, \$3,100 million of which would be needed to maintain the capital stock. This means a total net savings of approximately \$3,700 million. To this we should add a sum of about \$700 million, which represents expected receipts from foreign sources, giving a total of investment funds of approximately \$4,400 million. For these countries to create employment opportunities for all the natural increase in the labour force and to ensure slightly better living conditions for the people, they will need additional investment resources in the magnitude of \$2,100 million.

16. The sum of \$2,100 million should be regarded as a minimum in that it is based on the assumption of modest increases in income. In all these countries per capita incomes are low and in some of them there is considerable under-employment of labour. Therefore, an acceleration in the rate of development

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over that envisaged is much to be desired, and it may be anticipated that, with better prospects for a steady capital inflow, some of the development plans which Governments may draw up within the next decade will aim at higher rates of growth than their present plans imply. In particular, in certain countries a more rapid rate of industrialization might be necessary in order to overcome the problem of under-employment and to make it possible to realize the maximum benefits of improved agricultural techniques. Given a will on the part of the non-oil-producing Arab countries to take the necessary measures to promote economic development, the limit to the possible rate of growth is more likely to be set by the availability of capital than by other factors. It is, however, important to note that, strategic as capital is in the process of development, the rate of economic growth is also seriously affected by such factors as the preparation and execution of specific projects, the supply of skilled labour, and the possibilities of social adaptation to technological changes, not to mention the political factors.

17. In the light of the considerations set out above, it may be stated that an increase in the volume of capital for the non-oil-producing Arab countries, of the order of 20 per cent above the modest rate used as a basis for estimating minimum capital requirements between 1960 and 1970, would significantly increase the rate of economic development. This proposed 20 per cent increase represents a sum equal to \$1,300 million, and is derived from a total capital of \$6,500 million estimated to be the minimum capital requirements of the non-oil-producing Arab countries. Following this approach, the total capital needs of the non-oil-producing Arab countries, at an accelerated rate of growth, would become \$7,800 million, \$4,400 million of which is expected to become available from domestic savings and, to a much lesser extent, from other sources, leaving a deficit of \$3,400 million.

18. It is not necessary for our present purposes to attempt a measurement of the favourable consequences of an enhanced rate of economic development. Suffice it to say that both income and domestic savings are likely to increase significantly, thus reducing the capital needs of these countries in subsequent stages of development. Moreover, such an accelerated rate of growth would greatly assist in the establishment of a larger and more stable economic base at higher levels of income, and create better employment opportunities and a more attractive climate for investment.



19. Turning again to the region as a whole, if we now consider the approximately one million refugees as an additional population to be reintegrated with the region, an additional investment will be needed. We shall assume that such a reintegration takes place under conditions which would at least maintain the level of per capita incomes resulting from the expanded volume of investment discussed in paragraph 17 above. We may then suppose that the capital cost of providing one job for the refugees, within the context of such improved conditions, is \$3,300. This figure, which represents the simple capital-labour ratio for the area, is very close to other estimates. Now, as the present refugee population represents a labour force of approximately 380,000 which will increase to 500,000 by 1970, the total capital investment required to reintegrate the refugees by that date would be approximately \$1,700 million. It will be recalled that in paragraph 17 above it was estimated that the non-oil-producing Arab countries would have a capital deficit of \$3,400 million by 1970. Taking this amount together with the \$1,700 million estimates as necessary to reintegrate the refugees, wherever this may be within the area, a total capital shortfall of \$5,100 million, exclusive of the capital surpluses of the oil-producing countries. It is to be expected, however, that a significant part of this capital will come from the capital surplus derived from oil production finding increasing opportunities in the non-oil-producing countries.

20. The picture which emerges then is one of a region with great development potentialities, ultimately capable of meeting a large part, if not all, of its capital requirements. To bring the picture more sharply into focus, however, we must take into account two other circumstances. On the one hand, we must distinguish clearly between the capital-surplus and the capital-deficit Arab countries. On the other hand, we must recognize that, if an accelerated rate of development is to be initiated and sustained, there will be a considerable gap in investment funds in the immediate and early stages which will have to be filled by funds from outside the area. In the longer run, the extent to which these capital-deficit Arab countries will attract investment funds from the capital-surplus Arab countries of the area will depend largely upon their success in starting and sustaining their economic development on a scale sufficient to create an adequate demand for the employment of their available resources.

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21. The foregoing analysis dealt with the entire 1960-1970 period, with a view to establishing orders of magnitude in regard to the total capital requirements and availabilities of the Arab Middle East and to providing a background for an assessment of the potential economic growth of the area. To gain insight into the immediate and so into the more urgent problems, however, it is necessary to focus attention on a shorter period, extending to 1965. Thus, the crucial question which remains to be answered is, what scale of investment is required to achieve this more immediate objective? Our estimates show that by 1965 the non-oil-producing Arab countries will need to provide for an additional labour force of approximately 1.8 million which will require, at an accelerated rate of growth, a net investment of \$3,900 million for their employment. Out of this amount, net domestic savings will supply approximately \$1,900 million and expected foreign capital inflow \$500 million, adding to a total of \$2,400 million. This would leave a shortfall of capital of approximately \$1,500 million. Over the same period, the oil-producing Arab countries of the area may be expected to have a capital surplus of over \$2,000 million and it may reasonably be supposed that a substantial part of this surplus will be invested in the capital-deficit Arab countries.

22. To provide the means for productive employment to the Palestine refugees - irrespective of where in the area they may be integrated - would require by 1965 an additional investment of \$1,500 million. The total shortfall of capital by 1965 would then be of the order of \$3,000 million. If we consider this amount together with the shortfall of the non-oil-producing Arab countries and the expected flow of capital into these countries from the oil-producing countries of the area, we may obtain an indication of the scale on which capital from outside the area would be needed during the next five years or so. The shortfall thus to be made good will be of the order of \$1,500 million to \$2,000 million.

23. If within the next five years foreign capital of this order of magnitude is actually invested, it would - together with capital likely to become available from within the area - create a demand for labour sufficient to absorb, with rising per capita income, the increase in the labour force arising from the growth of population in the United Arab Republic, Lebanon and Jordan. Furthermore, it would also give equally productive employment to the Palestine refugees, irrespective of

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where in the area such employment may be created. After this initial period, the need for capital from outside the area might be expected to diminish considerably. This decline in the need for outside capital would be an expected consequence of the increase in the pace of economic development and the rise in the domestic supply of capital as a result of the general process of economic development, as well as from the growth of oil production.

24. The reintegration of the Palestine refugees into the surrounding economic life of the area is possible only within the context of general economic development. This condition sets certain economic dimensions to the problem. What those economic dimensions are, in terms of capital investment, has been approximately indicated. No attempt to deal with the problem on a scale considerably smaller than this analysis suggests can hope to be more than partially successful. There are, however, two critical aspects: the scale on which investment needs are conceived, and the timing of the investment. An immediate investment from outside the area in the order of magnitude indicated in paragraph 22 is a necessary condition to start the process of economic development on a sufficient scale.

25. The rate of economic development of the area in recent years and the fact of its still undeveloped natural resources are not only in themselves encouraging signs, but should lead us to regard the refugee population not as a liability but as an asset for the future. The more rapidly the refugees could be productively employed, the greater the contribution they would make to national income and thus also to the availability of domestic capital.

U.S. dollar projected rates of growth in non-oil-producing countries, 1960-1970

| Country | 1960-1970 |
|---------|-----------|
| Yemen   | 1.1%      |
| Jordan  | 1.1%      |
| Lebanon | 1.1%      |
| Syria   | 1.1%      |
| Total   | 1.1%      |



Table 1. Middle East: projected rates of growth in non-oil-producing countries, 1960-1970  
(values in millions of U.S. dollars and population in thousands, unless otherwise indicated)

|  | Egypt  | Syria | Lebanon | Jordan | Israel | Total  |
|--|--------|-------|---------|--------|--------|--------|
| <b>Population</b>  |        |       |         |        |        |        |
| 1960 . . . . .   | 25,941 | 4,560 | 1,601   | 1,056  | 2,126  | 35,284 |
| 1965 . . . . .   | 29,465 | 4,179 | 1,818   | 1,200  | 2,568  | 40,230 |
| 1970 . . . . .   | 33,706 | 5,924 | 2,080   | 1,372  | 2,995  | 46,077 |
| net cumulative increase . . . . .  | 7,765  | 1,364 | 479     | 316    | 869    | 10,793 |
| <b>Labour force</b>  |        |       |         |        |        |        |
| 1960 . . . . .   | 9,944  | 1,748 | 614     | 405    | 741    | 13,452 |
| 1965 . . . . .   | 11,192 | 1,967 | 691     | 456    | 871    | 15,177 |
| 1970 . . . . .   | 12,704 | 2,233 | 784     | 517    | 990    | 17,228 |
| net cumulative increase . . . . .  | 2,760  | 485   | 170     | 112    | 249    | 3,776  |
| <b>Gross national product</b>  |        |       |         |        |        |        |
| 1960 . . . . .   | 3,315  | 679   | 583     | 166    | 1,681  | 6,424  |
| 1965 . . . . .   | 3,842  | 866   | 744     | 188    | 2,031  | 7,671  |
| 1970 . . . . .   | 4,418  | 1,117 | 961     | 215    | 2,369  | 9,080  |
| annual percentage increase<br>(1950-1956) . . . . .                                | 5.0    | 10.0  | 7.0     | 5.0    | 13.0   | --     |
| annual percentage increase<br>(1960-1970) . . . . .                                | 3.3    | 6.5   | 6.5     | 3.0    | 4.1    | --     |
| <b>Gross per capita income</b>   |        |       |         |        |        |        |
| 1960 . . . . .   | 128    | 149   | 364     | 157    | 791    | --     |
| 1965 . . . . .   | 130    | 167   | 409     | 157    | 791    | --     |
| 1970 . . . . .   | 131    | 189   | 462     | 157    | 791    | --     |
| <b>Gross investment, annual average<br/>1950-1956 . . . . .</b>                    | 342    | 70    | 70      | 11     | 308    | 801    |
| <b>Gross investment as per cent of GNP,<br/>annual average 1950-1956 . . . . .</b> | 13.0   | 15.0  | 18.0    | 9.0    | 30.0   | --     |

A/4121  
English  
Annex  
Page 11

62



Table 1 (continued)

|   | Egypt   | Syria | Lebanon | Jordan | Israel | Total   |
|---|---------|-------|---------|--------|--------|---------|
| Total gross domestic savings                  |         |       |         |        |        |         |
| 1960 . . . . .                                | 365     | 88    | 58      | 9      | 59     | 579     |
| of which necessary for depreciation . . . . . | (166)   | (34)  | (29)    | (6)    | (59)   | (294)   |
| 1961-1965 . . . . .                           | 1,994   | 512   | 338     | 48     | 323    | 3,215   |
| of which necessary for depreciation . . . . . | (966)   | (197) | (169)   | (33)   | (323)  | (1,628) |
| 1966-1970 . . . . .                           | 2,307   | 654   | 433     | 55     | 390    | 3,839   |
| of which necessary for depreciation . . . . . | (1,049) | (252) | (216)   | (39)   | (390)  | (1,946) |
| 1960-1970 . . . . .                           | 4,666   | 1,254 | 829     | 112    | 772    | 7,633   |
| of which necessary for depreciation . . . . . | (2,121) | (483) | (414)   | (78)   | (772)  | (3,868) |
| Gross savings as per cent of GNP              |         |       |         |        |        |         |
| 1960-1970 . . . . .                           | 11.0    | 13.0  | 10.0    | 5.0    | 3.5    | --      |
| Depreciation as per cent of GNP               |         |       |         |        |        |         |
| 1960-1970 . . . . .                           | 5.0     | 5.0   | 5.0     | 3.5    | 3.5    | --      |
| Total net domestic savings                    |         |       |         |        |        |         |
| 1960 . . . . .                                | 199     | 54    | 29      | 3      | 0      | 284     |
| 1961-1965 . . . . .                           | 1,088   | 315   | 169     | 15     | 0      | 1,587   |
| 1966-1970 . . . . .                           | 1,258   | 402   | 217     | 16     | 0      | 1,899   |
| 1960-1970 . . . . .                           | 2,545   | 771   | 415     | 34     | 0      | 3,765   |
| Total consumption                             |         |       |         |        |        |         |
| 1960 . . . . .                                | 2,950   | 591   | 525     | 157    | 1,622  | 5,845   |
| 1965 . . . . .                                | 3,419   | 753   | 670     | 179    | 1,960  | 6,981   |
| 1970 . . . . .                                | 3,932   | 972   | 865     | 204    | 2,286  | 8,259   |
| Per capita consumption                        |         |       |         |        |        |         |
| 1960 . . . . .                                | 114     | 130   | 328     | 149    | 763    | --      |
| 1965 . . . . .                                | 116     | 145   | 369     | 149    | 763    | --      |
| 1970 . . . . .                                | 117     | 164   | 416     | 149    | 763    | --      |
| Net investment necessary to create            |         |       |         |        |        |         |
| one job (U.S. dollars) . . . . .              | 1,400   | 1,950 | 5,000   | 4,000  | 8,000  | --      |

Table 1 (continued)

|                     | Egypt | Syria | Lebanon | Jordan | Israel | Total |
|---------------------|-------|-------|---------|--------|--------|-------|
| 1960 . . . . .      | 176   | 175   | 0       | 0      | 0      | 351   |
| 1961-1965 . . . . . | 1,000 | 1,000 | 0       | 0      | 0      | 2,000 |
| 1966-1970 . . . . . | 1,000 | 1,000 | 0       | 0      | 0      | 2,000 |
| 1960-1970 . . . . . | 3,000 | 3,000 | 0       | 0      | 0      | 6,000 |



Table 1 (continued)

|  | Egypt | Syria | Lebanon | Jordan  | Israel | Total    |
|--|-------|-------|---------|---------|--------|----------|
| Number of jobs that can be provided with the expected net domestic savings |       |       |         |         |        |          |
| 1960 . . . . .   | 142   | 28    | 6       | 0.750   | 0      | 176.75   |
| 1961-1965 . . . . .  | 777   | 162   | 34      | 3.750   | 0      | 976.75   |
| 1966-1970 . . . . .  | 899   | 206   | 43      | 4.000   | 0      | 1,152.00 |
| 1960-1970 . . . . .  | 1,818 | 396   | 83      | 8.500   | 0      | 2,305.50 |
| Surplus of labour  |       |       |         |         |        |          |
| 1960 . . . . .   | 77    | 11    | 7       | 9.250   | 25     | 129.25   |
| 1961-1965 . . . . .  | 471   | 57    | 43      | 47.250  | 130    | 748.25   |
| 1966-1970 . . . . .  | 613   | 60    | 50      | 57.000  | 119    | 899.00   |
| 1960-1970 . . . . .  | 1,161 | 128   | 100     | 113.500 | 274    | 1,776.50 |
| Capital necessary to employ surplus labour force                           |       |       |         |         |        |          |
| 1960 . . . . .   | 108   | 21    | 35      | 37      | 200    | 401      |
| 1961-1965 . . . . .  | 659   | 111   | 215     | 189     | 1,040  | 2,214    |
| 1966-1970 . . . . .  | 858   | 117   | 250     | 228     | 952    | 2,405    |
| 1960-1970 . . . . .  | 1,625 | 249   | 500     | 454     | 2,192  | 5,020    |
| Expected inflow of foreign private capital                                 |       |       |         |         |        |          |
| 1960 . . . . .   | 0     | 0     | 35      | 0       | 86     | 121      |
| 1961-1965 . . . . .  | 0     | 0     | 215     | 0       | 430    | 645      |
| 1966-1970 . . . . .  | 0     | 0     | 215     | 0       | 430    | 645      |
| 1960-1970 . . . . .  | 0     | 0     | 465     | 0       | 946    | 1,411    |
| Outstanding official financial commitments                                 |       |       |         |         |        |          |
| 1960 . . . . .   | 78    | 12    | 0       | 0       | 100    | 190      |
| 1961-1965 . . . . .  | 60    | 81    | 0       | 0       | 58     | 199      |
| 1966-1970 . . . . .  | 0     | 51    | 0       | 0       | 0      | 51       |
| 1960-1970 . . . . .  | 138   | 144   | 0       | 0       | 158    | 440      |

A/4121  
English  
Annex  
Page 13



Table 1 (continued)

|                                     | Egypt | Syria | Lebanon | Jordan | Israel | Total |
|-------------------------------------|-------|-------|---------|--------|--------|-------|
| Required foreign official financing |       |       |         |        |        |       |
| 1960 . . . . .                      | 30    | 9     | 0       | 37     | 14     | 90    |
| 1961-1965 . . . . .                 | 599   | 30    | 0       | 189    | 552    | 1,370 |
| 1966-1970 . . . . .                 | 858   | 66    | 35      | 228    | 552    | 1,709 |
| 1960-1970 . . . . .                 | 1,487 | 105   | 35      | 454    | 1,088  | 3,169 |

The following exchange rates were used for the dollar:

Egypt LE = 0.36  
Syria SL = 3.38  
Lebanon LL = 3.20  
Jordan JD = 0.36  
Israel IL = 1.80  
Iraq ID = 0.36

Other oil-producing countries: original figures in dollars.

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Table 2. Middle East  
countries, 1960  
population

Population  
1960 . . . . .  
1965 . . . . .  
1970 . . . . .  
net cumulat

Labour force  
1960 . . . . .  
1965 . . . . .  
1970 . . . . .  
net c

Gross  
19  
1



Table 2. Middle East: projected rates of growth in oil-producing countries, 1960-1970 (values in millions U.S. dollars and population in thousands, unless otherwise indicated)

|  | Iraq  | Saudi Arabia | Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar | Total   |
|--|-------|--------------|---------------------------|---------|
| <b>Population</b>  |       |              |                           |         |
| 1960 .....   | 6,515 | 6,650        | 403                       | 13,568  |
| 1965 .....   | 7,400 | 7,554        | 459                       | 15,413  |
| 1970 .....   | 8,465 | 8,641        | 524                       | 17,630  |
| net cumulative increase .....                              | 1,950 | 1,991        | 121                       | 4,062   |
| <b>Labour force</b>  |       |              |                           |         |
| 1960 .....   | 2,498 | 2,549        | 155                       | 5,202   |
| 1965 .....   | 2,811 | 2,869        | 174                       | 5,854   |
| 1970 .....   | 3,191 | 3,257        | 197                       | 6,645   |
| net cumulative increase .....                              | 693   | 708          | 42                        | 1,443   |
| <b>Gross national product</b>                              |       |              |                           |         |
| 1960 .....   | 1,188 | 669          | 574                       | 2,431   |
| 1965 .....   | 1,515 | 854          | 739                       | 3,108   |
| 1970 .....   | 1,935 | 1,090        | 953                       | 3,978   |
| annual percentage increase (1950-1956)                     | 13.0  | 40.0         | ...                       | --      |
| annual percentage increase (1960-1970)                     | 6.3   | 6.3          | 6.6                       | --      |
| <b>Gross per capita income</b>                             |       |              |                           |         |
| 1960 .....   | 182   | 101          | 142                       | --      |
| 1965 .....   | 205   | 113          | 161                       | --      |
| 1970 .....   | 229   | 126          | 182                       | --      |
| <b>Gross investment, annual average</b>                    |       |              |                           |         |
| 1950-1956 .....  | 132   | 45           | ...                       | 177     |
| <b>Gross investment as per cent of GNP, annual average</b> |       |              |                           |         |
| 1950-1956 .....  | 17    | 13           | ...                       | --      |
| <b>Total gross domestic savings</b>                        |       |              |                           |         |
| 1960 .....   | 249   | 153          | 287                       | 689     |
| of which necessary for depreciation ..                     | (59)  | (27)         | (20)                      | (106)   |
| 1961-1965 .....  | 1,442 | 897          | 1,721                     | 4,060   |
| of which necessary for depreciation ..                     | (344) | (159)        | (121)                     | (624)   |
| 1966-1970 .....  | 1,854 | 1,157        | 2,210                     | 5,221   |
| of which necessary for depreciation ..                     | (440) | (205)        | (155)                     | (800)   |
| 1960-1970 .....  | 3,545 | 2,207        | 4,218                     | 9,970   |
| of which necessary for depreciation ..                     | (843) | (391)        | (296)                     | (1,530) |



Table 2. (continued)

|  | Iraq  | Saudi Arabia | Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar | Total  |
|--|-------|--------------|---------------------------|--------|
| Gross savings as per cent of GNP   |       |              |                           |        |
| 1960-1970 .....  | 21.0  | 20.0         | 50.0                      | --     |
| Depreciation as per cent of GNP  |       |              |                           |        |
| 1960-1970 .....  | 5.0   | 3.5          | 3.5                       | --     |
| Total net domestic savings   |       |              |                           |        |
| 1960 .....   | 190   | 126          | 267                       | 583    |
| 1961-1965 .....  | 1,098 | 738          | 1,600                     | 3,436  |
| 1966-1970 .....  | 1,414 | 952          | 2,055                     | 4,421  |
| 1960-1970 .....  | 2,702 | 1,816        | 3,922                     | 8,440  |
| Total consumption  |       |              |                           |        |
| 1960 .....   | 939   | 516          | 287                       | 1,742  |
| 1965 .....   | 1,197 | 663          | 369                       | 2,229  |
| 1970 .....   | 1,529 | 872          | 476                       | 2,877  |
| Per capita consumption   |       |              |                           |        |
| 1960 .....   | 144   | 78           | 710                       | --     |
| 1965 .....   | 162   | 88           | 800                       | --     |
| 1970 .....   | 181   | 101          | 910                       | --     |
| Net investment necessary to create one job (U.S. dollars) .....            | 2,240 | 1,790        | 1,800                     | --     |
| Number of jobs that can be provided with the expected net domestic savings |       |              |                           |        |
| 1960 .....   | 85    | 70           | 148                       | 303    |
| 1961-1965 .....  | 490   | 412          | 889                       | 1,791  |
| 1966-1970 .....  | 631   | 532          | 1,142                     | 2,305  |
| 1960-1970 .....  | 1,206 | 1,014        | 2,179                     | 4,399  |
| Surplus (deficit) of labour  |       |              |                           |        |
| 1960 .....   | - 29  | - 14         | -143                      | -186   |
| 1961-1965 .....  | -177  | - 92         | -870                      | -1,139 |
| 1966-1970 .....  | -251  | -144         | -1,117                    | -1,512 |
| 1960-1970 .....  | -457  | -250         | -2,130                    | -2,837 |

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Surplus capital available  
1960 .....

The estimates of investment reflect unpublished OPEC studies in 1958 by the CIA of oil production to be over \$8,000 million appendix.



Table 2. (continued)

|  | Iraq  | Saudi<br>Arabia | Kuwait,<br>Bahrain<br>and Qatar | Total |
|--|-------|-----------------|---------------------------------|-------|
| Surplus capital available for investment |       |                 |                                 |       |
| 1960 .....                               | 65    | 25              | 257                             | 347   |
| 1961-1965 .....                          | 396   | 165             | 1,566                           | 2,127 |
| 1966-1970 .....                          | 562   | 258             | 2,010                           | 2,830 |
| 1960-1970 .....                          | 1,023 | 448             | 3,833                           | 5,304 |

The estimates of income, domestic savings and surplus capital available for investment reflect estimates of oil production and income based largely on a 1958 unpublished OEEC study. The conclusions of this study are more conservative than other estimates such as the projections of Middle East oil production published in 1958 by the Chase Manhattan Bank. According to the Chase Manhattan projections of oil production, the 1960-1970 surplus capital available for investment would be over \$8,000 million instead of \$5,300 million. For more details, see technical appendix.

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Table 3. Middle East: regional totals and Palestine refugees, 1960-1970  
(values in millions of US dollars and population in thousands, unless otherwise indicated)

|   | Middle<br>East<br>Total | Palestine<br>Refugees |
|---|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| Population  |                         |                       |
| 1960 . . . . .                                      | 48,852                  | 1,021                 |
| 1965 . . . . .                                      | 55,643                  | 1,160                 |
| 1970 . . . . .                                      | 63,707                  | 1,327                 |
| net cumulative increase . . . . .                   | 14,855                  | 306                   |
| Labour force  |                         |                       |
| 1960 . . . . .                                      | 18,654                  | 391                   |
| 1965 . . . . .                                      | 21,031                  | 440                   |
| 1970 . . . . .                                      | 23,873                  | 500                   |
| net cumulative increase . . . . .                   | 5,219                   | 109                   |
| Gross National Product                              |                         |                       |
| 1960 . . . . .                                      | 8,855                   |                       |
| 1965 . . . . .                                      | 10,779                  |                       |
| 1970 . . . . .                                      | 13,058                  |                       |
| annual percentage increase (1950-1956) . . . . .    | --                      |                       |
| annual percentage increase (1960-1970) . . . . .    | --                      |                       |
| Gross per capita income                             |                         |                       |
| 1960 . . . . .                                      | --                      |                       |
| 1965 . . . . .                                      | --                      |                       |
| 1970 . . . . .                                      | --                      |                       |
| Gross investment, annual average                    |                         |                       |
| 1950-1956 . . . . .                                 | 978                     |                       |
| Gross investment as per cent of GNP, annual average |                         |                       |
| 1950-1956 . . . . .                                 | --                      |                       |
| Total gross domestic savings                        |                         |                       |
| 1960 . . . . .                                      | 1,268                   |                       |
| of which necessary for depreciation . . . . .       | (400)                   |                       |
| 1961-1965 . . . . .                                 | 7,275                   |                       |
| of which necessary for depreciation . . . . .       | (2,252)                 |                       |
| 1966-1970 . . . . .                                 | 9,060                   |                       |
| of which necessary for depreciation . . . . .       | (2,746)                 |                       |
| 1960-1970 . . . . .                                 | 17,603                  |                       |
| of which necessary for depreciation . . . . .       | (5,398)                 |                       |
| Gross savings as per cent of GNP                    |                         |                       |
| 1960-1970 . . . . .                                 | --                      |                       |

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Table 3. (continued)

|   | Middle<br>East<br>Total | Palestine<br>Refugees |
|---|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| Depreciation as per cent of GNP   |                         |                       |
| 1960-1970 . . . . .   | --                      |                       |
| Total net domestic savings  |                         |                       |
| 1960 . . . . .  | 867                     |                       |
| 1961-1965 . . . . .   | 5,023                   |                       |
| 1966-1970 . . . . .   | 6,320                   |                       |
| 1960-1970 . . . . .   | 12,205                  |                       |
| Total consumption   |                         |                       |
| 1960 . . . . .  | 7,587                   |                       |
| 1965 . . . . .  | 9,210                   |                       |
| 1970 . . . . .  | 11,136                  |                       |
| Net investment necessary to create<br>one job (US dollars) . . . . .          | 2,113                   |                       |
| Number of jobs that can be provided<br>with the expected net domestic savings |                         |                       |
| 1960 . . . . .  | 480                     |                       |
| 1961-1965 . . . . .   | 2,768                   |                       |
| 1966-1970 . . . . .   | 3,457                   |                       |
| 1960-1970 . . . . .   | 6,703                   |                       |
| Surplus of labour   |                         |                       |
| 1960 . . . . .  | 129                     | 391                   |
| 1961-1965 . . . . .   | 748                     | 49                    |
| 1966-1970 . . . . .   | 899                     | 60                    |
| 1960-1970 . . . . .   | 1,777                   | 500                   |
| Total capital deficit (non-oil-producing countries)                           |                         |                       |
| 1960 . . . . .  | 90                      |                       |
| 1961-1965 . . . . .   | - 1,370                 |                       |
| 1966-1970 . . . . .   | - 1,709                 |                       |
| 1960-1970 . . . . .   | - 3,169                 |                       |
| Total capital surplus (oil-producing countries)                               |                         |                       |
| 1960 . . . . .  | + 347                   |                       |
| 1961-1965 . . . . .   | + 2,127                 |                       |
| 1966-1970 . . . . .   | + 2,830                 |                       |
| 1960-1970 . . . . .   | + 5,304                 |                       |

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Table 4. Capital requirements and capital availabilities of the Arab Middle East, including Palestine refugees, 1960-1965  
(millions of US dollars)

|  | Non-oil<br>Arab countries <sup>a/</sup> | Non-oil<br>Arab countries <sup>b/</sup> | Palestine<br>refugees c/ | Total<br>deficit | Oil-revenue<br>surplus<br>OECE d/ CMB <sup>e/</sup> | Total surplus<br>or deficit<br>OECE CMB |
|--|---|---|--------------------------|------------------|---|---|
| Total capital deficit                                      |   |   |                          |                  |   |   |
| 1960 .....   | - 76                                    | -108                                    | -1,280                   | -1,464           |   |   |
| 1961-1965 .....  | -818                                    | -541                                    | - 172                    | -1,531           |   |   |
| 1960-1965 .....  | -894                                    | -649                                    | -1,452                   | -2,995           |   |   |
| Total capital surplus<br>(oil-producing Arab<br>countries) |   |   |                          |                  |   |   |
| 1960 .....   |   |   |                          |                  | + 347   | + 295                                   |
| 1961-1965 .....  |   |   |                          |                  | +2,127  | +2,612                                  |
| 1960-1965 .....  |   |   |                          |                  | +2,474  | +2,907                                  |
| Net capital position of<br>the Arab Middle East            |   |   |                          |                  |   |   |
| 1960 .....   |   |   |                          |                  |   | -1,117 -1,169                           |
| 1961-1965 .....  |   |   |                          |                  |   | + 596 +1,081                            |
| 1960-1965 .....  |   |   |                          |                  |   | - 521 - 88                              |

a/ Minimum capital requirements from outside in order to employ the natural increase in the labour force under conditions of a modest rise in income.

b/ Additional capital needed to accelerate the rate of economic development.

c/ Based on a capital-labour ratio of \$3,300 which is the simple average for the area.

d/ Based largely on OECE projection of Middle East oil production.

e/ Based on the Chase Manhattan Bank projection of Middle East oil production.



COPY

OF LETTER FROM  
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS  
4510 EMPIRE STATE BUILDING, NEW YORK 1, N. Y.  
750 3RD AVE., NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

57

File No. 210/1/3  
Memorandum No. 452/59

26th May, 1959.

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

CONFIDENTIAL

*all East  
M. J. Kemp  
City temp  
sent to  
J. L. King  
J. R.*

Arab Refugees

We have reported in our telegram No. 361 the information given us by Mr. Eilan of the Israeli Mission concerning the prospective conference of African States to consider Algeria. This information was given to us in the course of a discussion on 22nd May, when the Secretary-General's draft memorandum on Arab refugees and the question of Israeli cargoes transitting the Suez Canal were also discussed. On the first point, Mr. Eilan told us that the draft, which the Secretary-General has himself been preparing, contained two phrases to which the Government of Israel took specific exception. The first of these was a further reference to "freedom of choice", and the second, the conclusion that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency might have to be continued in existence "while the need remained". The retiring Ambassador of Israel, Mr. Abba Eban, had discussed these points with the Secretary-General in the course of his farewell call.

2. The burden of Mr. Eban's argument was that, while the Government of Israel naturally agreed with the principle of freedom of choice, it felt that its practical application to the Arab refugees presented difficulties. He was convinced that any plebiscite held amongst the refugees on the question whether or not they desired to return to Israel would result in the conventional 99.2% in favour of such return. However, he did not think that this would be a fair reflection of the true feelings of the refugees, since the Arab Governments clearly regarded these people as a vital pawn in the political game in the Middle East and would therefore present the case to the refugees in such a way that the result would be inevitable. One argument which Mr. Eban felt the Arab Governments would use with the refugees was that the only way to ensure continuance of the sustenance, etc. provided by UNRWA was to register a vote in favour of return to Israel. Mr. Eilan told us that the Secretary-General seemed to see the force of this argument.

*This is basic  
in Israeli thinking  
H.S.*

3. On the other point, Mr. Eban told the Secretary-General that his memorandum, as it stood, clearly involved the indefinite continuance of the Agency. This Mr. Eban suggested, was psychologically and politically unsound, since, if no terminal date whatever were placed on the Agency's mandate, there would be no pressure on the Arab Governments to seek, or accept, some solution for the refugee problem in the way of re-settlement or rehabilitation.

4. Mr. Eilan then told us that, with the departure of Mr. Eban, it was likely that the Israeli case would, in the Fourteenth General Assembly, carry a somewhat different emphasis. Mr. Eban's statements over the last few years had contained reference to the property left behind in the Arab States by Jewish emigres to Israel. In future, however, it was likely that this reference would be high-lighted, in the sense that the considerable expropriated property, particularly of former Jewish residents of Baghdad, would be put forward as a potential set-off against corresponding claims by Arab Governments on the Government of Israel. It might also be mentioned that Israel had over the years received some 400,000 Jewish refugees from Arab countries.

5. The final topic of discussion, concerning cargoes of Israeli origin transitting the Suez Canal, is the subject of a second memorandum.

National Archives of Australia

Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

NAA: A1838, 181/4/4 PART 2



CONFIDENTIAL

21st April, 1959.

181/4/4.

TEL AVIV'S MEMORANDUM 122/59 - ARAB REFUGEES.

MR. J.A. FORSYTH.

You asked for any comments we might be able to offer on Tel Aviv's memorandum 122/59 of 26th March regarding Mr. Carver's conversations with the Minister and Mr. Forsyth on Arab Refugees.

2. There is little I can say, except that I fully agree, with one exception, with the points made in the memorandum. In particular I think that the summary of the situation given in the last paragraph is masterly.

3. I agree entirely with the assessment in paragraph 6 that "Mr. Carver.....is suffering from..... inability to imagine a true picture of the situation" in proposing that a "fairly large number of the refugees" be readmitted to Israel. This is just not practical politics - although, as is pointed out in paragraphs 8 and 9, Israel's willingness to absorb Jewish immigrants is still unlimited.

4. The only point in the memorandum with which I would disagree is that made in paragraph 7 - viz. that there is merit in pursuing the idea that refugee leaders revisit the former Arab areas in Israel. This seems quite impracticable to me. I cannot envisage Israel - nor the Arab countries for that matter - agreeing to it.

5. I think the situation remains as described in the last paragraph of the memorandum; and that no movement whatsoever is possible until one side or the other makes a substantial and politically difficult concession.

(B. G. Dexter)  
Middle East Section.

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CONFIDENTIAL

TEL AVIV.

35

230.5.1.

Memo. No. 122/59.

→ Mr. B. D. E. E.

Is there any comment  
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make on the  
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memo?

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The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
CANBERRA.

A. C. T.

PALESTINE REFUGEES - U.N.R.W.A.  
Your memo. no. 30 (852/12/10).

26th March, 1959.

I have read the records of the conversations which Mr. Carver of U.N.R.W.A. had with the Minister and Mr. Forsyth respectively, and think that the conclusion expressed in my memorandum no. 4 of the 2nd January last, that no fresh political factor has yet emerged to break the unhappy deadlock on this matter, is still valid.

2. I think that it is salutary that an appreciation of the intractable forces on both sides should be penetrating the highest levels, with a consequent realisation that unless one side or the other departs in some striking degree from its present attitude, the future of U.N.R.W.A. cannot be other than humanitarian nor can its existence and activities contain the seed of a solution to the problem. The more clearly this is understood throughout the United Nations, the more likely it is that pressures will build up which seem to afford the best hope that the two parties will be forced to come to an arrangement.

3. I am far from espousing the Israeli thesis that the Arabs have brought all their troubles upon themselves, but I think it is inescapable that it must be accepted, as Mr. Carver says, that the Palestine of the refugees' recollections is now Israel, and that conditions are now completely and irreversibly different from what they were when the refugees left their properties. It follows from this that it is a correct view that the refugees will have to overcome a deep-seated psychological inhibition if they are to accept the principle either of absorption or rehabilitation, and possibly, even the idea of individual payments.

4. Another aspect of this psychological hurdle is that it is self-perpetuating. Children whose memories of their childhood homes must be very hazy are now aged nineteen and twenty or so, and have all the bitterness of their parents, without the ballast of their parents' greater experience.

5. Similarly, it is not necessary to espouse the Israel cause to accept as a fact the position that the physical condition of the blocks of land left behind by the refugees, the buildings and improvements thereon, the plantations, gardens and the like, has been changed, as well as the very metes and bounds of the lands, in greater or less degree, throughout the last ten years. Indeed it is a realisation of this, and of the fact that these properties have been productively taken into the Israeli economy, which

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CONFIDENTIAL

TEL AVIV.

SA

ought to have a great bearing on the amount of compensation to be ultimately paid, but it is this fact which would make returning refugees displaced persons inside Israel. thing is clear. The refugees themselves are caught between the attitudes of governments which they 6. There is something to be said for the view expressed by Mr. Carver that the refugees should be educated out of their illusion, but not for the way in which he proposes that this should be done. The record of the conversation reads: "In ideal terms, the solution of the Palestine refugee problem is to let a fairly large number of the refugees go back and see for themselves.... however, there was a pressing and insuperable obstacle to this course; the adamant determination of Ben-Gurion that each and every opportunity for settlement in Israel is to be reserved for Jewish exiles..." In the light of the last sentence I take the suggestion that a fairly large number of refugees be allowed to "go back and see for themselves" means go back for residence. If this is so, Mr. Carver (or Mr. Hammarskjöld) is suffering from the same inability to imagine a true picture of the situation as he rightly credits the refugees with. As I have said, the returning refugees' houses, shops or orange groves are mostly obliterated; where, in these circumstances, would they spend their very first night in Israel? The objection on the part of Israel to the return of the Arabs is not that given by Mr. Carver but that set out in length in my memo. no. 4 of the 22nd January last.

7. The suggestion however that a fairly large number should be allowed "to go back and see for themselves" has nevertheless the germ of a constructive idea. If the going back and seeing is visualised as a tour of Israel and particularly the former Arab centres in Israel, it could be a very educational undertaking, especially if undertaken by leaders of the refugees. I think it would be worth while pursuing this.

8. Mr. Carver's (or Mr. Hammarskjöld's) estimate of the absorptive capacity of Israel is very much astray. The statement that 10,000 a year might possibly, given favourable circumstances, be the maximum number of immigrants who could be received is, in particular, very wide of the mark. As my memorandum 104 of the 13th March showed, nearly 16,000 came between August and February last; reference should be made to memorandum 8 of the 6th January, 1958, for statistics from 1948 to 1957.

9. Until the Roumanian emigration dried up, the prospect of receiving and assimilating from 80,000 to 100,000 during the current year was accepted - with a wry appreciation of the difficulties and costs involved, it is true, but nevertheless accepted - and I believe that if the immigrants had been allowed to come their immigration would have been successfully financed and carried through all its stages. The statement that it is "impossible for Israel to absorb a further million people" made by Mr. Carver to the Minister, would not be accepted for a moment by Mr. Ben-Gurion or the present Government of Israel, nor by its senior officials. For example, Dr. W. Eytan, Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated recently in an article for an American Jewish publication: "Israel can offer a home and constructive employment to millions of people more than those living here today - to millions more, indeed, than are likely to come". It is of course true that the immense effort needed for this would only be made by the State of Israel for Jews. By Israel's domestic law, every Jew has a right to come, and it is inconceivable that the Knesset would tamper with this.

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CONFIDENTIAL

TEL AVIV. 53

10. It is probably impossible, even if it were of any use, to strike a balance of responsibility as between Jews and Arabs for the plight of the refugees, but to my mind one thing is clear. The refugees themselves are caught between the attitudes of governments which they have no hope of influencing: the Arab governments will not face absorption or rehabilitation with the object of absorption because the continued existence of the refugees as refugees is a matter of political advantage to them, and, on the other hand, Israel will not pay individual compensation to those whose properties it has taken over, but links compensation to a change of behaviour on the part of the Arab states (the blockade, for example), to conditions to be performed by the Arab states, and to the property which Jews were compelled to leave behind on their departure from Arab states, such as Iraq and Egypt.

(Sgd) B. C. Ballard

(B. C. Ballard)  
Minister.

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CONFIDENTIAL

50

In reply quote No. 230/5/1.

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION  
TEL AVIV.

Memo No. 122/59.

26th March, 1959.

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

*M.E. to return -  
Copy King sent to N.Y.  
do not*

PALESTINE REFUGEES - U.N.R.W.A.  
Your memo. no. 30 (852/12/10).

*F181/4/4*

I have read the records of the conversations which Mr. Carver of U.N.R.W.A. had with the Minister and Mr. Forsyth respectively, and think that the conclusion expressed in my memorandum No. 4 of the 2nd January last, that no fresh political factor has yet emerged to break the unhappy deadlock on this matter, is still valid.

2. I think that it is salutary that an appreciation of the intractable forces on both sides should be penetrating the highest levels, with a consequent realisation that unless one side or the other departs in some striking degree from its present attitude, the future of U.N.R.W.A. cannot be other than humanitarian nor can its existence and activities contain the seed of a solution to the problem. The more clearly this is understood throughout the United Nations, the more likely it is that pressures will build up which seem to afford the best hope that the two parties will be forced to come to an arrangement.

3. I am far from espousing the Israeli thesis that the Arabs have brought all their troubles upon themselves, but I think it is inescapable that it must be accepted, as Mr. Carver says, that the Palestine of the refugees' recollections is now Israel, and that conditions are now completely and irreversibly different from what they were when the refugees left their properties. It follows from this that it is a correct view that the refugees will have to overcome a deep-seated psychological inhibition if they are to accept the principle either of absorption or rehabilitation, and possibly, even the idea of individual payments.

4. Another aspect of this psychological hurdle is that it is self-perpetuating. Children whose memories of their childhood homes must be very hazy are now aged nineteen and twenty or so, and have all the bitterness of their parents, without the ballast of their parents' greater experience.

5. Similarly, it is not necessary to espouse the Israel cause to accept as a fact the position that the physical condition of the blocks of land left behind by the refugees, the buildings and improvements thereon, the plantations, gardens and the like, has been changed, as well as the very metes and bounds of the lands, in greater or less degree, throughout the last ten years. Indeed it is a realisation of this, and of the fact that these properties have been productively taken into the Israeli economy, which

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ought to have a great bearing on the amount of compensation to be ultimately paid, but it is this fact which would make returning refugees displaced persons inside Israel.

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(SGD)  
(B. C. Ballard)  
Minister.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.  
O.3503

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM. 1959

TO:.

1317  
(Via leased channel)

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

99 CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 156 - U.N.R.W.A. and U.N.H.C.R.

We regret that we see no prospect of an extra contribution  
at this stage.

MIN & DEPT E.A.  
TREASURER & TREASURY  
MIN & DEPT IMMIGRATION  
P.M.'S.

18th March, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA MR EASTMAN UN ER CR PAC&W A&P S&SEA  
SA E.A.F&ME E AF&ME INF INTELL

G

181/4/4



48  
CONFIDENTIAL

181/4/4.

16th March, 1959.

ARAB REFUGEES.

Mr. H. Forsythe.

I think Ludlow is realistic in insisting that positive action will have to be taken to eradicate refugee camps. There seems no prospect of the refugees even being absorbed into the Arab countries in present circumstances. There is, of course, plenty of scope for their absorption, particularly in the Gezira area (NE) of Syria and in Iraq: but there is no willingness in the Arab countries to allow the refugees to be absorbed. This results mainly from political considerations - the Arabs have no desire to see the refugee problem solved except through the liquidation of Israel. In the case of some countries - e.g. Lebanon and Jordan - absorption of the refugees existing within their borders would cause grave political and economic internal disruption.

2. As regards repatriation, I do not think Ludlow is being realistic. Nor do I consider Carver realistic on this topic - unless, as I suspect, he desires to see Israel disappear. Anyone who has seen the refugee camps knows that the refugees sit and dream of their lost lands, many of which they can actually see from their camps. I foresee that if Israel offered repatriation, however qualified, most refugees would opt for it. Further, the Arab states would no doubt urge them to seek repatriation. Israel could probably not survive such a flood. I think it wrong to attempt to press Israel to offer repatriation.

A. & M.E. Sections.  
B.G. Dexter/JM.

CONFIDENTIAL



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RRE/gw

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

47

(c) acceptance of Israeli citizenship

17th February, 1959.

MEMORANDUM NO. 120/59 the number of refugees who would be permitted repatriation in any single year;

The Secretary, physical change which has taken place in former Department of External Affairs, have to accept other land in the Canberra, A.C.T. as their former properties, which would be made available by the Israeli Government.

6. It was quite likely that in the first instance anything up to 90% of the refugees might accept repatriation instead of accepting compensation. However, when repatriates discovered the extent to which conditions had changed in Israel, they had to be referred to your memorandum No. 43 of 21st January, 1959 (your file 852/12/10 refers) and our savingram No. 810 of 3rd December, 1958. They would have to agree to serve in Israeli Army (our savingram above refers). Ludlow said that he had discussed the arguments advanced in the enclosure to your memorandum with Ludlow (U.N. Adviser, Near East Affairs). He admitted that Israel was adamant against conceding the principle of repatriation at the present time. He believed, however, that the Israelis had at one time or another considered the possibility of agreeing to repatriation in principle with conditions which would strictly limit the number of Arab refugees who would in fact return. They had, however, decided against doing this for the following reasons:-
- (a) Israelis felt that so long as U.S. and other countries were willing to continue bearing the cost of looking after refugees this would save them money;
  - (b) Israeli Government wished to keep any such concession as bargaining counter in some overall settlement of Arab/Israeli differences;
  - (c) Israeli Government rightly or wrongly believed that concession on the repatriation issue might adversely affect financial support which it was receiving from their co-religionists in other parts of the world.

*orig on 854/12/10.*

3. Ludlow commented that not all of his colleagues in the State Department agreed with him that the United States should put pressure on Israel to concede principle of repatriation. Many of them simply felt problem was insoluble and that matters should be left as they were. Ludlow, however, did not feel the problem was insoluble and he believed that Congress was going to become increasingly difficult about U.S. contributions to U.N.W.R.A. unless some attempt was made to settle the Palestine refugee problem.
4. Ludlow said that the Arabs would probably reject any Israeli offer of conditional repatriation, but if they did so, this would knock the props from under their position in the United Nations, as most countries would feel that conditional repatriation was reasonable. Arabs themselves might then be forced to do something about the refugees.
5. The conditions which Ludlow thought Israelis might reasonably attach to repatriation (outlined in our savingram above) represented his own personal views, but he thought the crux of any such conditions might be:-

/(a) acceptance

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

46

- (a) acceptance of Israeli citizenship;
- (b) limitation of the number of refugees who would be permitted repatriation in any single year;
- (c) with the physical change which has taken place in former Arab properties, repatriates would have to accept other land in the same general area as their former properties, which would be made available by the Israeli Government.

6. It was quite likely that in the first instance anything up to 90% of the refugees might opt for repatriation instead of accepting compensation. However, when repatriates discovered the extent to which conditions had changed in Israel and others had to wait around in camps for period of years, many might change their minds and decide to accept compensation. (In suggesting the condition that repatriates would have to agree to serve in Israeli Army (our savingram above refers) Ludlow said that all he had in mind was that this of itself would be such an unpalatable condition that it would make many refugees decide in favour of lump sum compensation.)

7. Commenting on the argument that Arab repatriates would become "displaced persons" in Israel and that their feelings would become even more exacerbated, Ludlow said that he could not see the Israelis allowing this to happen. The movement of Arabs in Israel was already restricted and if anything the circumstances in which they would find themselves would probably cause many repatriates to change their minds and make them want to leave Israel and accept compensation. Much bitterness would no doubt be engendered whatever system of repatriation was adopted, but the main thing was that the refugee camps would be wound up and the refugees dispersed.

8. In conclusion, Ludlow said he could not see anything being done about the refugees for the next several years, but with the growth of the population in the camps something would have to be done eventually. (He noted that within the next two or three years a point would be reached where over half of the population of the camps would be under fifteen years of age.)

R.R. FERNANDEZ  
Second Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL 445

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

:HC

I.4287

Dated: 9th March, 1959.

1720

Rec'd: 10th March, 1959.

1026

FROM: (via leased channel)

Australian Mission to the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN.156. CONFIDENTIAL.

U.N.R.W.A. and U.N.R.E.F.

Negotiating Committee for extra budgetary funds is at present canvassing all delegations for increased contributions to meet financial difficulties particularly of U.N.R.W.A. but also of U.N.R.E.F. Chairman and two members called on us today and while admitting that Australian contributions to both agencies had been generous, expressed hope that they might be increased.

2. Regarding U.N.R.E.F. they pointed out that there is likely to be shortfall of 1.8 million dollars on minimum budget for current year.

3. Discussion regarding U.N.R.W.A. followed lines of Carver's conversation of 17th February with the Minister. Additional points made were that special contribution from Canada is likely to be 1.5 million dollars (this in strict confidence), that there are at present no prospects for remaining 500,000 dollars and that certain types of contributions in kind are acceptable and attract matching contributions. This information will no doubt be available to you but we can get list if required.

-----  
MIN. DEPT. E.A.  
TREASURER & TREASURY  
MIN. DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
P.M.'s.

10th March, 1959.

SEC A/CS LA MR. EASTMAN UN ER CR PAC&AM AM&SP  
S&SEA SA E.A.F&ME E AF&ME INF INTELL

G

181/4/4

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

File No. 852/12/10

## EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with Mr. L. Carver, Deputy Director of U.N.R.W.A.on Monday, 16th February, 1959Officers Present: Mr. W.D. ForsythMAIN SUBJECT(S): U.N.R.W.A.

Mr. Carver told me that he had quite recently had a talk with Mr. Hammarskjöld at United Nations Headquarters. He outlined to me what he had gathered as to the Secretary-General's intentions in following up the understanding of the Special Political Committee XIIIth General Assembly 1958, that he would examine the situation of U.N.R.W.A. and make a report if he thought it necessary.

2. Mr. Carver had gathered that the Secretary-General was examining the work and experience of U.N.R.W.A. and had in mind producing a draft report for the purpose initially of testing Arab attitudes, i.e. the paper might or might not become a report to the Assembly but would in the first instance be shown to selected Arabs so that the Secretary-General would be able to get impressions of their feelings.

N.B. Mr. Carver asked that the above, and anything else relating to this conversation with the Secretary-General, be treated on a most confidential basis and not referred to in Secretariat or other relevant contacts.

3. He went on to give me his impression of Mr. Hammarskjöld's general ideas on U.N.R.W.A.

(a) He was not inclined to think that a new organization replacing U.N.R.W.A. would have any practical advantages, but felt rather that a new organization might arouse expectations and lead to pressures which could greatly increase the cost of administering Palestine refugee relief. Hammarskjöld seemed to be satisfied that U.N.R.W.A. was doing the relief job as cheaply as it could possibly be done. Of course, if there were any solid prospect of rehabilitation of a great proportion of the refugees (as opposed to relief), then some new or additional organization might have point. This, however, was not the case - there are no spectacular employment opportunities on a massive scale available anywhere in the area. The process of rehabilitation must be very slow and piecemeal.

(b) The major obstacle to more rapid solution of the problem of the Palestine refugees is a psychological one. All but a very small percentage (around 5 per cent) of the million refugees are of peasant origin and their vision of a solution is the simple one of being permitted to return to their former holdings, i.e. literally the same place and under the same conditions. This is

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→ Europe, Africa and Middle East Branch

## FOLLOWING POST(S):

New York (Please safeguard)

Report prepared by W.D. Forsyth

## ACTION:

2960/55.

CONFIDENTIAL



quite impossible. The conditions have changed. Moreover the State of Israel could not possibly in practice take on immigration of around a million people, or anything like it, in any period of practical importance. Ten thousand a year might possibly be the maximum, given favourable circumstances. In ideal terms, the solution to the Palestine refugee problem is to let a fairly large number of the refugees go back and see for themselves. They would have to face the fact that all conditions, physical and social, had changed; that they would have to become Israeli subjects, that their children would have to attend Israeli schools and learn Hebrew, etc. etc. The effect would be to remove an illusion which, while it persists, withholds the refugees from contemplating a realistic solution, i.e. absorption into the economics of the Arab lands. However, there was a pressing and insuperable obstacle to this course; the adamant determination of Ben Gurion that each and every opportunity for settlement in Israel is to be reserved for Jewish exiles, and given to no one else.

4. Mr. Carver spoke to me also about the world refugee year and the "stamp plan", both of which he has discussed with Dr. Lindt, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. He has left material in the Department on those and wishes to speak to the Minister, Mr. Casey, on the stamp plan which, in brief, is a plan for raising funds for both the European and the Palestine refugee Organizations through the sale of a special stamp issue in which it is desired that if possible all member States of the United Nations would co-operate.



Name of Paper *The Sydney Morning Herald* File No. *181/4/4 ME*  
 Published at *Sydney* Date *19-2-59*

## A Man With A Million Problems ME

By A STAFF CORRESPONDENT

"I AM walking along the edge of a precipice," he said. "I have a million problems on my mind."

He smiled gently as he spoke, but he meant every word of it. For his million problems are the Arab refugees who fled from their homes during the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948.

The speaker was Mr Leslie J. Carver, an Englishman, acting director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (U.N.R.W.A.). He will leave Sydney today after visiting Australia to stimulate interest in U.N.R.W.A.'s work.

"We provide food and medical care for nearly one million refugees," he said, "and they're increasing by about 25,000 a year (mainly births). About 400,000 of them are in organised camps; the others are squatting on the fringes of the camps or living with relatives and in rooms. It's a huge job."

U.N.R.W.A. has a staff of more than 10,000 (mainly Palestinians) to do this job, with headquarters in Beirut. It spends more than 30 million dollars each year on refugees spread over 100,000 square miles in the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Syrian region of the United Arab Republic. And this is not enough; it needs funds badly.

"We spend nearly 10d a day on each refugee," Mr Carver said, "and that certainly mounts up when you multiply it by a million and 365 days in a year. But we need money not just to keep the refugees as they are, but to expand vocational training, build more permanent camps, and intensify medical care."

### Aid—And Result

U.N.R.W.A. has about 4,000 school teachers (it educates 190,000 children), 3,500 health staff workers (from latrine-sweepers to doctors), and nearly 400 vehicles to help distribute supplies. It gives special rations each month to about 25,600 pregnant and nursing women and T.B. patients, serves 43,500 hot midday meals to children and sick people, and gives daily milk to 211,300 children, nursing mothers, and patients.

Once a month (twice a month in the Gaza Strip) it distributes a basic ration to about 850,000 of the refugees—dry foods inadequate in caloric content and dietetically unbalanced, but which refugees can barter for meat and vegetables. The result is that there



MR CARVER

is little malnutrition, never any major epidemic.

All this, however, does not win the refugees' warm approval for the United Nations. One idea obsesses them: to go home. They feel it bitterly unjust that the U.N. has not forced Israel to implement a 1948 General Assembly resolution urging repatriation and compensation. They are bitter with Britain, too, for the 1917 Balfour Declaration pledging British support for a Jewish national home in Palestine; they are angry with the United States because it makes grants to Israel. And political agitators are at work among them.

"It's really wonderful that they have stuck it out so well," Mr Carver said. "They're a rootless, potentially unstable element, and we are able to do very little for them, really, while awaiting a political solution to the problem."

"But we are gradually overcoming their suspicions; they have accepted the fact that we cannot do more than the money we have will allow. Somehow we have managed to keep them from becoming a dangerous spark that might set off something more serious; U.N.R.W.A.'s work prevents starvation and widespread rioting."

"We have a shelter improvement program; the number of tents has dropped to less than 5,000. We are doing all we can, with money from the U.S. and other Governments and organisations."



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

45

MR. DEXTER

File No. 181/4/4

Date 16/2/59

SUBJECT

Interview with Mr. Carver.

FOR Mr. Heydon

Mr Carver will be here at 4 P.M. & I think you should see him if you can manage it. Mr Lutter & I would like to be present if this is agreeable to you.

My wife  
I regret I  
could not  
attend so  
briefly.  
Mr Carver.

ABM

17/2/59

I suggest that before your interview with Mr. Carver, Deputy Director of M.N.R.W.A., this afternoon, you read again your minute of 5<sup>th</sup> February for the Minister (flag A).

You may also care to glance through Mr. Ballard's interesting Despatch No. 4 of 18<sup>th</sup> October, 1958, and (flag B), and Memo 534/58 of 18<sup>th</sup> November (flag C). Hammarshjold's account of his discussions with Ben Gurion is also of interest (see underlined portion of Sav. Ex 54 from London of 21 January, at flag D).

St. D. 16/2

I don't think you need bother with the other papers.

Bft



PK B. ~~DEFTER~~

F 181/4/4

8/6/2

5th February, 1959.

THE PALESTINE REFUGEES AND U.N.R.W.A. (UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY).

THE MINISTER

The following brief note may be of some use in connection with the visit to Canberra (16th and 17th February) of Mr. Leslie Carver of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. Mr. Carver, an Englishman, became Deputy Director of U.N.R.W.A. in October 1952, and acted as Director for two periods, - March 1953 to June 1954 and again since June 1958 until just recently, when it was announced that Dr. John Davis of Harvard had been appointed as Director.

2. About half a million Arab refugees left their homes in Palestine as a result of the troubles there in 1947 and 1948. Due to natural increase, their numbers now total over one million. The largest number is in Jordan (about 550,000). There are about 225,000 in Gaza, about 140,000 in Lebanon and about 110,000 in the Syrian region of the U.A.R. Although appreciable numbers of refugees have been assimilated into the local economies, most are in a miserable plight, and rely heavily upon U.N.R.W.A.'s assistance.

U.N.R.W.A.

3. This agency was established by the General Assembly in 1949. It began work in May 1950, and its present mandate expires on 30th June, 1960.

4. Its tasks are to provide food, health services, education, training and shelter for the refugees; and, in the long term, to assist them to become self-supporting.

5. Recent annual budgets of the Agency have been between \$30 and \$40 million. Contributions are on a voluntary basis. The United States and United Kingdom bear the bulk of the expense, but Australia's contribution compares favourably with most others.

6. In view of the critical financial position of the Agency as revealed at the 12th Session (1957) of the General Assembly, the Australian Government increased its contribution for the 12 months ending 30th June, 1958 from £A.50,000 to about £A.89,000. An amount of ~~about~~ £A.85,000 was included in the budget for the current financial year. This will bring our total contributions to over £A.960,000.

7. It is noteworthy that, for the period 30th June, 1956 - 31st December, 1957, only 38 countries out of 82 members of the United Nations had pledged contributions.

Political Aspects

8. One of the basic resolutions on the Palestine refugee problem (194 (111) of 11th December, 1948) states:- "The General Assembly - Resolves that the refugees wishing



to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return, and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Government or authorities responsible".

9. However, no progress has been made towards implementation of this resolution, or towards a political settlement of the problem, largely due to the intractable attitudes of both Israel and the Arab States. The Arabs have insisted on repatriation (with compensation where applicable) as the only just solution of the problem, but the Israelis, despite vague indications of willingness to readmit limited numbers of refugees, now firmly reject repatriation in principle, largely on the grounds of security. They say that return to Israel is not repatriation, but alienation (i.e. Arabs in a predominantly Jewish community), and take the view that the Arab refugees should be integrated into the Arab countries. This is opposed by the Arab States concerned, particularly the U.A.R. and Jordan, who state they cannot absorb them owing to the basic weakness of their economies. Public offers have been made by Israel for the payment of compensation, under a number of conditions, the most important of which is the willingness of outside interests to make the necessary funds available. Nothing, so far, has come of these offers despite an offer some years ago by the United States to provide financial assistance towards compensation as part of a general settlement.

10. A proposal at the last Assembly for a study of the arrangements that should be made for the refugees after 30th June, 1960, when U.N.R.W.A.'s mandate expires, was strongly opposed by the Arabs who do not want to risk any possible interference with present arrangements for relief and maintenance, and was dropped. However, the Secretary-General has made it clear that he considers it his duty to look into the technical operation of U.N.R.W.A. with a view to submitting proposals to the next session of the Assembly.

11. The resolution on U.N.R.W.A. adopted in Plenary on 13th December, 1958, by 57 (Australia) - 0 - 20 (Arabs and Soviet) did not break any fresh ground, or suggest any advance towards a solution. It noted with regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees had not been effected; drew attention to the precarious financial situation of U.N.R.W.A.; requested the Secretary-General "as a matter of urgent concern", to continue his "special efforts" to secure additional financial assistance, and directed the Agency to pursue its programme for the refugees, bearing in mind the response to requests for funds. The Arabs opposed this resolution. Their attitude, in effect, was that, failing repatriation, the United Nations should bear major responsibility for the refugee problem and should make permanent and adequate arrangements for their care.

#### Australian Attitude

12. Our attitude was summed up in the following statement by the Australian representative at the last session of the General Assembly.



"The Australian Government has been a consistent contributor to the Agency, and we cannot regard with equanimity, to say the least, the possibility that those members of the United Nations who have contributed to U.N.R.W.A. may be expected to continue indefinitely to support the refugees. As a member of this Organization, and as a contributor, we have a real interest in an early solution of this vexed and contentious problem, and we have the right to assume that some progress towards a settlement can and should be made".

13. However, in view of the sharply divergent attitudes of both parties, no settlement appears in sight. The United Kingdom have been content for some years to pay up, and avoid political arguments about the refugees. But there has been increasing insistence in the United States Congress that continued United States support should be made conditional upon some progress towards a settlement. Australia has also repeated several times in the Assembly the need for some give and take by both Israel and the Arab states, and expressed concern lest United Nations contributions be accepted as the only solution to the problem. Mr. Carver's personal views on possible lines of advance would be of great interest.

(P. R. Heydon)  
Acting Assistant Secretary,  
Division II.

United Nations Political Section  
J.A. Forsyth/RM



37

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

LstL

I.1793

Dated: 29th January, 1959

1530

Rec'd: 30th January, 1959

0908

FROM:

(via leased channel)

Australian Mission to the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

UN52 UNCLASSIFIED.

Our telegram 442 of 17th June, 1958.

Secretary General announced on 27th January appointment of Dr. John H. Davis as Director of U.N.R.W.A. to succeed Labouisse. Davis is an Agricultural Economist and since 1954 has been Director of the Agricultural and Business Programme in Graduate School of Business Administration at Harvard. Press release SG/775 forwarded in tomorrow's bag.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIG.  
P.M.'s

30th January, 1959

SEC A/Ss LA UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA  
E.A.F&ME E AF&ME INF C&P

G

181/4/4



INWARD SAVINGRAM.

CONFIDENTIAL

..MMc

I.1735

Dated: 21st January 1959

Rec'd: 28th January 1959

FROM:

External Affairs Office,  
L O N D O N.SAV. EX. 54. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Washington EX.74, Austunat New York EX.20.

Hammaraskjoeld's Visit to the Middle East.

We have seen reports from the United Kingdom Mission, New York, dated 17th and 19th January, in the following terms:-

"When I saw Mr. Hammaraskjoeld on January 14th he gave me an account of his recent visit to the Middle East. His general conclusion, to put it first, was that, setting aside the problem of Communist infiltration and in particular the increase of Communist influence in Iraq, the situation both between the Arab states and with regard to the Palestine problem was better than it had been for a long time.

"In Jordan he had found the attitude of the leading personalities somewhat surprisingly changed. The King, who he felt suffered from the unwillingness of his advisers to tell him unpleasant truths, had complained that the U.N.E.F. was acting as an instrument of the Israelis, and had criticised Nasser and the Saudis for being soft towards Israel, and con-  
 vining at the passage of Israeli ships through the Gulf of Agaba. Hammaraskjoeld had done his best to persuade him that this attitude was mistaken and unwise. King Hussein had also complained about the difficulties over road traffic to Syria and the establishment of a United Nations office in Damascus, and was evidently still very sore about the aggressive action by U.A.R. planes against his aircraft last November. In this connexion Hammaraskjoeld had previously secured from Nasser a somewhat equivocal assurance, which he passed on, that no responsible official of the U.A.R. had intended any action which might cause King Hussein inconvenience.

"Hammaraskjoeld had found that Samir Rifai and Abdul Monem Rifai were now warm advocates of a rapprochement with the U.A.R., the latter because he regarded himself as the architect of the joint Arab resolution at the Special Session of the Assembly last August. It was Samir Rifai's dearest wish to be invited to Cairo. Hammaraskjoeld said that he thought this was unlikely, and that a more probable develop-  
 ment would be a visit by Fawzi to Amman.

"In Cairo Hammaraskjoeld had also found a disposition to work for improved relations between Jordan and the U.A.R. He would not be surprised if in the spring there were marked improvements e.g. a resumption of diplomatic relations. He had taken up directly with President Nasser the question of road traffic between Syria and Jordan and had been assured

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INWARD ~~SAVING~~ <sup>2</sup>GRAM. **CONFIDENTIAL**

I.1735

that all difficulties would be removed. Hammarskjöld said that he thought this assurance was genuine, and that the difficulties were purely local between the border officers on both sides.

"Hammarskjöld had had some discussion with Nasser about the concept of Arab co-operation. The latter had said that his principal concern was to promote the maximum amount of practical co-operation in different fields between the Arab states, regardless of political institutions. Hammarskjöld had remarked that this seemed to him very like the Commonwealth principle, in that it left the sovereignty of the states concerned untouched. Nasser had said that he was indeed prepared to accept this principle.

"In Israel Hammarskjöld had had a long talk alone with Ben Gurion at Sde Boker, during which he felt that the Israel Prime Minister had revealed his real opinions, particularly on the question of the Arab refugees. He had concluded that on this Ben Gurion was irrevocably opposed to the principle of free choice for the Arab refugees about returning to Israel. Ben Gurion had refused to accept Hammarskjöld's view that if such a choice were allowed in principle, in practice only a small proportion would wish to return, and that it would be possible, by negotiation with the Arabs in which the United Nations would play a part, so to arrange that this was so. Ben Gurion had argued that if he were an Arab leader he would see to it that the vast majority of the Arab refugees returned to Israel, and said he was convinced that if this happened it would spell the destruction of Israel. Ben Gurion therefore would in no circumstances be a party to it. He therefore saw no solution of the refugee problem, short of a general settlement which he agreed would be a long time in coming, probably not in his lifetime. He admitted therefore that U.N.R.W.A. or something like it, would have to be kept in being.

"Hammarskjöld said that though he was in no doubt that it was Ben Gurion's real opinion that no progress could be made over the refugee problem, he would obviously not admit to this in public, and must be expected to continue to press for action. Nevertheless he thought that it was of real value to him to know what Ben Gurion's basic view was. On all other matters connected with the Palestine problem he had found Ben Gurion relaxed. He had admitted that the type of limited arrangements which the United Nations had been able to make in relation to the Arab-Israel dispute was all that could be expected in present circumstances.

"Mr. Hammarskjöld made two other points of interest:

- (a) he said that he had been much impressed by the general attitude of the Sudanese, whom he had found 'delightful';
- (b) he had tried to persuade the Somalis, who had been disposed to regard him as champion of their cause because of his intervention in the debate during the last General Assembly about the

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
3.  
INWARD SAVINGRAM.

34  
CONFIDENTIAL

I.1735

Ethiopia/Somalia dispute in Addis Ababa, that his action had not been taken with any particular result in mind. He had found the Ethiopians inflexible. In both territories he had refused to be drawn on the substance of the problem and insisted that he must await the result of the arbitration before forming any opinion."

2. "The Secretary-General opened the conversation by speaking of his visit to Riyadh. He said that the King, Feisal and Azzam had each in turn discussed with him their grievances about Buraimi and Khor El Odeid. They had left him with the impression that they did not wish to weaken the British position in the Persian Gulf, which they regarded as a useful balancing factor in their policy. They had said that they could not see any essential conflict between British interests and their own. Feisal and Azzam had expressed themselves more moderately than the King, but they were clearly preoccupied with the question. They said that they felt it was necessary for them to take some action in the near future, and that their present idea was to take their complaint to the Security Council. They had asked the Secretary-General what he advised them to do and to consider whether he could take any useful action. He had replied that he would need time to consider the problem and would let them have his ideas, if any occurred to him after his return to New York. It would be quite easy for him to talk to 'his British friends'. But he had added that he had no hesitation in advising them immediately against recourse to the Security Council. In the light of what they had told him about their objectives, he was sure that a discussion in the Security Council would be damaging rather than helpful to their policy.

"Hammaraskjoeld had been impressed both by the 'softness' of approach and by the determination of the Saudis. He suggested that we should have a further talk on this in the next week or two. He would have to reply to the Saudis in about a month.

"I should be grateful to know what line you would like me to take when Hammaraskjoeld returns to this subject."

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.

29th January, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA  
E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL INTELL MR. EASTMAN

TEL AVIV

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181/4/4<sup>33</sup>  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SHA:SDP

I:1403/1404

Dated:22nd January, 1959.  
1330

Rec'd:23rd January, 1959.  
1045

FROM:

(Via Leased Channel)

Australian Mission to the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

U.N.37. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Washington for information. London for External,  
Savingsgram 5.

Secretary General's Middle East Tour.

The United Kingdom Mission has shown us Dixon's report to the Foreign Office of his conversation on 14th January with Hammarskjold regarding the latter's recent Middle East Tour. Following are the main points:-

- (a) Hammarskjold gained the general impression that apart from increasing Communist infiltration, particularly in Iraq, the situation between the Arab States and also regarding the Palestine problem was better than for a long time.
- (b) Samir Rifai (Jordan Premier) was keenly interested in rapprochement with the U.A.R. and Cairo was not averse. Hammarskjold inferred diplomatic relations might be resumed by the Spring.
- (c) Ben Gurion was opposed to giving Palestine refugees the free choice of a return to Israel and did not accept Hammarskjold's arguments that few refugees would in fact opt to return. Ben Gurion said that no solution to the refugee problem was possible without a general settlement and hence conceded that U.N.W.R.A. must continue its operations.
- (d) Hammarskjold had been impressed by the generally responsible attitude of the Sudanese Government.
- (e) In Ethiopia and Somaliland, Hammarskjold had refused to be drawn on substance of frontier issue pending results of arbitration. In Somaliland he had had to deny that he was a champion of the Somali cause and had tried to persuade them that he had no particular result in view in intervening in the United Nations debate on frontier question. (our telegram 1643/58 refers).
- (f) Hammarskjold had suggested in Cairo that Armistice line be marked on the ground northwards from Lake Huleh. Surprisingly, Nasser had agreed but there had been no reaction from Ben Gurion.
- (h) Saud, Feisal and Azzam formally restated Saudi case on Bura'i and Khor El Odeid but Hammarskjold had impression they did not wish to weaken general British position in Persian Gulf which they regarded as useful

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 - I:1403/1404

"balancing factor in their policy". Saudis requested Hammarskjold's advice on next step (which they feel must soon be taken) and suggested further reference to Security Council. Hammarskjold advised them against Security Council discussion which might be damaging to their objectives. Hammarskjold told Dixon that he would soon have to reply to Saudis request for advice.

2. United Kingdom Ambassador in Amman forwarding impressions on Rifai and Spinelli on Hammarskjold's discussions with Jordan Government said that Secretary General undertook to endeavour to persuade Cairo to finalise the United Nations Office in Damascus and to settle dispute over road transit through Syria. Regarding resumption of relations with the U.A.R. neither side seemed in any hurry and when an announcement is made the initiative will be stated to have come from both sides. Rifai will press for some control over activities of Jordanian emigres in Cairo but will apparently not make this a condition for resumption of relations. Meanwhile Jordanian anti-Nasser broadcasts have been suspended.

3. You will have seen Commonwealth Relations Office Telegram No.W.20 of 15th January which stated that the U.A.R. seemed to be stalling regarding the Damascus Office which Nasser had told the Secretary General should be merely a "communications office".

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
P.M's.

21 January, 1959.

(Paragraphs numbered as received).

CONFIDENTIAL



31

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**RESTRICTED**  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

I.22071

:JAS

Dated: 17th December, 1958  
1330  
Rec'd: 18th December, 1958  
0952  
(Via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

NY 1664 RESTRICTED

Carver's Visit. Your 876.

U.N.R.W.A. Liaison Office now advises that Carver's idea is to begin his tour at the beginning of February which would bring him to New Zealand during February and to Australia at the end of that month or the beginning of March. Carver is now in Europe and returns to Beirut in two-three weeks' time. U.N.R.W.A. Office has undertaken to let us have a firm itinerary as soon after his return to Beirut as possible.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
TREASURER & TREASURY  
P.M.'S DEPT.  
P.M.'S

18th December, 1958

SEC A/Gs. LA UN PAC&AM S&SEA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF C&P

G.

181/4/4.



RESTRICTED <sup>20</sup>

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SDP:SDP

**OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.**

Sent: 17th December, 1958.

1321

TO:

(Via Leased Channel)

Australian Mission to the United Nation,  
NEW YORK.

876. RESTRICTED.

Your 1653. U.N.R.W.A. - Carver's proposed visit.

Last sentence of your paragraph one as received reads: "His tentative plan is to leave Beirut at the beginning of March, and visit the United States etc. arriving in Australia in March".

2. We had understood from the New Zealand High Commission here, (memorandum was about to be sent to you), that Carver planned visit to New Zealand during February. Will you please check? In order to advise regarding suitability of dates it would be useful if you could obtain some closer approximation.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M.'s. DEPT.  
P.M.'s.

19th December, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA  
E.AF&ME AF&ME E INF C&P

TEL AVIV WELLINGTON

181/4/4



29

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM RESTRICTED**

I. 21872.

Dated: 15th December, 1958.

1700.

Rec'd: 16th December, 1958.  
1314.

TP:MP

(via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

NY 1653. RESTRICTED

From Walker.

Carver (Acting Director of U.N.W.R.A.) has approached me informally and indicated that he would like to pay a short visit to Australia early next year following his visit to New Zealand that has just been agreed to by Wellington. His main purpose would be to express the Agency's thanks for Australia's continued support towards the relief of the Palestine refugees and to establish personal contact with ministers and interested departments. His tentative plan is to leave Beirut at the beginning of March and visit the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and Indonesia, arriving in Australia in March.

It seems to me that a visit by Carver could be extremely helpful in promoting a wider understanding of the significance of the Arab Refugee problem in relation to the stabilisation of the Middle East situation and that the timing is appropriate in view of the fact that the question of the renewal of U.N.W.R.A.'s mandate will come up at the 14th Session of the Assembly. I would appreciate an early indication of your views, particularly whether some time in March would be suitable in relation to the movement of the Minister.

MIN.&DEPT. E.A.  
MIN.&DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M.'s DEPT.  
P.M.'s

16th December, 1958.

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TEL AVIV WELLINGTON

181/4/4

RESTRICTED



28

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

I. 21742.

:MP

Dated: 11th December, 1958.  
1500.  
Rec'd: 12th December, 1958.  
1203.

FROM: (via leased channel)

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

NY 1620. UNCLASSIFIED

PALESTINE REFUGEES.

Our 1617.

Paragraph 7 of Draft Resolution:

Begins:

Requests the Secretary General to arrange for the submission to the Fourteenth Session of proposals for the continuation of the United Nations interest in international relief and rehabilitation for the Arab refugees from Palestine and the methods of such continuation, such proposals to take into consideration the views expressed by the various members of the General Assembly and by the Advisory Commission of the Agency, and the rights of all parties as recognized by past resolutions of the General Assembly.

Ends

MIN.&DEPT. E.A.  
MIN.&DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M's

12th December, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN OR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SPA SA  
E.A.F&ME E AF&ME INF

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181/4/4



27

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

:HB

I.21851

Dated: 13th December, 1958.

2320

Rec'd: 14th December, 1958.

1443

FROM:

(via leased channel)

Australian Mission to the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

NY.1647 UNCLASSIFIED.

Plenary.

1. U.N.R.W.A. Resolution from special committee was adopted 57 (Australia) - 0 - 20 (Arabs Soviets).
2. Report on 2nd conference on peaceful uses of atomic energy. Draft resolution sponsored by members of advisory committee was adopted unanimously with 77 votes.
3. Report of credentials committee. Committee recommended that assembly take no decision on Hungarian credentials. Report was adopted by 79 - 1 (Hungary) - 1 (Guinea). There were several statements on Hungarian and Chinese credentials.
4. Effects of Atomic radiation. Resolution from first committee was adopted unanimously.
5. Plenary adopted fifth committee recommendations on cost of U.N.E.F. by roll call 43 - 9 - 26.
6. Outer space resolution adopted 53 - 9 - 19.

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MIN. DEPT. E.A.  
IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M's.

15th December, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN@ CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.A.F&ME  
E INF DL MR. EASTMAN

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181/4/4



## INWARD SAVINGRAM.

Dated: 3rd December, 1958

Rec'd: 12th December, 1958  
(Via air mail)

:HP

FROM:

Australian Embassy,  
WASHINGTON.SAV. 810 CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Austunat and copy London.

Palestine Refugees.

Following from Ludlow (United Nations Adviser, Near East Affairs) on December 2nd:

2. United States Congress, in making appropriation for relief of Palestine refugees in last fiscal year had added rider that funds could only be used if President made determination that progress was being made towards eventual solution of problem. President had made this determination, even though no progress was being made. In going before Congress for authorisation of funds for this fiscal year the State Department had explained the position and argued against further rider of this kind. Congress however, had added stiffer conditions, and had specified that of these funds could only be used for resettlement or repatriation. It was against this background that the United States was seeking resolution in the United Nations which would provide for study of alternative means for solving problem.

3. Arabs were both sensitive and intractable on issue of resettlement. Israelis were equally intractable on issue of repatriation. Position in United Nations had not been helped by differences between United Kingdom and United States. United Kingdom wanted softer approach which would not upset Arabs as much as terms of present United States draft resolution. Beasley appeared to envisage that study should only deal with rehabilitation and not repatriation or resettlement. United States, because of congressional pressure, could not accept this. Ludlow thought problem could be overcome in end by some changes in wording of United States draft resolution which would help to make it more palatable to Arabs, and consultations were taking place to straighten out United Kingdom and United States differences.

4. We understand from other officers in Office of Near East Affairs that some would have preferred not to have aroused Arabs over Palestine refugee problem. They believed problem was insoluble at present time. Ludlow, however, did not agree that problem was insoluble. He felt that if Israelis would agree to principle of repatriation they could insist on reasonable conditions which, in fact, would result in very few Arabs seeking repatriation and would provide lever to get concessions from Arabs on resettlement. Conditions which Israelis might attach to repatriation could, in Ludlow's view, reasonably include following:

- (a) Insistence that any Arab accepting repatriation to Israel would have to accept Israeli citizenship and serve in Israeli Army if necessary:
- (b) That Arabs accepting repatriation would not necessarily get back land they held previously but

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CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

**INWARD SAVINGRAM.**

-2-

I.21658

would receive other land from Israeli Government;

- (c) Repatriation would take place over period of several years and there would be quota for each year;
- (d) Arabs seeking repatriation would be subject to security clearance.

5. Arab countries would not like these conditions but it would be difficult to argue against their reasonableness and would open way for lump sum compensation for resettlement of those Arab refugees who were unwilling to agree to repatriation on these terms.

6. As matters stood refugee problem was, in fact, getting worse each year as result of high birth rate in refugee camps. Number of Arabs in camps had, in fact, doubled over last ten years.

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Min. & Dept. External Affairs.  
" " " Immigration.  
Treasury.

11th December, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME AF&ME  
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**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

SDP

I:21689

Dated: 10th December, 1958.  
2125

Rec'd: 11th December, 1958.  
1630

FROM:

(Via Leased Channel)

Australian Mission to the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

NY.1617. UNCLASSIFIED.  
Palestine Refugees.

After negotiations to produce agreed resolution had broken down following draft was tabled by Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States.

Begins:-

The General Assembly

Recalling its Resolutions 194 (III) of 11th December, 1948, 302 (IV) of 8th December, 1949, 393 (V) of 2nd December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26th January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6th November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27th November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4th December 1954, 916 (X) of 3rd December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28th February 1957, and 1191 (XII) of 12th December, 1957,

Noting the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and in particular the observations relating to the expiration of the Agency's mandate on 30th June 1960, and noting the report of the Advisory Commission of the Agency,

Noting with regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in Paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III), has not been affected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in Paragraph 2 of Resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

Having reviewed the budget prepared by the Director and having noted the endorsement thereof by the Advisory Commission of the Agency,

Noting with grave concern that contributions to the budget are not yet sufficient and that the financial situation of the Agency remains serious,

Recalling that the Agency is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations,:

1. Draws the attention of the Government to the precarious financial positions of U.N.R.W.A. and urges them to consider to what extent they can contribute or increase their contributions in order that the Agency may carry out relief and rehabilitation programmes for the welfare of the refugees;

2. Requests the Secretary General, in view of the serious financial position of the Agency to continue, as a matter of urgent concern, his special efforts to secure the additional financial assistance needed to meet the Agency's budget and to provide adequate working capital;

181/4/4



## INWARD CABLEGRAM

1.21689

3. Directs the Agency to pursue its programme for refugees bearing in mind the response to Paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

4. Requests the Director of the Agency, without prejudice to Paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III), to plan and carry out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees, and in particular programmes relating to education and vocational training;

5. Requests the host Governments to co-operate fully with the Agency and with its personnel and to extend to the Agency every appropriate assistance in carrying out its functions;

6. Requests the Agency to continue its consultations with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interests of their respective tasks, with particular reference to Paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III);

8. Expresses its thanks to the Director, Mr. Henry R. Labouisse, for the devoted attention he has given to the affairs of the Agency and the welfare of the refugees for the four years of his incumbency, to the Staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out its mandate, and to the Specialized Agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting refugees.

9. Request the Director of the Agency to continue to submit the reports referred to in Paragraph (51 Ø) of General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV) of 8th December, 1949, as modified by Paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 1018 (XI) of 28th February 1957.

Ends.

2. In introducing the Resolution the United States invited the Secretary General to indicate whether he considered operative Paragraph 7 was necessary to authorise him to submit proposals to the Fourteenth Session. The Secretary General said that he intended in any case to study the situation and make proposals to the Fourteenth Session. Sponsors then withdrew operative Paragraph 7. Resolution as amended adopted 44 (Australia) - 18 (Arabs, Soviets, some Asians).

3. The Special Political Committee has thus completed its Agenda.

Ø Corrupt Group  
Paragraphs numbered as received.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. 12th December, 1958.  
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIGRATION.  
TREASURY  
P.M's.

|     |         |    |       |     |        |       |       |
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| SA  | E.A.F&M | E  | AF&ME | INF |        |       |       |

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

27  
**RESTRICTED**

I. 21499.

Dated: 8th December, 1958.  
2025.  
Rec'd: 9th December, 1958.  
1630.

:MP

(via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

NY 1598. RESTRICTED  
PALESTINE REFUGEES.

Special Political Committee will take up this item again tomorrow. United States Delegation hope to table Draft Resolution tomorrow with United Kingdom, New Zealand and Netherlands as co-sponsors. Arabs are still being difficult on operative paragraph about the study. Following is text of this paragraph:

"Requests the Secretary General to arrange for the submission to the Fourteenth Session of proposals for the continuation of the United Nations interest in international relief and rehabilitation for the Arab refugees from Palestine and the methods of such continuation, such proposals to take into consideration the views expressed by the various members of the General Assembly and by the Advisory Commission of the Agency, and to take into consideration the rights of all parties as recognized by past Resolutions of the General Assembly".

MIN.&DEPT. E.A.  
MIN.&DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M.'s

10th December, 1958.

181/4/4

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SA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF  
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21  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

SDP

I:21390

Dated: 5th December, 1958.  
1850

Rec'd: 7th December, 1958.  
1152

FROM:

(Via Leased Channel)

Australian Mission to the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

NY.1568. UNCLASSIFIED.

The following Third Committee Items disposed of  
today in Plenary:

Item 31 - Refugees

Item 71 - World Health Year.

Voting on Resolution under Item 31 (see A/4001) was  
as follows:-

Resolution I - -59 (Australia) -9-6 (Soviet Bloc)

Resolution II - -59 (Australia) -9 (Soviet Bloc) -7

Resolution III - -60 (Australia) -0-10 (United Kingdom).

World Health Year Resolution adopted unanimously.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
IMMIGRATION  
HEALTH  
P.M's.

8th December, 1958.

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CONFIDENTIAL  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

MBP:JD.

I.20909.

FROM:

Sent: 28th November, 1958.  
2130.

Recd: 29th November, 1958.  
1336.

Australian Mission to  
the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

(via leased channel)

NY1504. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Washington for information, London (for External)  
Saving 172, Ottawa Saving 164.

Cameroons.

At Commonwealth Meeting this morning Cohen (United Kingdom)  
outlined developments leading to resolution for resumed session  
to deal exclusively with United Kingdom and French Cameroons.

U.N.R.W.A.

Noble said that negotiations were going on between  
United States and Arabs to agree on a draft resolution for a  
study.

Cyprus.

In reply to question from Jordan (South Africa), Lall said  
India was working on a draft resolution. He felt assembly should  
give some indication of direction in which negotiations on  
Cyprus should proceed.

Radiation.

Lall said U.S.S.R. had indicated that they would vote  
for but not co-sponsor Indian draft resolution. Moreover,  
Soviet statement would be uncontentious.

Algeria.

Lall said that according to Slim (Tunisia), debate on  
this item would last about one week.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
P.M.'S.

30th November, 1958.

SEC A/bs LA UN ER CR PACAM AMASP SASEA SA E.A.FAME F INF  
DL MR E. STMAN

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19

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

:HB

I.20808

Dated: 26th November, 1958.  
2203  
Rec'd: 27th November, 1958.  
1846

FROM: (via leased channel)  
Australian Mission to the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

NY. 1477 UNCLASSIFIED.

Repeated Washington for information.

Special Political Committee.

General Debate on Palestine Refugees concluded with statements by Saudi Arabia (Shukairy) and Israel in reply. No resolution has been tabled or is in sight. The Committee will tomorrow begin consideration of items dealing with the expansion of United Nations organs.

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MIN. DEPT. E.A.  
MIN. DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M.'s.

28th November, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN@ ER CR PAC&AM S&SEA SA  
E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF

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181/4/4



Name of Paper *The Canberra Times*  
*Canberra*  
 Published at .....

File No. *181/4/4 ME*  
 Date *27. 11. 58*

# Boredom Enemy In Gaza Strip

By ANTOINE YARED

GAZA (Associated Press). — "Gentlemen," said a suntanned young Danish officer to a group of correspondents standing atop a small hill, "this is Israel and this is the Gaza Strip."

Only an almost unnoticeable (2 ft.) ploughed line separates the refugee-packed Gaza Strip from Israel.

The area around that hill was almost deserted. Near by in the plain, a couple of Arab villagers were peacefully tilling their land. About 100 ft. up the hill, a United Nations flag fluttered in the cool autumn breeze atop an observation post.

Correspondents walked to the post. There two young Danish soldiers were standing guard. Their rifles were put aside near their binoculars. They were reading books.

The two Danish soldiers are members of the United Nations Emergency Force (U.N.E.F.), which entered the Gaza Strip on March 7, 1957, after the withdrawal of Israeli troops which, with Anglo-French forces, had attacked Egypt on November 29, 1956.

## Quiet Reigns

U.N.E.F. troops man similar outposts all along the 35-mile demarcation line. Their main task is to prevent anyone from crossing the line either from Israel or the Gaza Strip.

Since U.N.E.F. arrival here peace has prevailed over the area, in contrast to the tension which dominated the place before.

U.N.E.F. is also deployed along the 125 mile long Egypt-Israel international frontier and up to Sharm-el-Sheikh, which dominates the entrance of the Akaba Gulf.

When a couple of hundred young Scandinavian soldiers landed on November 15, 1956, in a battered airfield in the Suez Canal zone, as vanguard to U.N.E.F., veteran observers could hardly believe that U.N.E.F. would be able to pacify the then turbulent Middle East. U.N.E.F. had as its first task to supervise the withdrawal of Anglo-French forces from the Suez Canal zone. It was operating, due to the circumstances prevailing in the area, according to improvised plans.

## No Incidents

After two years service since it was created by United Nations resolution, U.N.E.F. is functioning smoothly.

In a recent address to U.N.E.F. on the occasion of U.N. day, Indian Colonel I. J. Rikhye, acting U.N.E.F. commander, paid tribute to his "Achievements of U.N.E.F. in properly fulfilling its task

it. These are: Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia. Since then three countries—Indonesia, Finland and Colombia—have withdrawn their forces.

The force is composed of 5,275 officers and other ranks. Of these, 2,500 are committed to operations.

## Five Sectors

The demarcation line along the Gaza Strip, which is divided into five sectors, is manned by Danor (Danish and Norwegian), Swedish, Indian and Brazilian contingents.

Motorised units of the Canadian and Yugoslav contingents patrol the rugged terrain of the Sinai Desert along the Egypt-Israel international frontier. The Swedes are also guarding Sharm-el-Sheikh, on the Akaba Gulf. In addition, the Canadian Air Force, using three U.N. small Otter planes, makes air reconnaissance over the vast Sinai Desert frontier.

Although U.N.E.F. soldiers are in the military service of their respective countries, they are under the command of U.N.E.F. commander General E. L. M. Burns, of Canada. Each contingent, however, has a national commander. Burns commands all units through respective unit commanders.

U.N.E.F. officials describing U.N.E.F. say that it is "indeed a unique force regarding its condition and formation."

Officials say that despite the language barrier and difference of living conditions and customs, goodwill exists among all contingents.

## Boredom

"We have a very happy force," these officials contend.

However, U.N.E.F. still has one enemy—boredom.

The Gaza Strip is typical Arab land where there are no amusements. The soldiers spend hours idly standing guard on the demarcation line. When they finish their guard duty, they have no other place to go but their camps.

U.N.E.F. welfare officers, however, have laid down extensive entertainment programmes to break this monotony.

These include: Movies shown almost nightly in all camps, cultural meetings, ex-

organised among the different contingents.

Finally, there are leave centres which U.N.E.F. officials say are very important to soldiers' morale. Each soldier spends one week after three months duty at these centres, with all expenses paid by U.N.E.F.

## Want To Stay

Officials say that, despite the grim outlook, some U.N.E.F. soldiers, mostly from Scandinavian countries, ask for renewal of their assignment at the end of their term of duty, which is normally six months.

U.N.E.F. officials praised local authorities and the Egyptian liaison staff for "full co-operation."

Officials express amazement at the way all matters connected with U.N.E.F. are being solved through meetings with Egyptian liaison staff.

Officials remark that U.N.E.F. is here as guest of the Egyptian Government, and will have to leave when asked.

However, in the meantime, U.N.E.F. officials are proud of their force, which they call "unique, efficient and happy."



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## No Incidents

After two years service since it was created by United Nations resolution, U.N.E.F. is functioning smoothly.

In a recent address to U.N.E.F. on the occasion of U.N. day, Indian Colonel I. J. Rikhye, acting U.N.E.F. commander, paid tribute to his soldiers.

"Achievements of U.N.E.F. of properly fulfilling its task under trying conditions are exemplified by the absence of any major incident and prevailing quiet since policing by it of the Gaza Strip and the international frontier. U.N.E.F. deserves credit for this," Rikhye said.

When U.N.E.F. was formed, 10 nations participated in

it. These are: Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia. Since then three countries—Indonesia, Finland and Colombia—have withdrawn their forces.

The force is composed of 5,275 officers and other ranks. Of these, 2,500 are committed to operations.

## Five Sectors

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U.N.E.F. welfare officers, however, have laid down extensive entertainment programmes to break this monotony.

These include: Movies shown almost nightly in all camps, cultural meetings, exchange of visits among different contingents, a library where soldiers can find books in their own language, and foreign entertainment troupes which visit the area regularly.

In addition, sports tournaments of soccer, volley ball, basketball, track and field, squash rackets and tennis are

organised among the different contingents.

Finally, there are leave centres which U.N.E.F. officials say are very important to soldiers' morale. Each soldier spends one week after three months duty at these centres, with all expenses paid by U.N.E.F.

## Want To Stay

Officials say that, despite the grim outlook, some U.N.E.F. soldiers, mostly from Scandinavian countries, ask for renewal of their assignment at the end of their term of duty, which is normally six months.

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17

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

I.20558

Sent: 21st November, 1958.  
1900  
Rec'd: 24th November, 1958.  
1453

ENM

FROM:

via leased channel.

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

NY1439 UNCLASSIFIED.

Special Political Committee: Palestine Refugees.

Iraq, United Kingdom, Sudan, Netherlands, Denmark, Peru and Roumania spoke today. Jawad (Iraq) said Israel's immigration policy would lead to Israeli expansion against Arab States. Israel was being used as a base for aggression by certain Western powers. Beeley (United Kingdom) stressed the need for more funds for U.N.R.W.A. The United Kingdom saw no immediate prospect for progress towards solution. Service of the type U.N.R.W.A. provides will have to continue after 1960. Supporting idea of study said the Assembly could not be expected to continue U.N.R.W.A. without examining whether agency is most efficient method of assistance to refugees. Study would not prejudice stand of parties. Sudan and U.N.R.W.A. should continue. The Netherlands supported study of technical needs of refugees. Welcomed Israeli proposal on compensation.

2. Committee agreed to hear statement by Tannous (Arab Refugees Office) on Monday. Eban expressed Israel's reservation.

MIN & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN & DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M.'s

24th November, 1958.

SEC. A/SS LA UN ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA  
E.A.F&ME E AF&ME INF CR

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16

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

I. 20509/10

Sent: 21st November, 1958.

2350

ENM

Rec'd: 23rd November, 1958.  
1408

via leased channel.

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

NY1436 CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 776. Palestine Refugees.

United States Delegation told us today that they have abandoned the idea of trying to get the Assembly to establish a Committee. They now accept the United Kingdom view that Labouisse should be asked to undertake study. (Labouisse has not yet indicated whether he would be willing to accept this task. They are experiencing great difficulty in persuading Arabs to go along with this modest proposal and they have sought the Secretary General's help. The United States have reasons to believe that the Arabs will agree to study by Labouisse provided the wording terms of reference are sufficiently vague and do not oblige the Arabs to retreat publicly.

2. The United States initiative for the Committee was taken because the United States Congress is known to be impatient at the continued United States contributions to U. N.R.W.A. When the question of future United States contributions to assist the refugees comes before Congress in 1960, the United States want to be able to demonstrate that they have made strenuous efforts to secure some progress.

3. The Canadian, New Zealand and Netherlands delegations all favour the United Kingdom proposal for one man study with limited terms of reference. In discussion, these delegations have made the following points:

(a) The Refugees problem cannot be settled in isolation from general political settlement. Accordingly, an initiative to which the Arabs are opposed would not seem very sound, unless the United States intended to mount a full scale diplomatic offensive in the next few years to put pressure on both Israel and the Arabs for an overall political settlement. There has been no suggestion from any quarter that the United States is disposed to do this.

(b) There is insufficient support to secure the adoption of a resolution establishing a Study Committee.

(c) International assistance to refugees will have to continue after 1960 whether or not U.N.R.W.A. is terminated. An enquiry into the most useful means of providing such assistance would be valuable. A study could be done more effectively by Labouisse, in whom the Arabs have confidence and with whom they would co-operate. It was stressed that the study would be made in the Arab countries not in Israel and that Arab co-operation would be essential. (The Israelis seem to be indifferent about the study). This is one reason why there is little support among

**CONFIDENTIAL**

181/4/4



15

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

- 2 -

I.20509/10

delegations for the proposal, because it appears to be directed solely against the Arabs, who appear to many to be the injured party.

(d) In the last ten days the United States has been preoccupied with extricating themselves from their stand and has made no attempt to secure support for their initiative from friendly delegations.

4. I believe there is much to be said for these views and in all the circumstances I do not believe there is any point in pressing further our views upon the United States.

MIN & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN & DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M. 's

24th November, 1958.

SEC. A/SS LA UN ER CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA  
E.A.F&ME E AP&ME INF

CONFIDENTIAL



14

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

SM:BMW

I.20539

Sent: 20th November, 1958.  
1945  
Rec'd: 24th November, 1958.  
1214

FROM: (via leased channel)

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

NY1430. UNCLASSIFIED.

Special Political Committee. Palestine Refugees.

Panama, Malaya, Morocco, Bulgaria, Canada and  
Tunisia spoke today.

2. Malaya said U.N.R.W.A. should continue. Every  
effort should be made to have refugees repatriated. Morocco  
and Tunisia presented Arab case in moderate terms. Canada  
supported study which should examine most appropriate methods  
of international assistance to the refugees. Welcomed Israel's  
statement on compensation.

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MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M.'s

24th November, 1958.

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|-----|--------|----|-------|-----|----|-------|-------|-------|
| SEC | A/ Ss  | LA | UN    | ER  | CR | PA&AM | AM&SP | S&SEA |
| SL  | EAF&ME | E  | AF&ME | INF |    |       |       |       |

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181/4/4



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

:ABK

I.20567.

Dated: 19th November, 1958.

2015.

FROM:

Rec'd: 23rd November, 1958.

1630.

Australian Mission to the  
United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

(Transmitted via leased channel)

NY1398 UNCLASSIFIED.

Special Political Committee Palestine Refugees.

Japan, Pakistan, Jordan, Yemen, Greece and Israel  
spoke today.

2. Japan said refugees should be allowed to return provided they were prepared to live peacefully. Pakistan made a strong attack on Israel for refusal to accept repatriation. Rights of refugees had precedence over the rights of the State of Israel. Jordan and Yemen presented Arab case in moderate terms. Eban replying to Shukairy said that discussion of repatriation should take into account unique character of Israel's position; a State surrounded by hostile forces. Israel's offer of compensation was made in an effort to break deadlock.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIG.  
TREASURY  
P.M.'S.

25th November, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN ER CR PAC&AM S&SEA SA E.A.F&ME E AF&ME  
INF C&P

G.

181/4/4.



INWARD CABLEGRAM.

12

::LStL

I.20203

Dated: 18th November, 1958  
2050

Rec'd: 20th November, 1958  
1057

FROM:

(via leased channel)

Australian Mission to the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

NY1399 UNCLASSIFIED

Special Political Committee. Palestine Refugees

Saudi Arabia, New Zealand, France, China and Italy spoke today.

In reply to Eban's statement yesterday Shukairy reiterated right of repatriation. Arabs were opposed to a study whether by Committee or an individual. As a means of advancing prospects of a solution he proposed that Labouisse be appointed United Nations Trustee for Refugee Property with the duty of administering property and passing on revenues to refugees. New Zealand called on all members to contribute to U.N.R.W.A. and supported proposal for study which should be an enquiry into the needs of the refugees. The refugees right to compensation or repatriation should be maintained. Expressed regret that Israel objected even to principle of repatriation.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIG.  
TREASURY  
P.M.'s

20th November, 1958

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR PAC&AM S&SEA SA E.AF&ME  
E AF&ME INF

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. **CONFIDENTIAL**  
**OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.**

REPEAT  
WASH.?  
::LStL

0.14500

TO

Dated: 19th November, 1958  
1835

(via leased channel)

Australian Mission to the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

776 CONFIDENTIAL

Your NY.1355 Palestine Refugees.

We are disappointed at reactions of other countries to United States proposal. We do not feel that United States initiative should be abandoned yet. "Technical enquiry" into refugees' needs as apparently envisaged by United Kingdom delegation would mean that opportunity to apply some pressure towards a solution would be missed.

2. Funds for U.N.R.W.A. are provided mostly by countries not in the region. As United States said on 10th November, contributors have legitimate interest in solution of problem. As a regular contributor we would like to see problem of refugees studied as proposed by Acting Director of United States (preferably the latter).

3. We would appreciate your speaking to United States delegation along above lines and if their reaction is favourable attempting in concert with them to stiffen other key delegations. We realise that Arab intransigence may in the end prevent any progress along lines we desire. Nevertheless opportunity might not occur again for some years to attempt to persuade Arabs to co-operate, or at least to demonstrate that our contributions may not continue indefinitely in face of continuing Arab obstruction.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (181/4/4)  
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIG.  
TREASURY  
P.M.'s

20th November, 1958

SEC A/Ss LA UNO CR PAC&AM S&SEA SA E.A.FINE  
E INF

X Cons requested to report include  
Washington in address.  
ADS 21/11

**CONFIDENTIAL**



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

AMENDED COPY.

....JD.

I.20092

FROM:

Australian Mission to  
the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

Sent: 17th November, 1958.  
2020.

Recd: 18th November, 1958.  
1324.

(via leased channel)

NY1372.

UNCLASSIFIED.

Special Political Committee-Palestine Refugees.

Statements were made today by U.A.R., Ghana, Israel,  
Cambodia and Australia.

2. The U.A.R. traced the history of the Palestine problem. Refugees should be repatriated or resettled with compensation. There was no need for a technical study and U.N.R.W.A.'s mandate should be renewed. Ghana said it was regrettable that Israel had not complied with assembly resolutions on repatriation and compensation. Eban (Israel) said refugee problem arose because of Arab aggression against Israel. Responsibility is not on United Nations but on Arabs to assist refugees. Permanent settlement of refugees in Arab states is feasible but problem has been left unresolved by Arabs as means for putting pressure on Israel. Opposed repatriation as solution because it would enlarge security\* of Israel and integration is only solution. If this were done and "if international assistance offered in 1955 were available Israel would be prepared to pay compensation, even before the achievement of a final peace settlement or solution of other outstanding problems"

3. The Australian representative congratulated Labrousse for his work. There was urgent need for Middle East settlement so that progress could be made with economic development. Most distressing feature in situation is problem of refugees. Expressed hope that there would be improvement in U.N.R.W.A.'s status in host countries. Since last year there has been improvement in U.N.R.W.A.'s financial position and funds are now available for activities in self supporting fields. This represents more positive aspect of assistance than mere provision of relief. Called on all member states to contribute to U.N.R.W.A. so that financial burden may be widely spread. As regards the future, there is not much hope of settlement and there is little prospect international assistance can soon be terminated. Australia does not regard this prospect with equanimity and as a contributor we have right to assume some progress towards settlement can and should be made. To assist in decision in 1959 on future of U.N.R.W.A. Assembly should make provision now for study of situation. Primary responsibility for progress towards settlement rests on parties.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.A.  
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M.'S.

\* Amendment

18th November, 1958.

SEC A/Se L. UN ER CR P.C.C.M. MESP SASMA E.L.F&ME  
E L.F&ME INP

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## INWARD CABLEGRAM.

1.20092

....JD.

FROM:

Australian Mission to  
the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

Sent: 17th November, 1958.  
2020.

Recd: 18th November, 1958.  
1324.

(via leased channel)

NY1372.

UNCLASSIFIED.

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MIN. & DEPT. EX.  
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
TREASURY  
P.M.'S.

\* As Received.

18th November, 1958.

SEC L/Se L. UN DR CR P.OLAN L.MSP SASMA E.L.F&ME  
E L.F&ME INF

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8

CONFIDENTIAL

181/4/4

18th November, 1958.

PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM

THE SECRETARY:

On 14th November you approved of the despatch of telegram 770 to our Mission in New York saying that we might wish to seek membership of the study committee which the United States had in mind on future arrangements for the care of the Palestine refugees, and seeking an assessment of our chances of securing appointment.

...

2. New York's telegram 1355 (attached) in reply indicates that the Arabs are adamantly opposed to the United States plan; that the Afro-Asian countries are unwilling to support it in view of Arab opposition; and that the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Canada and New Zealand incline towards the idea of a purely "technical enquiry" by one man into what United Nations action will be required for the refugees, this being in their view the maximum that the Arabs will accept.

3. If, as seems likely, the "technical enquiry" were to result in the extension of U.N.R.W.A.'s term by, say, another five years or the establishment of an alternative organization for a similar period, the opportunity for studying the refugee problem and perhaps making some progress towards a solution would have been lost until 1965. Even though the chances of achieving a solution are slight at the moment, it seems desirable that every effort should be made to have the problem re-examined, or at least that the Arabs should be made aware of the reluctance of some contributors to continue contributing indefinitely in the absence of any attempt to seek a solution.

...

4. A draft telegram to New York which aims at keeping the United States proposal alive is attached for your consideration. Mr. Munro concurs in general with the proposed text.

(J.C.G. KEVIN)  
Assistant Secretary

B. G. Dexter  
Africa & Middle East Sections

CC - [unclear] - [unclear]



## EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. 181/4/4

Date 18th November, 1958.

## SUBJECT

## PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM

FOR THE SECRETARY:

*Colle despatched 19/11*

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*hsk*  
(J.C.G. KEVIN)  
Assistant Secretary

*→ Mr B DEATER*  
B. G. Dexter  
Africa & Middle East Sections

CONFIDENTIAL



INWARD CABLEGRAM. **CONFIDENTIAL**

:HB

I.19986

Dated: 14th November, 1958.

2025

Rec'd: 15th November, 1958.

1943

(via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,  
NEW YORK.NY.1355. CONFIDENTIAL.Palestine Refugees.

Your 770.

The United States proposal for a study committee has run into difficulties. The Arabs are adamantly opposed to the proposal because they feel it might produce recommendations leading to reconsideration of the basic political issues. There is no disposition among the Afro-Asians to support a proposal to which the Arabs are opposed. The United Kingdom delegation doubt whether the United States resolution which has not been tabled would obtain a two thirds majority. The United Kingdom have suggested to the United States that a study be undertaken by one man, (they have Labrousse in mind) and that it be confined to a technical enquiry into what United Nations action will be required on behalf of the refugees. They believe that this is the maximum the Arabs will accept. United States Delegation are awaiting Washington's reaction. Netherlands, Canadian and New Zealand Delegations incline to United Kingdom view.

Feeling now is that proposal for Committee will not get much support and that the best possible outcome is something along the lines of the United Kingdom suggestion.

MIN. DEPT. E.A.  
MIN. DEPT. IMMIGRATION  
P.M's.

16th November, 1958.

SEC 1/88 LA UN@ CR PAC&M S&SEL SA E.A.F&ME  
E AF&ME INF

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*Decker*  
**CONFIDENTIAL**



COPY

OF LETTER FROM  
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS  
4510 EMPIRE STATE BUILDING, NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

5

18th November 1958

File 210/1/3

Memorandum No. 1088/58

F 181/4/4

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
Canberra. A.C.T.

Palestine Refugees

....

Attached are two copies of the statement made by  
the Australian Representative, Mr. Arnott, in the Special  
Political Committee on 17th November on this item.

for Delegation

MW/fab



4

STATEMENT BY THE AUSTRALIAN REPRESENTATIVE

PALESTINE REFUGEES

The plight of refugees in different parts of the world has been a matter of international concern and action for many years. Devastation of war and changes in political outlook have caused millions to leave their homes and countries and seek refuge and in many cases a new life elsewhere. Much has been done by this Organisation, its Agencies and by Member States to relieve the distress of the dispossessed and assist them to settle in new environments. Each organisation which has acted on behalf of the United Nations for the care maintenance and resettlement of refugees has served the United Nations and the international community with distinction. None has served it longer and more faithfully and diligently than the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. The present report of the Agency is eloquent testimony to the devotion and service of the Director and his staff to the well being of over one million refugees. At this point I think it would be appropriate if I were to express the Australian Delegation's and Government's grateful thanks to Mr. Labrousse, the former director, for the work he has done. We are most appreciative for the four years of faithful service he has given to the United Nations and to the refugees as the Director of the Agency.

This annual report serves to remind us, if that be necessary, of the deep conflicts and divisions that unfortunately exist in the Middle East. The continuation of the conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbours is a source of concern. A regrettable feature is that the countries of the area can ill afford a continuation of the existing situation. Their needs for economic development and for a determined attack upon poverty and depressed living standards are abundantly clear. A settlement in the Middle East would release resources and energies now being devoted to less fruitful purposes for economic and social development with the prospects of a better life for all peoples in the Middle East.

From a humanitarian point of view, the most distressing factor in the Middle East situation is the problem of the Palestine refugees who have for ten years lived in camps in the neighbouring countries. The material lot of the refugees may have improved a little in that time with the increasing organisation and efficiency of UNRWA. However, the frustrations of the dispossessed are not so easily remedied. The human condition of a million refugees must always be remembered in our deliberations in this Committee.

Mr. Chairman, I would like now to make one or two observations on matters contained in the Director's report.

The first of these deals with the Agency's status in the host countries. We have noted in Annex H of the report that the Agency has continued to experience difficulties and obstructions in the proper exercise of its functions and duties in the host countries. The Agency is the creation of the United Nations as a whole and as such its personnel should be accorded uninhibited movement and freedom from local restraint - all the more so as the Agency is engaged in the succour of Arab peoples in Arab countries. We would hope that there would be an improvement in this situation.

The second point on which I would like to touch at this time is the financial position of UNRWA. We are pleased to note that the grave financial crisis of the Agency, which was of such concern at our last session, has to some extent been overcome. We also note that there appear to be sufficient funds to enable the Agency to embark again on activities in the rehabilitation and self-support fields. As the Director has pointed out such programmes represent a more positive aspect of assistance to the refugees than the mere provision of relief. These programmes give hope of an escape from a dismal existence to useful and satisfying opportunities of education training and employment. Nevertheless, I do not believe we can be complacent about the financial position. The total Pledges of Contributions by Member States for the coming year fall below the Agency's budget for the relief, education and rehabilitation work. In our view, the financial burden of the Agency should be spread as widely as possible and we would support Mr. Carver's appeal to Member States for the provision of more funds to enable the work of 1959 to be carried forward fully and effectively. This is a humanitarian work in which all states should assist to the extent that proves practicable.



Perhaps the most important question raised in the Acting Director's report concerns the future activities by the United Nations on behalf of the refugees. The mandate of the Agency will expire in the Middle of 1960, some eighteen months away. At the very latest, the Assembly will at its next session be required to take a decision on the future of the Agency. Accordingly the Acting Director has prudently raised this question at this session and placed the alternatives before us. This is an important question and I would like to touch on certain aspects, as they appear to my delegation.

The first most important and perhaps most obvious point is that there is not much hope in the near future that this problem will be settled. There appears to be little likelihood therefore, that international assistance will be able to be terminated in a reasonable time. We are disquieted at such a prospect as all must be who would wish to see an end to the tension and bitterness; a tension which is an ever present threat to the maintenance of international peace and security in the area. The Australian Government has been a consistent contributor to the Agency and we cannot regard with equanimity, to say the least, the possibility that those members of the United Nations who have contributed to UNRWA may be expected to continue indefinitely to support the refugees. As a member of this organisation and as a contributor we have a real interest in an early solution of this vexed and contentious problem and we have the right to assume that some progress towards a settlement can and should be made.

UNRWA and its predecessor UNRPR have been in existence for a decade. At the Ninth Session of the General Assembly, the mandate of the Agency was extended until 1960. When the United Nations established this relief organisation there was a wide expectation and hope that some progress would be made towards a solution. The same hopes were expressed at the ninth session. Today unfortunately we find ourselves no nearer a solution. At the next session we will be faced with the need for a decision on the future of UNRWA. We do not feel that a discussion of such importance should be taken without careful preparation and examination. Accordingly, my delegation believes that we should now at this Session make preparations for the action that will be required in 1959. So that the General Assembly will be in a position to take a decision in the light of the situation now existing, we consider that it is necessary for a study and examination of the question to be undertaken. It may be that there are factors which have not hitherto been sufficiently taken into account. If so, the Assembly should have at its disposal a concise and objective analysis as a basis for appropriate action. We would hope that the parties most directly concerned would also see this proposal in this light and lend their support to it.

The Australian Delegation believes that it is incumbent upon the parties to recognize that upon them rests the primary responsibility to make some effort towards a peaceful reconciliation. We would hope there will be some modification of the inflexible positions to enable some progress to be made.



230.5.

Memo. No. 534/58.

18th November, 1958.

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
CANBERRA. A. C. T.

ARAB REFUGEES.My Despatch No. 4 of 18/10/58.

Press reports of the debate now proceeding at the General Assembly on the Arab refugees give some account of announcement by the Israel delegate, Mr. Eban, of some change in Israel's stand. The tenor of what he had to say, according to today's press, is as follows:-

"The basic solution of the refugee question lies in the integration of the refugees in the countries where they have been for the past decade and where they live among their own kinsmen.

"If such a solution by integration were actually carried out, and if the international assistance offered in 1955 were available, Israel would be prepared to pay compensation even before the achievement of a final peace settlement or the solution of other outstanding problems.

"We are now disposed to envisage a settlement of our compensation undertaking in advance of the settlement of other outstanding questions, provided only that substantive solution of the refugee problem were actually implemented."

2. Although this willingness on Israel's part to separate the refugee problem from the solution of Arab-Israel problems as a whole is a slight departure from Israel's attitude so far, my first impression is that it is no significant step towards a liquidation of the general refugee problem, and that it has been made to remove the impression that Israel is completely negative in the matter.

3. It is to be noted that it glosses over the fact that the refugees' lands have been fully integrated into the Israel economy, in which they have been productive for some years, and that there is no disposition at this stage to hint at any precision on what I consider two vital questions, the amount of compensation and the recipients. In this connexion, it is to be noted that - according to local press report - Mr. Eban said "it would be necessary to take into account the claims of Israel citizens who had the right to compensation for property left behind in Arab lands". If the clamour of the Austrian refugees is to be taken as any guide, the Israel citizens to whom Mr. Eban refers would insist on individual payments and would not content with an inter-government settlement in which the Israel Government would receive a global amount. Neverth-



less, there is no suggestion that individual compensation of the Arab refugees is contemplated under this new adumbration of Israel's attitude.

(Sgd) B. C. Ballard

(B. C. Ballard)  
Minister.